"Chandigarh's modern citizens, India's smart citizenry: (re)constituting subalternity"

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Abbreviations

- ABD: Area Based Development
- CIAM: Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne
- CII: Confederation of Indian Industry
- CPM: Chandigarh Master Plan - 2031
- EWS: Economically Weaker Sections
- GASM: Ghar Adhikar Sangharsh Morcha
- HLRN: Housing Land Rights Network
- ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies
- NIUA: National Institute of Urban Affairs
- PPP(s): Public-Private Partnership(s)
- SC(s): Smart City/Cities
- SCM: Smart Cities Mission
- SCP(s): Smart Cities Proposal(s)
- SEZ: Special Economic Zone
- SFS: Students for Society (Punjab University)
- SPV: Special Purpose Vehicles
- SU: Smart Urbanism
- RTC: Right to the City
- WB: World Bank

1. Introduction: challenges of today, citizens of tomorrow

Once geometric urban centers now networked information systems; on the quest towards functional optimization, 20th-century representations of modern urban planning have reshaped *the grid* from Garden to Smart Cities. In addition to the preponderant role of top-down master planning, both paradigms coincide on the concern for environmental protection via demarcating specific zones for concentric development (i.e. 'smart hubs'). Moreover, even if its utopic value is still highly questioned, due to dystopian outcomes (depending on the scope and scale of analysis), its transnational influence well beyond the UK seems undeniable. How did such ideals reach global expansion? - we wonder. Why, if researchers and policy makers have abundantly argued the need of understanding life quality improvements starting from localized contexts, do think tanks and IOs keep asking if the Global South is capable of coping? Born and bred amidst rapidly expanding neoliberalism, critiques to the Smart Cities (SCs) paradigm range from the privatization of personal information (big-data, stalker economy (Taylor 2016)) to the negligence of public services (formerly duty of the state). What are the conditions upon which inhabitants of certain locations gain or are rather deprived of the 'smart citizenry' category? Which rights are at stake amidst such hierarchical differentiation of citizenship?

Especially in Asia much has changed since industrial capitalism globalized; not only colonial powers, but especially 'developing nations' became focal locations for rapid urbanization as well as technological development. As African and Asian demographics and economies grow the fastest – accompanied by rising inequalities; unsurprisingly, not Wall Street's 1%, or Europe, the world's largest consumers, but cities in the Global South are crafted as faces of decay (Vidal 2018). Yet in parallel, with the aim to control its populations and resources, in a similar colonial fashion, *the South* is pressured by its presumed responsibility for global environment. No longer can 'crowds in the South' (Pearce 2018) be governed by infrastructural and bureaucratic chaos. The Urban Age has to be managed by 'world class government' (Kakabadse et al. 2011). What does this imply for citizenship imaginaries? Kavita Philips (2010) asks: "We see a transition from colonial modernity, but to what? The 3rd World comes of age - she responds- as it becomes an equal citizen in the age of globalization earning subjectivity under the sign of the brand". In contemporary India,

more concretely, this means that the growing number of consumer and lifestyle aspirations grant it not only the 'biggest democracy' title, but- while planning expertise towards the use (and abuse) of information and communication technologies (ICTs) is determinant to sustain optimism on 'cities-as-engines-of growth' (P. Khanna 2016), which displaces sentiments of environmental, thus civilizational disasters – policy makers and investors crucially started seeing India as one the world's 'biggest smart market'. From this viewpoint, it does not only seem feasible to build and multiply SC in the Global South, it also entails an excellent business (WEF 2016).

As cities become the main site to enact technological solutions (Merricks White 2016, 584), for technocrats any kind of issue- from inefficient waste management to happiness (Brdulak and Brdulak 2017)- becomes a challenge to be tackled. The idiom of crisis and renewal in urban planning (Ponzini 2016) is utilized by World Bank (2012), UN-Habitat, consultancies and corporations, in order to promote SC as the sole convenient path anywhere: "where they do not exist, they should be created" (Slavova and Okwechime 2016, 15). Emerging in the 90s in California, yet quickly proliferating across the US, EU and UK; the paradigm now reaches promotion climax across the Global-South (Bouskela et al. 2016; Manda and Backhouse 2016; Kumar 2017). Who would have expected, i.e. that the Bandung Conference (originally 1955 aimed to fight colonialism) would denominate its most recent Asian-African Summit as "Smart Cities for Civilization Advancement" (Saragih and Dipa 2015)? Hence, even if SC priorities are traceable to– a rather politico-economical, than geographical- *Global North* (Datta 2015); we may attend possibilities for fresh inter-Asian (Pandey 2014) dialogues. India, after China (Chandrasekar, Bajracharya, and O'Hare 2016) the world's second smartphone market (Russell 2017), and soon to become the third largest market, in general (Rapoza 2017), could not be disregarded but had to be primordially included in this $ 1,5 trillion business (Liu and Puentes 2015, 58).

In June 2015 India launched its '100 Smart Cities Mission'. However, the only novelty (in comparison to JnNURM) of this policy turned out to be its competitive format, wherein 100 cities would be selected as loci for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) investments. As the SCs framework further legitimizes corporatizing policy-making it is expectable that, apart from financial inclusion, not much will change for

already marginalized groups in spatial, economic and digital senses. Nonetheless, there have been significant efforts to promote a presumable *participative, sustainable,* and *inclusive* approach. How is this e-governance discourse performed? Are apps, pictures of meetings and future infrastructure; or diagrams of consultations enough to simulate participation and, thus, pacify right to the city (RTC) reclamations?

Since the digital is not immaterial (but should at least be thought in terms of industrial relations), it cannot be apolitical. One of the clearest examples derives from analyzing the entanglements between IT and water politics. Beyond intrinsically linking land dispossession (expansion of the city, shrinking of agricultural land) (AP News 2011), both are negotiated along caste/class, gender hierarchies, which consequently facilitate or restrict someone's positioning in the knowledge (IT) economy (Dasgupta 2015). The point is by the time governments and corporates advertise SCs, India[1] faces the 'worst water crisis in [its] history' (Banerji 2018). Meanwhile National Geographic tells us not to exaggerate (Richter 2012), yet not only when water is exported can it create profits. Paradoxically, 'investments in technologies and programs' are advocated as the 'only way out of water scarcity', and the 'best way to make money', in parallel. Yet there is a significant difference between 24/7 circulation- concentrated in middle-/upper class sectors- and limited water access, abusive sensors or no service for 'illegal encroachments', which due to increasing contamination could be even more expensive for the poor: too risky to take from public pipes, if possible buying from tankers. Earlier the *developmentalist* discourse (exemplified by Nehruvian India, i.e.) at least demanded social welfare. Now the digital wave of modernization attempts to obliterate all kind of reclamations for basic infrastructure improvements by setting SCs as a higher goal. Nonetheless, extending much beyond 'the urban', ICTs increasingly connect subjects (in addition to social networks) through big-data sensors. Consequently, even if we have learned that over-emphasizing dichotomies is a common Euro-/anthropocentric strategy for domination (*coloniality/modernity* two sides, same coin) as it enables denying (human/nature, north/south, i.e.) interdependencies (Santos 2014); totally blinding urban/rural divides can incur in universalizing experiences. Yes, Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid (2013) present strong arguments to conceive overall trends and flows within a process

[1] Similarly to South Africa: businesstech.co.za/news/it-services/216683/wi-fi-to-be-seen-as-a-utility-in-2018/ thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2018/01/07/wifi-but-no-water-can-smart-tech-help-a-citys-poor/

of 'planetary urbanization'. However, *the Urban* or *the Digital Age* is not *enjoyed* by all human beings the same. Therein relies the relevance of so-called *subaltern* differences. As Ananya Roy (2015) reminds us, not only is *the urban* separated from *the rural*- its 'constitutive outside'-, in order to establish 'categories of governance', but at the same time acknowledging the historical, hence, incomplete character of *the urban* prompts us to focus in inequalities, since these entail a diverse source of ontological struggles, a vast potential for alternative futures. For some celebrated as *effective management* (Christensen 2006), others would denounce SCs as the *embodiment of a society of control* (Krivý 2018); at what point does housing, rather than surveillance occupy concerns for 'smart citizenry'?

1.1 Research question: a modernist loop?

Housing, beyond water (a fundamental human right, in India attached to the Right to Life), highlights material interdependencies of digital/SC discourses. Three years after launching the Mission, Modi's government has been five times slower than the former in constructing housing (Vivek 2017). Thus, taking into consideration the intrinsic relationship between adequate housing, health, working, and education opportunities, which should be granted rights, in order to exercise (smart) citizenship *fully* - we ask: does the SC paradigm enlarge or restrict the RTC in India? Furthermore, on what conditions does the RTC rely? For whom (HLRN 2017)? Are we talking about 100 SCs or 100 smart enclaves? In this dissertation, I propose three dimensions for empirical research: *epistemic - Who's to decide what a proper environment is?* (SC globalization and its introduction in India); *material - Who is to profit from it?* (PPP scheme); and *civic - To what extent fitting-in or subverting the grid? (Participation)*.

Due to the novelty of the policy, only two ethnographic studies published to date have analyzed SC politics in India from the perspective of a variety of actors, whose lives are already (not merely in a future scenario) affected, considering they have been deeply related to territorial contestations: from opportunist land dealers (Varghese 2017), to peasant/land rights movement (Datta 2015). Throughout Varghese's research on the *developmental* discourse in Kerala, i.e. "the virtual did have real effects, as land acquired or as the gross ecological and livelihood transformations

across the region". Further, in light of the Kadambra River's co-option for PPP-tourism and IT, Varghese concludes, "the materiality of urban processes is best exemplified in regional contexts and personalized narratives of inclusive exclusions" (2017, 89). On the other hand, Datta describes how peasant movements in Gujarat act as bottlenecks to the Delhi-Mumbai Corridor. In spite of such relevant contributions, none considers the institutionalization of *e-governance* as another strategy for capitalist accumulation. By not only harmonizing normative visions on urban infrastructure, but also on citizens' behavior, this research is principally concerned on the way the construction of 'smart citizenry' facilitates or endangers the RTC.

Inspired by the empirical and conceptual attention that Henry Lefebvre dedicated to the reconfiguration of RTC struggles through daily life interactions, wherein citizen's 'tactics' challenge *top-down* 'strategies' (De Certeau 1984)- usually feared for determining citizens whereabouts – I attempt to demonstrate that even in Chandigarh, an acclaimed icon of modernity, which optimal planning was supposed to dispense with politicization; the SC has not been introduced without contestations of a history characterized by *inclusive exclusions:* celebrating elitism while denying citizenship, and *generic exception*ality: concentration of resources within an aspirational hub by arguing uniqueness. Choosing Chandigarh as a case study, consequently, points at questioning the epistemologies, materiality and civics of master planning, much deeper and prior to SCs. What Le Corbusier fanatics do not tell is that despite isolationist efforts, such experiment could not detach modern infrastructure (roads and buildings), from conservative social structures; anchored in the patriarchal history of Partition and caste feudalism (Kalia 1987). Similarly, digital nationalism is nurtured by the international discourses and imaginaries of *smart* as *pro-active citizens*, however the same grid (planned city) that separated modern residents from those, who constructed it- working classes inhabiting *the temporal, the informal* (Sarin 1986) – now marks the difference between *users/consumers* and *their servers*. Consequently, instead of being a limitation for SC's inclusiveness, the segregationist identity of Chandigarh offers stable grounds for the SC's proposal to cement inequalities, while the seal of heritage may be useful to displace questionings. Nonetheless, if this city/citizenship model is entirely successful for disciplining subjects is a question, which cannot be predicted, but learned from empirical contestations.

As mentioned above, Garden Cities, the Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM), and now the Smart Cities Challenge entail significant transnational attempts to establish universal norms of 'urban living'. Unfortunately, the 'genius' of its thinkers has concentrated attention in iconic examples (commonly *metropolis*), while there has been much less research on precisely *how, when, why* did adaptation paths vary across a broader radio of influence throughout (post-) colonial territories. Prototyping cities has not resulted in entirely top-down exercises, as Laura Bigon (2016) reminds us, but the 'variegation, multiplicity, and transformative capacity of scale-specific, locally 'embedded' projects depending on distinctive national, regional, cultural, institutional contexts entail a rich source for diversified conceptualizations of 'the good city'. In parallel, ongoing negotiations of rights so as conflicts, due to citizenship reclamations in arguable segregationist endeavors; might explain the shift that SCs undertook from an initial focus on technology and infrastructure, towards incremental efforts to justify citizen-centeredness. In order to understand *whether the RTC is (systematically) enlarged/restricted*, we will initially ask: *how is smart citizen-ry constructed (internationally)? What has been the Indian path and expansion scope?*

Secondly, bearing in mind that the SC paradigm undoubtedly exceeds 'the urban' in terms of process (labour and resources), this explorative research has been importantly informed by *smart or world-class/slum, informal/planned, physical-labor /knowledge-worker* interdependencies. At the same time the search for ontological differences, which would privilege 'other' practices, knowledges, rights, and needs has been also a common theme to inquire *whether SCs further endanger the RTC of the already marginalized. Thus, how are SCs contested? Is the 'smart' scenario fertile (for the 'right to centrality' regarding housing and work, e.g.) or rather wretched for diminishing socio-spatial injustices (manifestations of hegemony-subalternity)?* Does Chandigarh as case study corroborate the optimism on a so-called *"chatur citizen-ry?*

Chandigarh is the living proof that planning (far from objective, or scientific (Rittel and Webber 1973)) requires faith (J. C. Scott 1998). It is further accompanied by myths, for example that 'slums', either don't exist or accommodate a lazy mafia. Consequently, technocratism should not only be questioned on the basis of "transparency", i.e. whether ICTs could help decision-making process; but what kind of content and political will (i.e. tackling gentrification (Hoyng 2016)) is implicit?

This is how the SC's policy coincides with Slum-Free demolitions even if no one voted for the precise 'reallocation' (marginalization) of 'rehabilitation' projects, which by the way have repeatedly been awarded. This reminds us about Kavita Philip's (2010) critique of Lyotard's division of humanity in "one part facing the challenge of complexity, the other that ancient and terrible challenge of its own survival." However, the "new rhetorical split: between the fetishized constructions of a new kind of technohuman, transcending the organic, and the displacement of an elder construction of pre-technological subjects without history, mired in the muck" - does no longer sound to a 1st/3rd world divide. If there are two Indias as Ravinder Kaur (2012) suggests, 'smartness' traces the line, so that inequalities are not shameful, but credentials to demand or even to aspire a certain lifestyle are granted only on the 'world-class' corner. SCs are rarely about flagging off sustainable innovations, rather they intend showing there is no need to go to Canada or Europe, if ICTs facilities are at home, in Chandigarh. The SC is herein questioned not, due to a future warning, but because past and present (socio-spatial) injustices seem to remain untouched. However, even if SCs tend to attempt performing democratic procedures, claims for unfulfilled rights (gender, basic services, housing) to/in the city will not be eradicated that easily. Not everyone is capable of paying for the basics, nor is trained or legitimated to foreground fights. Notwithstanding, for the exercise and recognition of 'smart' citizenship rights, more than ICTs, socio-economic resources are paramount. Empirical research shows *unregulated autonomy*, because of exceeding control, is highly menacing for the SC ideology. The auto-constructed city does not oppose to technological advancements (say infrastructure), in fact, once in place, successfully or not, 'citizens will crack it' by learning/adapting very quickly (Bhan 2015). Yet as the trend goes: expansion of the SC paradigm, restriction of resources, ergo failure on its implementation; it cannot be expected only hegemonic tools or categories work; but for activists it is vital to build alliances and trust outside, rather than within *smartness*. As for now the recognition of *chatur citizenship* has not shaped RTC reclamations, but especially right to housing is defended, because the city grows at the expense of their work. Even if the credential economy expands its domain (IT/on English), not only 'urban', but also aspiring citizens with one foot in the village or small town, another in the 'smart hub', might see this as an empowering opportunity. If simulating or differing from elites' aspirations that is an issue for further research.

1.2 Methodology

I divide the research question into two parts. The first one (chapters 2 to 4) deals with the top-down theorization of 'smart citizenship' as it can be observed throughout corporation strategies, consultancy reports, and even academic depictions of a *globalized 'smart' utopia*. *Mandatorily* citizenship is redefined via an increasing use of ICTs upon which not only inequality divides, but also novel civil rights rely. Chapter 2 illustrates how even though the imaginary of 'smart urbanism' is naturalized as inescapable modernity, such is historically traced to a Cold War *rationality* (following Halpern (2014) should not be taken as *reason*) transposed into Silicon Valley's neoliberal dynamics. The development of the discourse 'from *planetary urbanization* to *human-centeredness*' shows its resilience, yet not its depth. Collaborative enterprises are seldom *grass-rooted* enough to trust as *anti-hegemonic*. The following chapter (3), therefore, calls into question the potential of the SCs idiom to enlarge or restrict the *Right to the City*, particularly from the perspective of *subalternity,* as an umbrella term for those who are yet considered to be on the opposite side of 'smartness' (rural, poor, old, Global-South). Significantly, Indian scholarship has enriched our understanding of *subaltern urbanism,* which describes how *political* (instead of simply *civil*) *societies* (Chatterjee 2004), actively (*performative*) reclaim their rights (instead of patiently expecting such recognition). By analyzing available ethnographic studies on the smart cities project in India so far, we will contest the construction of a *smart ('chatur') subalternity*; indeed useful for excluded categories from the *smart ideology*. Chapter 4, more concretely, looks at the implementation path of India's 100 Smart Cities, which certainly implies exclusive roles and benefits for a restricted section: 'smart people'; meaning *it's not for all*. In order to examine how the Indian state visualizes the *smart Transform-nation*, we will critically analyze the Mission Guidelines throughout *epistemic, material, civic dimensions,* which lead us to understand to what extent PPPs endanger the RTC of *the subaltern*. Newspaper articles, graphic exemplars, and expert interviews (Indian and European bureaucrats) support our skepticism towards 'smart' promisy-making of sustainable and inclusive futures. Chapter 5 involves the major substance to respond to the second part of our research question: *how is the vision of 'smart-citizenry' contested by bottom-up engagement?* Complemented by historical and contemporary accounts on Chandigarh's (a famously acclaimed, yet not less criticized experiment of

modernist planning) uniqueness, the case is elaborated upon the voices of activists, scholars, citizens, and technocrats showing how such imposition of "smart urbanism" is, in fact, trembling, due to the citizen's skepticism towards Indian bureaucracy, in general, and due to a tradition of middle-/upper-class lifestyle, which characterizes the apathy of comfortable citizens to changes, more precisely, based on the aesthetic and classist myths about the legitimate citizens of Chandigarh in contrast to dehumanized outsiders. Paralleling the discourse of modernist master planning, 'smart' policy-making becomes instrumental to advance capitalist luxuries (*city experience*) amidst at times hidden, mostly celebrated (heritage; cultural superiority) socio-spatial inequalities. Numerous interviews confirm the fallacy of optimism on 'smart technologies' if hoping living conditions (intrinsically RTC) of the working classes (Le Corbusier and even less the current state ever thought about) improve through 'smart urbanism'. On the contrary, the diversity of empirical sources points at an inefficient and corrupt administration serving PPPs commands. The highly promoted *collaborative endeavor* is uncovered as a farce, once the performance of e-democracy/e-governance is criticized by experienced activists, who altogether (in spite of varied backgrounds and focus) rather advocate for constructing a long-term, grass-rooted dialogue *with* the marginalized. Finally, the discussion sums up all the arguments that support distrust on the SC model, as well as on the constitution of a 'smart citizenry' as a viable way to exercise the *RTC*, especially favoring those who need infrastructure, services and accountability improvements the most. Yet, activist coalitions do not merely ask for *inclusion* in the SC, rather their opposition to *smartness* is constructed via subversive channels, topics, and solutions proposed by the *Mission*. Nonetheless, in parallel, ICT education becomes a determinant source for credentials to work, participate (e-governance), and even contest the (smart) city.

The entire research process was oriented by interviews and participant observations, wherein doubtlessly my geographical and institutional background, together with the description of my research purpose played important roles. The fact that I am a young woman, for instance, favored me (contrary to expectations), since it generated an idea of naivety and openness, which allowed interviewees to extensively (the dominant logic and dynamics of the city, e.g. had to be explained to me from the beginning) justify their position (leading questions where formulated for each occasion, still

flexible to spontaneous interests as can it be noted in the appendix), without perceiving me as a competitor. This was especially useful to combat distrust, because I was not identified with an Indian (JNU, i.e., would have generated repudiation), but with a German institution. The pride of been taken into account by a researcher from Humboldt University, however, often vanished in the faces of bureaucrats once seeing that my phenotype does not fit with German stereotypes. On the other hand, my South American origin was crucial, particularly for activists, who, got the impression I understand *how cities from the Global South work* (in terms of neoliberal dynamics; shameless PPPs and state abuses). Within Chandigarh, charaterized by a recent history and small social circles (often public figures), the communication with forthcoming interviewees was facilitated on a recommendation basis. Only that way I made contact with high-profile bureaucrats, although it has to be emphasized that it was almost impossible to reach the top ones. I faced hostilities from *experts* (old-men) once challenging their vision of the city (especially pride), hence their political/human ideology. As a reaction, responses would be less bland, firmer (i.e. realizing their own contradictions when developing ideas and arguing further). A common way of starting interviews, which worked all across class and space was: *Since when or how come Chandigarh?* English was unproblematic for bureaurats (anyways expected to articulate national policies in common idiom), activists (except for a couple, who prefered Punjabi), IT workers, and citizens in the mall (language clear sign of class). Otherwise, I would have appreciated the possibility to dialogue with street vendors and understand the conversations in the *bastis*, which in most cases attracted the attention of citizens from all ages; often not mere curiosity, but an evident desire to be heard. Even though the experience and support (as guides and mediators) of activists (chiefly GASM) was vital, since I do not speak Hindi (in contrast to most migrants coming from neighboring states), it was very hard to initiate conversations directly on 'smart cities'. Although the term is not clear to the majority; 'smartnes' is already loaded with meaning: tech/modern/civilized/clean. Altogether, this sets the limits of the current, while initiates possibilities for further research; looking at daily negotiations/contestations, such as the formation of digital working classes (Qiu 2016, 2018), in a much deeper, relational, and comparative manner, i.e. by following the interaction, mobilization, and use of ICTs – in their own languages and purposes – in order to consider diversifying ways of reclaiming space, meaning and resources.

2. From *smart mandate* to *citizen-centeredness*: a genealogy

Initially mentioned in the 60s, yet truly becoming influential during the last decade, this chapter explores the incremental evolution of SC formulations by positioning 'smart citizenry' at the heart of our inquiry. Initially "top-down, techno-centric, and technocratic examples of solutionism serving the interests of corporations and governments rather than actually improving the quality of life for actual citizens" (de Waal and Dignum 2017, 263) concerned critical scholars and social movements. Prompt responses on the part of its proponents, mainly corporates, consultancies and policy makers, who increasingly rely on research papers, in order to justify the *smart enterprise* (Cosgrave, Doody, and Walt 2014; Neirotti et al. 2014) were forced to include *social* justifications, in order to defend *citizen-centeredness*. The manifold ways of conceiving the forms, channels, and degree of citizen participation is an evident sign of unceasing contestations to a paradigm, which is certainly not a universal, nor determinant monolithic. Abstract definitions and multiple connotations could indeed facilitate a fruitful scenario for citizens to intervene and reclaim broader RTC recognition. Yet, simultaneously, the variety of smart policy configurations exemplifies resilience, which sustains neoliberalism, instead of making it tremble due to the lack of creativity of it defenders. A quick view at SC presentations held by IBM, Frost & Sullivan, as well as India's Ministry of Urban Development suffices in order to realize visual and conceptual commonalities. SCs are defined by an accumulation of technological services that facilitate management (pic.1), wherein smart citizens are user/consumers subsumed to the list of services, whose participation is counted, validated, simulated through the use of ICTs. Further, charts of geographical extension give the impression that one is on the right path, such trend is inescapable (pic.2). Analogously, scholarly discussions on 'smart citizenry' not only shape our questions, motivate our skepticism, and offer us terminology, but they also encourage us to inquire to what extent does the Indian SCs' path inherently develops from recipes and conventions tried out elsewhere. Altogether, the debate on smart citizen-centeredness informs the context wherein Indian policy makers could anticipate or respond to former critiques, by relying on consultancies and *handholding agencies*, which should assure that each Smart Cities Proposal is in tune with the overall (politico-economical) objectives of India's Transform-nation Mission. An

interesting example is how a Lighthouse Cities report (NIUA 2016) makes 'participatory decision-making' an obligatory quantifiable criteria, even though no qualitative illustration could show how precisely these dialogues evolved and if they are expected to sustain. Overall, this short SCs' genealogy attempts to demonstrate how, instead of embracing expert knowledge in such an arrogant manner so that citizen perspectives are entirely rejected, the main difference between modernist planning (à la Le Corbusier) and SCs is that in the latter policy makers face growing pressures to include citizen participation. From this viewpoint, rather than a hotbed for grass-rooted propositions, SCs epitomize huge politico-economical laboratories nurtured by transnational discussions on 'smart governance', wherein concepts and PPP modalities are incorporated, in order to facilitate the acquisition of land (for greenfield development, special economic zones, or IT hubs). Whether this materializes without uprisings is a broad, mid-, and long-term matter of discussion. At this stage, however, we opt to concentrate on scholarly debates on *what defines a SC?* Initial pilots (Carvalho 2014) have been largely criticized, due to its evident authoritarian ideology. Yet this has not stopped scholars to think whether increasing 'local embeddedness' would lead to *'smart initiatives'*, which could actually favor communities. Still, none of these perspectives argue the need of becoming or constructing a *'smart citizen-ry'*.

2.1. Climate change, untapped markets and other crises

Booming only a decade ago, the scholarly literature on SCs is *mainly* characterized by normative (Ramaswami et al. 2016), even apocalyptic visions of a future, which either for the sake of 'sustainable growth' or 'risk reduction' has to be *urban, digitally managed and highly interconnected by ICTs*. To put it differently, in spite of a myriad of SC definitions it is particularly the extension of ICTs use in urban governance what defines a 'smart' enterprise (Batty et al. 2012, Dameri and Benevolo 2016, Zhuhadar et al. 2017, Kummitha and Crutzen 2017). Yet, as smart grids usually rely on extremely expensive technologies, how could 'smart' purchases grow so much since the end of 2000s amidst a "negative economic climate, corporate cost-cutting measures, and general anti-CEO/business sentiments"? Basically, an IEEE publication suggests; "you never let a serious crisis go to waste" (Costello and

Laplante 2011). Beyond the 2008 financial crisis, however, which doubtlessly served to globalize the 'smartness mandate' (Halpern, Mitchell, and Geoghegan 2017). Smart urbanism (SU) is "foremost a rhetoric battleground" (McFarlane and Söderström 2017) overall encouraged by pessimistic apprehensions, especially due to climate change. Hereby *ad-hoc arrangements* entail useful *dispositifs to* deviate critiques; 'there's no crises that can't be managed' (Wakefield and Braun 2014). SU is inherently self-referencing to the extent that solely best-practices within the 'smart' idiom are recognized (Anthoupoulos 2016). Moreover there is no common ground on basic indicators; whether economic or social sustainability (Ahvenniemi et al. 2017), these just keep being added (Höjer and Wangel 2014; Berardi and Monfaredzadeh 2015; Marsal-Llacuna 2016). Thus, SCs prescribe augmenting and improving digital deployment, in order to solve any infrastructural issue (Ojo, Dzhusupova, and Curry 2016) any city could face. Consequently SCs entail a conceptual proxy to norm how to take advantage of ICTs with the aim of optimizing (Powell 2016a) urban governance (Goodspeed 2015; Deakin 2014). Consequently, even if SCs commonly vary in their formulations (Albino, Berardi, and Dangelico 2015), in regard to increasing citizen involvement (i.e. through collaborative planning approaches (Castelnovo, Misuraca, and Savoldelli 2016; van Waart, Mulder, and de Bont 2016)); it has to be emphasized that the 'smart governance' imaginary (Rodríguez and Meijer 2016) privileges a technocratic perspective. *Smart is* what is already solved for *us*: sensible, predictive, individual. Hence, even though most academic depictions simulate being "non-ideological, commonsensical and pragmatic" (Kitchin 2015, 132) its historicity and economic instrumentality inescapably call for critically questioning the 'expertocratic' basis of a paradigm, which in spite of striving for clean and efficient technologies for environmental control (Halpern and Günel 2017), it is hardly ever accountable to citizens. The following sections illustrate how SC discussions evolved from techno- to citizen-centric approaches, as the paradigm has been steadily targeted by critiques of diverse character, yet coinciding in a general concern: undemocratic governance. An initial body of uncritical literature (2.2.) aims to serve urban policy makers (sole politico-economically powerful enough entities capable of contracting 'smart grids' (Glasmeier and Christopherson 2015)) as it exposes, in light of big data developments, the varied ways high-technological services can further institutionalize territorial management (Garcia-Ayllon and

Miralles 2015). The control over goods (i.e. energy, water, transportation, security) flows points to the reduction of subjects to additional resources to track (Hashem et al. 2016). Further, even whence citizens are addressed as co-creators or innovators of smart items, such *entrepreneurial* modality does not guarantee citizens become active part of the decision making process since the complexity of big data analysis virtually annihilates hopes of a *deliberative public sphere* (Cowley, Joss, and Dayot 2018) (2.3). Altogether, this explains why no SC promoter talks about the RTC as a common ground or a common fight (2.4). Rather, as the next chapter examines, the access to digital devices and e-governance become conditional for the recently conceived 'right to the digital/smart city'. It seems safe to anticipate that without "a radical political willingness to think beyond the horizon of neo-liberal capitalism toward a global revolution that reintegrates the labor of the urban as well as the rural poor in the sustainable reconstruction of their built environments and livelihoods' (Davis 2010, 45). Else, SCs will fail on channelizing grass-rooted struggles capable of tackling *self-destructing extractivism* (Jose 2018), beyond India, characteristic of the current human experience.

2.2. Planetary urbanization: from a *planet of slums* to a *smarter planet*

Once defined (approx. 60s, 70s) as "the alternative or antidote to sprawl (…) opposite of ill-planned, ill-coordinated development" (Beatley and Collins 2000, 289); in recent decades "Smart Growth" has rather consolidated a tripartite (state, market, consumers) alliance "bringing together industry, regulators and users in the field of telecommunications" (Ryser 2014, 447). Meanwhile, *Agenda 21* on 'sustainable growth' gave further meaning to the Silicon Valley-based "Smart Communities" concept (Coe, Paquet, and Roy 2001). Indeed, SCs could fund in the rhetoric of environmental policies (particularly exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol and by the EU's energy strategy (Cocchia 2014, 14)) fertile grounds to expand the paradigm across the Global-North. However, what really seems to have pushed SC's 'corporate storytelling' to global confines (Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser 2014) is the 2008 "Smart Planet" campaign by IBM (Palmisano 2008; Dirks and Keeling 2009; Kehoe et al. 2011), allegedly holding across 100 SC Forums and currently involving 2000 worldwide (Hollands 2015, 68). Ironically, such context of a globalized banking crisis

welcomed the mandate of austerity politics at a national level, while attention shifted to sustainability, resource efficiency, growth and innovation, enabled sealing PPPs at a city level. This tendency kept pace until today: gigantic ICT corporations (in addition to IBM (Paroutis, Bennett, and Heracleous 2013), CISCO, Intel, Siemens, etc.) took advantage of the recession scenario to sign millionaire contracts with a low profile. In parallel the provision of e-services increasingly established as an indicator for life quality and fitness for future business (Kuk and Janssen 2014). Accordingly, it is worth highlighting the 'Informed and Interconnected: Manifesto for Smarter Cities' (Kanter and Litow 2009) as an alliance between academia (Harvard Business School) and IBM, in order to permeate much lower scales of governance. Even if the authors convoke 'smarter communities' it seems impossible to distract us from its anchor in IBM's top-down SC imaginary. To start with, the "creation of information-rich, interconnected, communities" also coincides with the 2008 crisis scenario. Still, communities, instead of policy makers are made responsible for difficulties[2] faced; poverty is reframed as 'social isolation', wherein a *smart solution* would not imply tackling the socio-economic sources of it, but facilitating business continues, in spite of a rampant housing crisis. In fact, since poorer migrants are accused of bringing problems with them, technologies could now solve connectivity and comfort issues, in ways that transport would have not. "Through IBM's dynamic workplace model, about 40% of its U.S. work force works virtually on any given day (…) via remote or work-at-home options" (ibid.6). What is more, the broad illustration of 'smarter citizens' entirely blinds the class structure, while unity, instead of conflict or competition is advocated. "The human side of change" is defined as an "infrastructure of collaboration across boundaries or jurisdictions and sectors". Further, a "sense of mission" has to be propelled, in order to "identify and link influential knots in the social fabric". In sum, technologies[3] are not posed at the disposal of communities for their autonomous development, but local leaders are sought for the means of nurturing IBM's, the corporate class or the state's big-data network.

[2] Herein: "geographic sprawl, residential mobility, the location of jobs, the organization of government departments and the contracting process, non-profit fragmentation, lack of overarching strategic impact goals, and weakened civic leadership". Pollution and labour conditions do not represent valid concerns.
[3] New technology capabilities – such as data warehousing, data mining, automatic language translation, voice recognition, and cloud computing –could provide data to inform decisions and enable professionals and providers, with data in hand, to better serve people, from the at-risk to the affluent. Networks could provide interconnectivity, offer databases of best practice information, enable e-government and e-procurement to flourish, connect people to job training and job opportunities.

Dan Hill's (2013) attempt to *pragmatically* (assuming techno-culture/-politics are unavoidable) differ between tacit benefits and the hype around civic collaboration results in a much different manifesto. Hill ridicules both, 'passive citizens' (waving at smart buildings' sensors, while expecting recognition instead of solving it manually) and technocrats, who are very far from taking advantage of digital media innovations to channelize citizens interest to participate in "*bottom-up civic entrepreneurship"*. Yet, Hill warns us there is nothing inherently democratic in digital media. Instead of rescuing a 'sense of public good' delivery services are increasingly privatized. Financial markets significantly profit from the contemporary 'attention economy', rather characterized by *status-seeking behavior and selfish individualism*. Speaking from the UK context, which 'could be seen as a Big-Society-driven abnegation of urban services, in favour of 1000 start-ups blooming to take care of the city', Hill observes an 'ideological backdrop' in opposition to 'state-led innovation', since it 'usefully substitutes municipal taxes'. Instead of making 'the same mistakes we made 50 years ago, which we are still paying for', Hill concludes policy makers should 'unlock the city's technological potential' if a next opportunity to 'dovetail active citizens with active governments' is not to be missed, but enhanced to discover 'better cultures for producing good sustainable decisions'.

2.3. (Digital) citizenship in-the-making

As consultations (via apps or social media i.e.) are increasingly used to legitimate either civic support or the efficiency of government operations, Martijn de Waal and Marloes Dignum (2017) call our attention to *Do-It-Yourself* initiatives, since these "mainly attract higher educated and well connected citizens", yet commonly under the name of "a right to the city (…) [which] is rather common than an individual one". SC technologies, therefore, could add novel organizations models and interactions, in order to envision and enact practices of citizenship. We should keep in mind, however that 'citizenship' should not be 'understood as a formal set of rights and obligations', but rather as a constantly challenged and reshaped institution 'through which individuals and social groups claim expanding or losing rights' (ibid.). The provision of digital participation channels, consequently, does not inherently include *all citizens* in the *same manner* within the decision-making process. Certainly, could ICTs be

useful for 'contesting the rules and norms of belonging, by *making visible the invisible,* and thus including people/practices that have no proper place in the city, as such are connected in an autonomous network' (Iveson 2011). However, as illustrated above, digital media can also be used for *controlling* ('on behalf of *good citizens*, identifying and containing *anti-social* urban inhabitants') and *responsibilizing* ('providing better information to shape choices') citizens, simply to give the impression that they have a say even if policy options are already pre-defined (ibid.). Digital media, incorporates the potential to reconfigure the relationship between governors and citizens- from *administrator and residents (Cities 1.0),* to *'service provider' and 'consumer' (Cities 2.0), 'facilitator' and 'participants' (Cities 3.0)* and, recently, between *'collaborator' and 'co-creator' (Cities 4.0)* (Foth 2017) – so that incrementally the initial purpose of facilitating communication is driven by and for the benefit of communities, instead of being absorbed by large power holders. The larger 'smart' propositions are, i.e. by striving to cover entire cities or countries (such as India), instead of concise initiatives, the higher the risk of losing sight over the commodification of knowledge/information, expressed under the rubric of 'data'.

2.4. Collaborative, yet manageable: participation read as big-data

Beyond overtly surveillance concerns (van Zoonen 2016, Vanolo 2016) developed upon the corporate-driven SC pilots, Songdo in South-Korea, Masdar in the UAE and PlanIT Valley, in Portugal (Hollands 2015); herein I suggest putting attention to concrete interventions policy makers draw from a certain rhetorical and technical *SCs' tool-box,* in order to simulate participation. In spite of various attempts, based on rankings and indexes, technocrats have failed in universalizing a strategy to measure SCs (De Santis et al. 2014). However, in daily business, what interests policy makers and investors is the collection and analysis of data, in order to adjust their sales. Therefore, even when arguing human-centeredness (Lara Pardo et al. 2016; Beinrott 2015), tools and platforms are often meant to predict and respond to market desires (Kioes et al. 2015, Alizadeh 2017). As remarked by Grossi and Pianezzi, i.e. even if digital initiatives have expanded matters and participation channels, "the neoliberal ideology influences the framing of these problems by favoring business-led technological solutions rather than long-term urban planning" (2017). Accordingly, if

the sole convenient role for a "smart community" (Stratigea 2012; Jung 1998; Eger 2007) in technocratically based knowledge capitalism (Rooney 2005) is to participate either as consumers (ICT users, e.g.) or facilitators (embodying sensors) of knowledge, but rarely critical of hegemonic maintenance. Thus, the organization and diversity of grass-rooted synergies is threatened to be handicapped or even sabotaged, rather than empowered (Galdon-Clavell 2013). Nonetheless, not only neoliberal politicians and corporates have the capacity to develop ICT-based initiatives, in order to favor local needs (Palleis 2013). Rather the characteristic freshness of 'smart strategies' debates emphasizes these are "open, experimental and potentially modifiable" towards new forms of urbanism "under the leadership of communities, ad hoc volunteer groups and local organisations" (Marvin, Luque-Ayala, and McFarlane 2016). "Alternative smart cities" could, indeed, develop from prioritizing a "socially just use of digital technology", once especially the knowledge and needs of the urban poor and the marginalized are put at the center (McFarlane and Söderström 2017). Hence, it may be too soon to sentence the evils of smart technologies. Although convenient 'solutions can often be low-tech', following Alison Powell's (2016) prospects of a "subversive citizenship in the smart city". Yet the same time, she reminds us to "take into account the structuring power of the frames that are used to transform data into action" particularly in regard to the implications of data use for citizenship rights. "In a supposed 'age of austerity'"- Powell (2016b) warns us, technologies have been used to give the impression that "a citizen is an individual subject whose relation to a state can be disintermediated". Besides surveillance, hence, citizens can be seized as sensors, since for the sake of optimization of service delivery data collection relies upon 'algorithms constructing portraits of individual users/consumers (…) into all areas of experience' (ibid.) 'It's more about the individual as a creator of data- Powell clarifies - which in aggregate becomes valuable as it shows all sorts of things about what people are doing' (Strong 2014). Data is not hegemonic per se, since it can also be useful for autonomous organization of blinded groups (Appadurai 2001), yet, whence citizens are urged to participate within a *mediated network*, in order to behave *well,* the "right to communicate" is replaced by the "duty to share" (Powell 2016a, 8). For the means of subverting the SC, therefore, rather than 'rights claims', which are increasingly targeted for private gains (pic. 3) (Taylor 2016), Powell motivates us to discuss 'mechanisms of action'.

3. Reclaiming rights *in* the city: is 'smart' compatible 'subaltern urbanism'?

A symptomatic reading of 'the urban age' characterized by fragility, uncertainty, and ever-increasing complexity is described by Ash Amin (2017), in order to explain how SC promoters find in smart urbanism a way to reconcile optimism on a 'prosperous, secure, sustainable' future that via the use of 'smart' technologies becomes manageable. Notwithstanding, while the city is understood as an all-predictable and malleable machine, Amin reminds us, the SC underestimates collective agency and cognitive capacities, which have been cultivated along a history of (un)conscious resilience. In other words, as SCs privilege 'operational details', in order to perform certain services (i.e. 'cleanliness') more efficiently, 'sociotechnical systems' (i.e. 'labor involved in urban maintenance') are ignored. Again master planning loses the opportunity to learn from 'situated practices'. If the purpose of material preparedness is supporting social agency, the typical inequality amidst 'technical robustness, [commonly] tuned to protect some urban spaces and subjects more than others', could be avoided. Yet legitimating, instead of fighting inequalities is precisely the purpose of SC enterprises- as shown above or herein in Amin's words:

> "Sometimes this variety and definitional plays to a politics of urban protection seeking not only to tackle the real risks and hazards, but also reorient the city, towards particular interests and dispositions, in the name of risk mitigation, with decidedly unpleasant outcomes for subjects deemed to be suspicious, dangerous or unable to protect themselves." (ibid. 4)

More than expressing the failure or absence of planning, policy makers impose the category of 'informality' on undesired citizens and practices, in order to impede them (i.e. by designating the territories they inhabit as 'illegal settlements') of contesting decision-making over concentration of resources; land and services. However, this should not be confused as a 'smart' novelty. In fact, the arbitrary restriction of citizenship (e.g. via designating policies' geographic extension) develops upon the idea of the 'good city' articulated by modernist planning - either in colonialist or nationalist rationale –in a *top-down,* segregationist manner. Thus, despite efforts to portray 'smart solutions' as objective techno-scientific arrangements, SCs undeniably affect the RTC because it presuppose decisions along *epistemic, material and civic* dimensions, globally structuring this research's theoretical and empirical analysis. By deepening on the implications of constituting 'smart citizenship' as a category that

differentiates certain citizens' access and participation to the SC, while it excludes others' RTC; this chapter sketches the theoretical tool-box, generally inspired by Lefebvre and de Certeau's empirical loyalty to follow 'walking tactics', which eventually leads to refuse the idea of citizens' absolute subordination to the *grid* (3.1). Aiming to demonstrate SCs are neither a totalitarian 'control room', nor an entirely inclusive or participative 'creative city', further connections between 'smart growth' and the strive for land (accordingly molding purposes, technical solutions, and beneficiary/disadvantaged subjects) are explored. Chiefly, India's governing party, BJP, relies upon increasing politicization of data, as well as oppression of dissent, and privatization of education, which altogether pose serious doubts about a democratic exercise of smart citizenship. Indeed, as argued along empirical studies in the US, UK and India, achievements as well as obstacles to smart materialization vary according to the interests of the ruling classes (3.2). The arbitrary designation of (in)formality, (il)legality, and (de)regulation within an idiom of *exceptional* 'smart' planning authorizes highly *exclusive* RTC, fulfillment of citizenship. The *material* guarantees for *civic* input to re-shape smart utopia *(epistemically)* is reserved for a tiny minority. How do housing rights (or its deprivation) condition RTC? Thereupon, relations of subalternity framed within the SC become our focus (3.3). Ayona Datta (2018) argues the 'chatur citizen' opens up space for vernacular versions of SCs. Yet, does the RTC start when capable of arguing *smartness* or is it hampered by such requisite (3.4.)?

3.1 Theoretical construction of grass-rooted demands

The concept of the 'right to the city' is, for the most part of academic citations, accompanied by a reference to Henri Lefebvre, whose work "Le Droit à la Ville" signalizes one of the most influential acknowledgments within the context of May 1968: "the revolution in our times has to be urban or nothing" (Harvey 2012, 25). Almost half a century later, scholars, yet especially social movements keep inquiring the potential of such paradigm. Especially in India (Kumar Vaddiraju 2016), i.e., without being legally declared a universal human right yet, it is increasingly argued as state duty (Parnell and Pieterse 2010). However, as insightful as the efforts of researchers may be on providing historical, philosophical or politico-economical grounds to sustain the RTC *theoretically*, David Harvey insistently reminds us that

'what has been happening on the streets (…) is far more important than Lefebvre's legacy' (2012, xii). In spite of such courageous articulation, consequently, Lefebvre's role remains one of an observer, who "depicts a situation (*irruption*), which was not only possible but almost inevitable" (ibid. xi). Similarly, Harvey explains the resurgence of the term- all around the planet – as "some kind of response to a brutally neoliberal international capitalism that has been intensifying its assault on the qualities of life since the early 1990s" (ibid.). The World Social Forums organized in Brazil, India or Venezuela (HIC-AL 2008) noticeable showed that "the struggle over the city as a whole framed the particular struggles denouncing homelessness, gentrification and displacement, criminalization of the poor and the different" (ibid.). The desire for "greater democratic control over the production and use of the surplus" (ibid. 22) was proven to be a globalized concern – pertaining the Global-North as much as the South. In Quito's Habitat III Conference, e.g., "it became clear that there had been a conjuncture of policies concerning the right to the city[4]" (Verso editors 2017, 12). Interestingly, the overall agenda, which was prepared in advance and solely expected to be ratified, already included the SCs paradigm (UN-Habitat, UNDP, ITU 2015). Thus, as we recognize the relevance of historical discussions on both concepts, the RTC and SCs, we should be careful of avoiding theoretical impositions (Uitermark, Nicholls, and Loopmans 2012) by empirically documenting contestations, in order to expand our understanding of these struggles. Aiming to be institutionalized, both discourses require to be *performed***,** since these entail at the same time "a particular set of visions on the city, as well as a collection of concrete practices enacted by coalitions of actors" (de Waal and Dignum 2017, 264).

Together with Lefebvre's writings inspired by the context of May '68, the work of Michel de Certeau advocates for a radical shift from analyzing the conditions, which shape the (im)possibilities of behavior (in accordance to Foucault, already set by infrastructure, surveillance and punishment technologies), in order to focus on the interaction between individuals and space, dedicating hence, foremost attention to subjective agency (Sacré and de Vissher 2017). This means that while top-down planning determines *strategies* ("treat the city as a planned, readable, and stable totality that is visible from above and subject to intentional operations of power"),

[4] See: http://www.forumue.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Habitat-for-People-de1.pdf

social actors embody *tactics* as a counter-reaction. Only by performing an action ("walking across the *grid*, transgressing and leaping across boundaries") in space, the latter exists (Gieseking and Mangold 2014). Walking implies an act of constantly "updating possibilities", particularly when actions overcome expected mechanics set by the strategist. "Processes of subversion and appropriation, which imply a deviation from the norm and *could* (yet not *must*) remit to grey zones of illegality stand for 'practices of repurposing' (Bernardy and Klimpe 2017, 181). It is this conscious act of being-in-the-world (ontology) and acting upon it (praxis), which enables to transform environments (ibid. 173). A myriad of *everyday experiences* unnoticed, unpredicted or even undesired *from above* (ibid. 184); are highly valuable, because they are a source of creativity. Thus, Certeau's work can be read as a "tribute to the periphery", (ibid. 182) in terms of radically acknowledging each person's capacity to transgress and reshape the meaning and of uses of space. Even in profoundly planned cities like Chandigarh subverting the purpose designated for a certain area (i.e. squatting or displacing *slums* in the periphery) depends on the capacity to reclaim the *right to make the city* (Bhardwaj 2015). Indeed, Chandigarh's high income concentration attracts all kind of migrants (wealthy or not), whose quality of life aspirations unceasingly fuel RTC contestations. In order to inquire such, I propose the following RTC dimensions:

- *Civic*: ruling classes determine inconvenient 'informality' as 'illegality', sanctioning an ethical judgment on populations, who allegedly do not deserve good quality (if any) of public services. Notwithstanding the RTC is not a static institution recognized solely on paper, but rather we align with Lefebvre's perspective, wherein "belonging is a revolutionary act" (Verso editors 2017, 14). If we consider that 'citizenship has to be struggled for, recreated anew, hence such is not rubber-stamped' (Merrifield 2017, 18). Even if some groups are privileged, this does not impede, but encourages disadvantaged ones to reclaim a saying on the *production of space*.
- *Epistemic:* while SCs are justified by the need of 'risk mitigation', instead of supporting an infra-structure of solidarity (Simone 2004) "the fear of losing out on future credit and investment" pressurize adapting to a global agenda of acquisition of "expensive intelligence systems and expertise" (Amin 2017). In contrast to this, from a RTC perspective, citizens are empowered to manifest either individually or

collectively the desire to improve their living conditions, by positioning themselves: their needs, aspirations, and experiences at the center of city making.

- *Material:* without romanticizing the agency of deprived communities it is vital to acknowledge "the very real experience of infrastructural exclusion and associated frustrations of housing, water, energy, health, education, insurance, connectivity, and mobility" (ibid.). Approaching socio-spatial ubiquity, 'distributional fairness' could further equip *citizens* to support *each other*. Otherwise, "if you take one person's home, you take this person's everything", as mentioned by an interviewed activist in Chandigarh. Therefore, our case study focuses on SC contestations based on struggles for the Right to Housing, which encompass a whole bond of rights (Rolnik 2014). Adequate housing, especially in India, remains a massive issue (Duggal 2010, 9).

3.2 Privatizing rights to the digital/smart city

The "ideal space" for the **"digital right to the city"** is the "sharing economy" to the extent that "achieving a right to the smart city"- more than "maximizing wellbeing for all the citizens" -points at "data sharing", in order to produce "multiple kinds of value across the collaboration of different groups" (Dean 2017). Hence, without reference to further Human or Civil Rights the "digital right to the city" could contribute to; the focus is put on the government's (not citizen's) need to "open their kimono to create an 'information-sharing culture', since business innovation is nurtured by *open data*. Earlier, however, it has been argued that the **"citizen's right to the digital city"** (Foth, Brynskov, and Ojala 2015) depends on the right for information, freedom of expression (ibid. 138), and crucially on privacy rights (ibid. 170). This enters into conflict whenever citizens decide "to distrust, challenge and take over control", yet police monitoring or corporatization of data hampers opportunities for "autonomy participation and social innovation" (Rekow 2015). Questioning the so-called independent nature from ICT giants scholars suggest that resisting "new informational monopolies", like Google, consists of "embracing ownership and self-management technologies" (J. Shaw and Graham 2017). However, in a "world saturated with the automated aggregation of analytic mechanisms that are not, even in principle, open to any continuous human interpretation or review", this seems largely unfeasible. Data transparency implies revealing the 'logic of calculation, ownership and use of data' (Powell 2016a), which is commonly inconvenient for private interests.

Certainly, either for corporative or 'grass rooted' attempts to benefit from 'open government', data needs intermediaries (Schrock and Schaffer 2017). Similarly, smart citizenship presupposes the need of a new kind of specialized education (Martelli 2017). Yet amidst the current politico-economical context in India, unfortunately, this also seems inconceivable. In fact, even if the recognition of the Right to Education was recently (2009) institutionalized; it does not serve as a guarantee against surveillance (Spiegel 2018) or privatization of schooling. Aspirations of English-medium education all across the strata spectrum have made of meager quality education targeting at low-income families, a profitable business (Nambissan 2017). Moreover, the deluge of data ('dashboards, mobile apps and indexes that rank states, cities and villages on every conceivable indicator from the ease of business to the ease of living') recently became the hallmark of BJP's ("more than any of its predecessors, deft at using data to score political points") governance. Despite large collections of data, consequently, the state is "stubbornly silent" on central political issues, such as the debate on India's 'jobless growth', at times depicted as a myth (Vyas 2018). As argued above, therefore, the democratic use of data depends on independent, third-party evaluations of administrative data on flagship schemes. Notwithstanding, even if scholars have been working on this for decades, the ongoing abuses of an alarmingly authoritarian state- whose intolerance demonizes dissent as 'anti-national', 'urban naxals'-discourage the creation of a similar data-ecosystem (Aiyar 2018).

Progressively, as we approach the acknowledgment that beyond the specificities of data, SCs represent a dispute for land, I propose considering these statements:

"Under the acronym PPP, one often hears of public private partnerships- says Wayne Crews (2018), an experienced Forbes ideologue- *but here's hoping for greater emphasis on private-private partnerships, driven by private financing, and relaxation of antitrust so mega-deals and mega-scale infrastructure projects can happen, and novelties like user ownership of grids (…) You may not be ready to sell off all the roads, but think about what is not yet built."*

Richard Raj Sebastian – principal consultant for digital transformation at Frost & Sullivan, confesses in an interview to also privatized International Telecommunications Union that *"while most smart city initiatives in Asia-Pacific are government-driven, we're likely to see the private sector taking the lead, whether it's in the form of a PPP model or private companies acting on their own" (Tanner 2018).*

"From listening to smart growth advocates, one could easily gather the impression that people, who oppose it are 'pro sprawl', right-wing ideologues, anti-environmentalists, or have vested interests in the home building, real estate, auto, or road building industries. But this couldn't be further from the truth". Rather the Afro-American farmer denounced further (historical) denial of land revenues: *"What little land we now have represents wealth and potential wealth— When you take that from us, then you've robbed us/them of everything that we/they've slaved and labored for all those years, which is the promise that somewhere down the road, this property might produce wealth" (Berlau 2002).*

All in all, besides the time and space variation of 'smart' frameworks, the cited perspectives confirm the paramount relevance of bounding digital discourses *materially,* as well as *territorially* (Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski 2018). Rather than starting with technology, hence, if *smart urbanism* is supposed to respond to citizens' needs, it "should be grounded on actually existing cities; their specific populations, resources, and problems" (McFarlane and Söderström 2017, 313). Turning to a short examination of few, yet highly pertinent empirical studies of 'smart citizenship' in the US, UK, and India, prompts us to abandon *Orientalizing* prejudices on a *Global-South* allegedly characterized by structural and bureaucratic deprivations. So far, even in the so-called *Global-North* SCs tend to blind the inequalities they reinforce.

Indeed, from a RTC perspective, data, and technology are not the only central issues, but planning for the benefit of certain classes over others. To put it differently, "the problem is less with data and more with the *uncritical, ahistorical, and aspatial* understandings of data often promoted within SC imaginaries, recycled from earlier attempts to make urban studies and planning 'more scientific". Consequently, based on the observation that "the assemblage of actor, ideologies and technologies associated with smart city interventions bears little resemblance to the marketing rhetoric and planning documents of emblematic, greenfield smart cities (built from scratch in peripheral locales)", Taylor Shelton, Matthew Zook and Alan Wiig invite us to inquire "how is the smart city paradigm becoming grounded (…) in the more mature cities and economies of the global north" (2015, 14). Taking highly segregated cities in the US, such as Louisville, Kentucky, and Philadelphia as case studies, the authors conclude that in spite of access to mobile phone Internet -promoted by IBM and policy makers as "new pathways to relevant skill sets for entry-level jobs that would ultimately bridge longstanding socio-economic divides"- inequalities persist. SCs reproduce inequalities, firstly because creating a PPP hub required removing both socially and spatially, "the poorer neighborhoods that the smart city project was meant to help"; and secondly because "this initiative did not extend beyond education and digital literacy programming" (ibid. 20, 21). At a smaller scale, there might be successful examples (Foth, Forlano, and Bilandzic 2016), but expectations of a panacea to any urban issue turn into disappointments whence deepening on stories of already vulnerable groups.

In tune with Bigon's (2016) approach to transnational colonialism and neoliberalism; Robert Cowley, Simon Joss, and Youri Dayot (2018) suggest that "the opportunistic nature of SCs' development gives rise to unique local assemblages, [while] simultaneously holding hostage to broader societal and economic agendas". Alone in six cities in the UK the authors highlight varied modalities of 'publicness'. Thus, it is overall argued that a SC is neither one-dimensional nor "attempts to exclude the public" any longer, but "institutional protagonists do have vested interests in [enacting] democracy" (ibid. 72). However, researchers resist concluding that under a SC regime a 'qualitative recasting of the public' takes place, since large infrastructural projects lacked civic engagement, while entrepreneurial activities were dominated by ambitions to 'create wealth through hi-tech innovation'. Opportunities to 'enable or engender more formal political participation' were entirely unexplored by SC technologies. What is more, amidst a context of austerity politics, the 'experimental nature' of SCs turns deeply problematic, considering the "world-view of a society of entrepreneurs and service users" has a particular easiness of 'bypassing traditional democratic processes' (ibid. 73).

In the meantime, Paolo Cardullo and Rob Kitchin's (2018) concentrate in SCs initiatives in Dublin, Ireland, where they develop a scaffold of participation (*consumerism, tokenism, citizen power*), which further corroborates to vanish the optimism on the production of a 'citizen-centric' SC. Even though citizens were supposed to be empowered by technologies, they are treated as "consumers, testers - sources of data, which can be turned into products" (ibid. 10). Oriented on a neoliberal conception of individual autonomy, instead of being grounded in civil or political rights, citizenship in the SC remains largely tokenistic: "rooted in stewardship, civic-paternalism (and) prioritiz[ing] consumption choice " (ibid. 2). As administrations and corporations continually own and control "technology-led entrepreneurial urbanism", therefore, an expectable/acceptable behavior, in their accordance, is constrained to providing feedback on a development plan, instead of challenging, replacing, or transgressing its political rationality (ibid. 10).

Finally, coming back to India, even if conscious that "ICTs and supporting infrastructures can entrench existing urban asymmetries by fueling elitism, exclusion,

enclaves" (*splintering urbanism*), David Sadoway and Satyarupa Shekhar (2014) propose optimist examples of Smart Citizenship, such as initiatives ran by the 'civic-cyber non-profit action-research group' Transparent Chennai. As a means to counter the global commercialization agenda driven by ICT firms, this Smart Citizenship approach "call[s] for engaged, active and critically reflective civic-cyber debates, as well as deeper discourses among a diversity of citizens – and not only the visions of digitally dominant 'thought' or business leaders". In opposition to the SCs approach, thus, the authors suggest an idealized perspective of Smart Citizenship consisting of:

"Civic leadership negotiations in a transparent public environment through 'client relations' and local needs addressed through work with/for community and civic groups. Decentralized citizen-driven forums and civic-cyber initiatives nurtured by face-to-face, ICT and urban infrastructure (internet) provision shaped by principles of universal and affordable 'access for all'. Successes are publicly debated (in terms of speech, dissent, privacy rights) (…)" (pic. 4).

However, once this ideal-type depiction is analyzed empirically, it rather serves to denote the abyssal difference between "alternative pathways to smart cities where ICTs have been used to strengthen communities, foster participation, and make cities livable", which are not incorporated by Indian and international policy-making as Satyarupa Shekhar later recognized (Willis et al. 2016, 5). Whereupon Shekhar poses the fundamental question driving this research: 'why do cities and city residents do not already exhibit the characteristics that can make 'smart' cities'? "At best- she replies – this corporate-led and commercially-driven process attracts investment and fosters consumerism" (ibid.). "Whose Right to the Smart City?" inquires the report, which is nurtured by SC experiences in Chennai, Pune, and Bangalore. Overall, the corporatization of governance is signalized as a general outcome. In Chennai the preparation of the plan was highly dominated by consultants, who relied on pre-exiting plans. Pune's elaboration of the plan, on the other hand, was "widely discussed and consultative", however public consultations were very superficial and filled "with tensions between elected representatives and bureaucrats". Lastly, Bengaluru's chances to become a 'world-class city', as the JnNURM mission already aimed, are rather ruined by the "existing systematic governance and infrastructure lacunae". Yet the SC proposal seems even more harmful. Following Shekhar, "technology might annihilate geographical distance, but corporative reliance (Special Purpose Vehicles, as argued next chapter) threatens to fracture communities" (ibid).

3.3. *Absent presence:* subalternity and nationalist planning

Rapid modernizing experiments intrinsically create margins. *Within* and *outside of the colonial city* aesthetic, sanitary, but principally power concerns (held by the ruling groups) divided urban experience into white and black towns, the old and the new, residential, commercial, and policed zones. Prior to Lefebvre or Foucault's theorizations, therefore, the restriction of the 'right to the city' through territorilized 'governmentalities' is arguably a constitutive phenomenon of the urban (Legg 2007). In regard to India, discussions on urban planning as well as on citizenship have been central to the *Nation-building* process. Douglas Haynes and Nikhil Rao (2013), i.e., describe how from the 1920s onwards the 'increasing number of planning institutions, together with the range and scope of intervention increasingly controlled by Indian elites' fueled clashes between class interests attempting to impose or to subvert a certain vision on the cityscape (ibid. 327). Moreover, the author's observation that "Improvement Trusts often dishoused more people than they rehoused, [whereby] the 'temporary' settlements inhabited by construction workers, often became permanent" could well describe peri-urban formations around the 60s and 70s when Chandigarh was majorly built, as well as ongoing or future squattings surrounding SC projects. What becomes clearer in recent decades, however, is that the village as a typical Indian socio-spatial organization (Srinivas and Shah 1960) is well left behind. The modern city, in contrast (Jodhka 2002), gained major terrain over nationalist distinctiveness, paradoxically being steadily mediated by international trends and aspirations. The examples of Chandigarh, Bhubaneshwar, and Gandhinagar are well known, yet as Haynes and Rao remind us, the Indian state built 118 towns between 1947 and 1981 (2013, 330). Hence, even if Chandigarh, our case study, is characterized by an exceptional history of master-planning, marginalization dynamics (economic and urban growth through disposession and expulsion (Kuldova and Varghese 2017)) are similar across the country. As argued by Jan Nijman, 'slums'- which arise because of *rapid urbanization*, simultaneous to "India's *lethargic formal manufacturing sector*" represent a 'structural feature of the country's modern urban landscape' (2015). In parallel, decadent labor and environmental conditions, coupled with immanent caste discrimination, motivate citizens to *leave* 'the rural', generally being treated as a "residual category" of 'the urban' (R. Bhagat 2005). Thus, even if

'the rural' is likewise growing (Charan Pradhan 2013) and diversifying (de Bercegol 2017), the way lifestyles generate pull force aspirations as well as RTC reclamations (Bhagat 2017) remains a crucial matter for research. The socio-spatial category of 'slum' (Arabindoo 2011), by inhabiting allegedly 'informal/illegal' (Datta 2012) spaces, incarnates day-to-day contestations to the RTC, since even savage neoliberalism has not stopped historically subaltern populations (generations denied to own the land they work, due to caste/class or gender hierarchies) to construct *their city*. In sum, our empirical research focuses on the connections between digital politics and the *land question,* due to three reasons:

Firstly, contrary from dominant discourses, 'informality' is not the opposite (failure, absence) of planning, but rather a characteristic politico-economical strategy to gain from the privatization of land in undemocratic manners (i.e. whence PPP facilitates the *business* of disposessions). In the name of *public purpose*, as Ananya Roy explains, *zones of exception*- SEZs or SCs, indeed (Varghese 2017) – are explicitely anti-poor (2009, 79). Consequetly the real estate market, more than any other source of urban transformation, entails a central ground for unceasing contestations (Shatkin 2011, 2014, 2015). As exemplified by India's SC mission (next chapter), not only do upper-classes (who generally have major influence over the direction of urban planning) use their RTC at the expense of 'slums' (Ghertner 2011a, 2011b; Srivastava 2009), but exaggerating the fear of slums (Davis 2006; Gilbert 2009), i.e. blaming them for ecological crises or supposedly avoiding migration disorders, also work as justifications for privileges, instead of dismantling the neoliberal system.

Secondly, scholarly discussions on 'subaltern urbanism' (Roy 2011, 2012; Denis and Zérah 2017) have been a valuable source for 'Urban Theory' (in general, not merely 'of the South') (Oldfield and Parnell 2014), as it has been widely demonstrated that top-down projects are not capable of resulting in an absolute bureaucratization (governmentality) of life. Actually, if we consider *slums* as the territory (Rao 2006) of undesired citizens and their struggles; this *ontological diversity* entails the potential of subaltern resistance to challenge the *planetary* ambition (Ruddick et al. 2017) of SCs. Even if emerging autonomously, these are usually forged by relational and networked spatialities (Jazeel 2014), as we attempt to confirm in our empirical study.

Finally, by the time this research initiated, in spite of rich discussions about exercising citizenship 'at the margins of the urban' (Bautes, Dupont, and Landy 2014; Doshi 2013) *(*as mentioned in the introduction) the sole existing ethnographic studies on Indian SCs limit their scope to subaltern resistance to the subjectivity of farmers (Datta 2016). Resistance to SCs is, thus, only expected *outside* but not *from within or in/between (*'gray zones' (Roy 2011)*) the urban.* Notably, in her most recent paper (in fact after this dissertation's empirical material was gathered) Ayona Datta (2018) introduces the imaginary of 'chatur citizen' as a vernacular *and* subaltern version of 'smart citizenship'. On what basis does such discourse legitimate RTC reclamations?

3.4. Too soon to invoke a 'chatur citizen(ry)'?

Datta's approach to 'the digital turn in postcolonial urbanism' addresses the question of smart citizenship - *in the making* – through three key processes: *enumerations, performances and breaches*. Importantly complementing the examination of policy documents and the results of online citizen consultations (made public) with a series of observations at stakeholder workshops in Varanasi, Chandigarh, Navi Mumbai, and Nashik; one of Datta's major contributions is a deep empirical elaboration on how the policy-shift towards 'focusing on smart citizenry', not only depends upon the 'discursive emphasis on inclusive and citizen empowerment', but crucially the constitution of a 'smart citizenship' necessitates to be *performed* through statistics, meetings, and consultations, as well as via content on social/digital media (ibid. 8). Despite the fact that "80% of its citizens are currently outside the digital divide", Datta explains that as a "prelude to 'smart citizenry'" 'digital subjects' have to be *enumerated* by becoming, namely, *legible, fast tracked* or "*drawn into the digital space,* in order to produce a 'user base' for the smart city services*"*(ibid. 2). Notwithstanding, even if Datta is cautious of "*smart citizen* becoming an euphemism for an elite citizenship built on class, religious, and caste privilege", the author decidedly inquires the possibilities for subaltern citizens to "breach the boundaries between digital and urban publics that define their exclusion from the future city" (ibid. 10). Relying on the intervention of a slum-dweller's representative in Navi Mumbai, who denounces that "in general, the government is trying to create a separate city for the rich and a separate city for the poor", Datta highlights this local

leader's reclamation for "a share in the economic success of the smart city" (ibid. 11). Accordingly, this citizen's breaching act consists of "an alternative characterisation of the smart city as economically and ethically just", instead of entirely opposing the segregationist root of a paradigm, which departs from a differenciated recognition of citizenship by alluding to 'smartness': a category implying cognitive, technical, as well as classist connotations. The cited subject certainly contests the meaning of 'smart': "we are smart because we do hard work for our living (…) if we get ten rupees, [and] spend it all today, then how will our children get food tomorrow? That is why we are smart, because we plan every move." What caught my attention for futher inquireis this citizen's need to reclaim the recognition of his socio-economic capacities of survival, in Hindi, to an audicence that was willing to listen to him (research workshop), hence, outside of the terminology and the channels proposed by the state, in order to validate his voice for influencing SCs' decision-making. Even if the 'chatur citizen' imaginary illustrated above expresses solely one citizen's attitude towards the SCs' program, to what extent are his attempts to be recognized as a 'chatur citizen' representative of broader social sentiments? Further, is such discursive (epistemic) level of reclamation sufficient for been granted material benefits within India's SCs framework? The Administration of Navi Mumbai itself abandoned the Mission "because of irreconciliable differences with the federal state over the use and control of urban revenues in SC projects" (ibid. 11). If the justification of cognitive or labor capacities, such as in the cited example, becomes conditional for demanding the recognition of housing, information, education, water, etc. (besides *legal, ethical* rights (Baxi 2011) here encapsulted as his RTC, is it foreseable that the SCs' scenario is advantageous for reorienting Indian politico-economical planning towards a more democratic direction, wherein- based on the Constitution- especially subaltern citizens would receive exceptional support? Along the next chapters, we will extensively discuss how does the inseparable juncture between material resources and class interests seem to foreground the designation of 'smart citizenship' at the national (policy-making) (4), and at the local (in Chandigarh) levels of policy-implementation and contestation (5). If 'smart citizenship' inclusion/exclusion is structurally determined, will the recognition of certain (i.e. productive or cognitive) capacities be useful for expanding acces to 'smart services', as much as influence on the participation of subaltern populations?

4. Smart Citizenry within India's *Transform-nation Mission*

Throughout the aforementioned chapters we have illustrated how the SCs' discourse permeates across multiple scales, from a universalistic 'Smart Cities Challenge' to more localized 'smart communities' initiatives. Critical insights show as well very diverse concerns; a big part sustained either by the lack or excess of imagination on the configuration of *smart citizenship*. How does the Indian Smart Cities Mission (SCM) envision it? Even if our empirical analysis focuses in one out of 109 enlisted cities (Bouissou 2017), this chapter argues how fundamental it is to acknowledge the degree (i.e. ideology, vocabulary, modality) of the central governments' authority over a national scheme, which nonetheless was advertised as pluralistic, because of aiming at decentralization. Furthermore, in regard to the RTC and this Mission's accordant or divergent 'smart people' imaginary, it is notable that the proposed notion of civic participation distances from *collaborative* or *responsibilization* approaches. Since scoring in the terms, nationally established by the Guidelines, is conditional to access funds, municipalities engage in a self-congratulating manner. Instead of democratizing the debate about Smart Cities Proposals (SCP), administrations monopolize its *politicization,* for citizen's only recognized capacity is assenting.

As we discuss whether the SCM is keen to expand or restrict the RTC, the (rather mutually reinforcing than singular) RTC dimensions proposed above, will serve us to structure our argumentation in: *epistemic* (4.1)- according to which ideological background ((inter-)national political-economy) are 'smart cities' defined? – *material* (4.2)- what socio-spatial strategies (i.e. funding) are put in place in order to construct smart city components? Who is likely to profit, who will face disadvantages? -, and *civic* (4.3) dimensions - who *is/could be* a smart citizen, what would imply *becoming* a smart citizen(ry)? How could governance evolve through novel methods of participation? How is 'inclusion' thought/sought? Whether the SCs master plan is materialized or not, it entails a crucial paradigm to study since it mobilizes power. While the *nation-building mission* evolves into *nation-branding efforts,* in order to attract corporate patronage (Kaur 2012), citizens are either conceived as consumers or entrepreneurs. Among a gamut of PPP services promoted *from above,* ICT use becomes the sole participation channel recognized, even if no influence is guaranteed.

4.1. Signifying 'smartness'

In spite of the insistence of bureaucrats I interviewed, SCs is not a concept India's Prime-Minister Narendra Modi pioneered. In contrast to this common belief, SCs trace back to Manmohan Singh's Congress administration as the 12th Five-Years-Plan (2012-2017) already put "inclusive and sustainable (…) smart cities" at the core of its urban vision (Planning Commission: 2013, 320). Nonetheless, the term SC, as shown in the previous section, has a much precedent history and use that trespasses the field of urban planning. In his research on India's tourism and industry campaigns, i.e., Ravinder Kaur narrates how frequently he encountered the word 'smart': "often-used as a catchphrase and at first (…) seem(ing) meaningless (…) it appeared in all possible combinations: smart frame, smart image, smart feel, smart design or just *being* smart" (2016, 311). Further he says "the idea of smart packaging seemed to convey more an expression of a deeply rooted belief that every product can be made valuable and saleable if illuminated optimally" (ibid. 318); 'almost as a visual restoration of pride, particularly for young generations' (ibid. 320). To put it differently, we are attending a *nationalist enterprise* expressed *in globalized trends*. "The SCs' idea is not driven by a deeper understanding of an urban habitus"- observes one of the scholars interviewed - "rather, it's driven by some belief that we can become the next Singapore". How did such vision become India's predilection?

In "Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global", the editors Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011), suggest three common practices that characterize the transformation of Asian cities (ibid. 14). a) *Modeling* - taking advantage of mega-projects for the sake of neoliberal planning (Shatkin 2011, 2015), b) *inter-referencing*- increasingly utilizing Shanghai, Singapore, or Dubai (rather than London or L.A.) as aesthetic/speculative inspiration (Ong 2011; Goldman 2011), and c) *association* - creating new solidarities among public and private elites, in order to impulse a specific lifestyle (mainly real-estate projects) for *world-class citizens* only (Ghertner 2011). While *modeling* and *association* constitute fundamental elements of the Indian path towards SC policy-making, this research could not corroborate the thesis that SCs are as well product of Asian *inter-referencing*. More concretely, even though Datta's SCs analysis (2015) might be largely right on public governance and

corporate attempts to facilitate land privatization, from my point of view, she fails on pointing at Modi's trips to China as catalysts for introducing the 'smart' idiom (ibid., 7). Indeed, Modi's ambitious promise to build no less than 100 SC might be a competitive answer to China's urban development plan (Riva and Riva 2017, 127). However, judging from documents produced by the National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA, basically a public think-tank guiding government policy) references to SCs' 'best practices' *elsewhere* (PEARL 2016) appear in the frontline. The influence of *Western*-cultivated approaches turns evident in four aspects: firstly, formatting it as a *challenge,* which is pretty much anchored in US-based approaches (DOT 2015, Alizadeh 2017) and is most probably connected to the guidance of Bloomberg Philanthropies, one of Modi's main SC partners (2015; 2016). Secondly, the idea of competing and ranking middle-sized cities, typical of European campaigns (Centre of Regional Science 2007, Riva and Riva 2017, 14). And thirdly, as shown in the Guidelines, the Ministry of Urban Development clearly suggests the Japanese, British, German, French, and US development agencies (in addition to the World- and the Asian Development Bank) (MOUD 2015, 10) as *handholding agencies;* together with consulting firms' assistance, a mandatory requirement for each SCP. Finally, series of workshops were organized by Germany and the EU, which worked as platforms for the *exchange* of political and technical *know-how*. Indian speakers were commonly invited, however a horizontal relationship of cooperation seems questionable, since the purpose was rather enabling business gateways (such as SCs Expo). Hereby, I am not suggesting that drawing inspiration from experiences and discourses abroad implicitly endangers Indian citizens' RTC, rather it seems pertinent to highlight the incoherency (renown architect Rem Koolhaas calls this "stupid" (2014)) of adapting deliberately flawed formulas to tackle inequalities- as exemplified above by case studies in the US and UK and (guided by the same rhetoric and actors, such as the WB and EU) expecting different outcomes. More than the geographic origin, in sum, the expansive *institutionalization* of 'transfer[ing] authority' to the private sector, currently ruling over public values (ibid.), represents an arguably dangerous epistemology. Analyzing the EU's SCs framework, Alberto Vanolo, points out that one of the major menaces of "smartmentality" is 'reducing the city to a single-technology centric vision'; hence, 'limiting the creation of alternative solutions to the problems of today and tomorrow' techno-corporates decide to prescribe (2014, 895).

Similarly, within India's SCM the emphasis is not put on the materialization, but rather in the expression (performance) of a certain SC vision, which should fulfill the national parameters as compiled in the Mission Guidelines (MOUD 2015), henceforth our focus of analysis. We can start by belying that municipal autonomy (decentralization) was ever intended, considering that altogether the challenge modality entails an India-wide race among municipalities, in order to access funds. The pressure to fulfill scoring criteria homogenizes the proposals, which are expected to rely on a PPP logic, since: "the success of this endeavor will depend upon the (…) revenue model and comfort provided to lenders and investors" (p. 13). Accordingly, the NIUA (2016) published a 'Lighthouse cities' report, which may serve to municipalities as examples to portray SCPs. Note that solely the Urban Ministry is entitled to enlist, rank or reject proposals, and as one of Chandigarh's high officials confessed "no one wants to be called non-smart". Still, alike the SCs' genealogy discussed above, the SC's definition remains very broad, while any sort of compromises with the disadvantaged are avoided. Even though the Bureau of Indian Standards has repeatedly tried to set certain principles upon which 'life quality' can be measured, the Ministry rejected them in name of India's plurality (Sambhav 2017). Hence, instead of a clear-cut definition, the Guidelines refer to a "not one-size-fits-all approach", for each municipality to "formulate its own concept, vision, mission, and plan (…) that is appropriate to its context, resources, and level of ambition" (MOUD 2015, 5). Maintaining a vague definition de facto leaves space for neoliberal entrepreneurialism, whereby *the technical* ('smart solutions') can be distanced from *the political* (rising inequalities).

A closer look at Digital India's policy framework, especially since the BJP's mandate (Sen 2016), most clearly positions the 'smart' adjective within the country's public-private growth alliance. Accordingly, the progress of the *info-nation* is measured by the number of users and services provided online, instead of critically examining how the influence of the universalization of such informational market plays for either diminishing or reinforcing existing socio-economic hierarchies. Indeed, *info-activism* might enable some innovative ways of organizing collective agency (ibid. 94). However, examples of censorship, surveillance, and similar abuses of an authoritarian

state abound[5], demonstrating that the development of an informational infrastructure via digital technologies is not an immediate sign of democratizing communication, political participation or material inclusion within 'the nation'. In this vein, amidst the impressive extension of the Aadhaar identification system, which becomame in less than a decade the world's biggest biometric system, the debate on the Right to Privacy urgently needs to go beyond judicial circles (The Wire 2017; Scroll 2017; Yamunan 2018), in order to position the integration of cumulative digital services as a main concern for citizens (Singh 2017). Anyways, life in a city encompasses much more than an infrastructure of PPP services. However, from the perspective of those desiring its absolute management, the meaning of "smartness" matters much less than examples of "smart solutions" (such as *water, waste and energy management, e-governance, telemedicine, tele-education, security, trade facilities* or *skill development),* which by relying on "robust IT connectivity and digitalization" intend to "provide core infrastructure and give a decent quality of life to its citizens" (MOUD 2015, 5, 6).

Altogether, the Mission Guidelines highlight the corporative nature of this endeavor, which I could also confirm in Chandigarh. Instead of public consultations, expertise consultancies are quintessential; first to be selected, then to prepare a program that would satisfy the central governments' vision. Decelerating the extension of India's digital infrastructure, in order to encourage the quality of a public discussion in varied levels, is precisely the contrary of what the Indian industry and state attempt to facilitate. Rather diversifying the scope of e-commerce and e-governance services from telecom to logistics, waste or wellness, in order to facilitate the "ease of doing business", in order to attract FDI delineates much precisely India's "knowledge economy" growth calculations (CII 2017). "The key enabler in this regard is technology" as a major consultancy firm Deloitte and India's Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry conclude (Assocham 2015, 6). Therefore, together with the JAM trinity[6], Skill India or Start-up India, SCs are presented as just another of dozen of government initiatives (CII 2017, 42) instrumental to fuel the ICT market.

[5] "Intolerance Tracker" enables a geographic visualization throughout varied indicators, see website: http://intolerancetracker.com/ or Facebook page.

[6] *Jan-Dhan Yojana, Aadhar, mobile* is one of the programs created by India Stack, in order to integrate four digital layers so as to expand the digital financial market, absorbing users even in the remotest areas. See: http://indiastack.org; Raman and Chen 2017; Business Line 2017.

4.2. Fabricating 'smartness'

If already from an initial conception, human rights were entirely ignored as a fundamental base for urban planning, according to a recent Housing Land Right's Network report (2017) which analyzed all SCPs so far, it is extremely unlikely that this framework represents a fertile scenario for subaltern groups to reclaim their RTC. More concretely, moving to the politico-economical set-up of the Mission, this section corroborates concerns for the privatization of land, in addition to further services', as illustrated in the aforementioned chapter. Hereby a techno-digital discourse is pushed forward, yet access to ICTs does not represent the major divide, but rather the capacity of land trading elites to solidify socio-spatial inequalities.

Four mechanisms were conceived as implementation priorities (MOUD 2015, 8). Firstly, *retrofitting* refers to enabling "more intensive infrastructure services", in order to make the city "more effective, more livable". Further, *redevelopment* implies replacing the "existing built-up environment and co-creating a new layout using mixed land use and increased density". Saifee Burhani Upliftment Project (formerly Bhadi Bazaar) in a) Mumbai (Goyal 2015) and East Kidwai Nagar in Delhi (Chapman Taylor 2018) were initially presented as examples. On one hand, these signalize real estate as the Indian SCM main raison d'être, which appeals to middle-/upper classes and private interests (Mahrotri and Antony 2016). While on the other hand, slum-dwellers are repeatedly susceptible to "eviction and demolition of their properties without proper procedure and rehabilitation". Moreover, during the SC's construction, they denounce been forced to live under "unhygienic, deplorable conditions" (A. Jain 2017). *Greenfield development,* thirdly, targets at "vacant areas", where most of the *Smart Solutions* are supposed to be introduced. Promoted as paradigmatic 'smart utopias' built from scratch, Amravati[7] and Dholera[8]- attached to Delhi-Mumbai's Corridor (Datta 2015)- have also being strongly questioned, since the principle of "land-pooling" (voluntary handover of land) "generally results in loss of livelihoods and incomes to farmers, who are often coerced to give up their lands" without fair (if any) reconstitutions (HLRN 2017, 23). Consequently, as highlighted by both cities visual projections, SCs entirely displace agricultural lands as the *hinterland* of

[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-RahriAP3vg, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZTJ1Hg16A8
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tc_jsWt1IWQ, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOFpWFLSqgU

massive infrastructural projects (airports, highways, IT, and business hubs), which gain central attention. It is the flow of resources, rather than 'smart citizen' initiatives what matters. Finally, the *pan-city* principle calls for re-assuring that Smart Solutions cover larger parts of the city. However, most of this optimism has failed in praxis, as "a major chunk of central funds is lying idle with state governments" (Das Gupta 2017). *Greenfield* and *pan-city* approaches evidently seem unachievable in such scenario. Even *retrofitting* and *redevelopment* strategies signalize a massive scam as most SCPs cover 2,7% of the candidate cities, not even of whole India (Vivek 2017).

In fact, *area-based development* (ABD) dominates (according to a NIUA functionary, mostly 60-70%, and in some cities, more than 80%) the funding pattern. Whether loans are acquired through domestic or foreign capital, such entails a risky transaction for the *commons*, since firstly "interests increase the financial vulnerability of the local body", secondly "cities have to try their best resources, in order to pay off", and thirdly this involves "investing were most lucrative people live so you can finance project". Further the privatization of land and services is not only discursively but also materially facilitated through 'smart technology'. Another NIUA bureaucrat said:

"Most cities are trying to reform their own systems of revenue recoverment, improving their own property taxation rules, mapping, telescoping, metering for water, for energy consumption, and then depending on their own land… so capturing the value once its developed to raise the procedures."

Elitist concentration and corporatization, therefore, are not casual mistakes, but main components of the SCM. The Guidelines clearly leave out socio-spatial and socio-economic guarantees (public housing, public education, public health). Choosing instead singular areas, wherein infrastructural *solutions* are supposed to bring revenues to investors, not to any citizen, indicates a conscious choice to favor richer segments and ignore a large proportion of the population's desperate needs for basic services and decent housing. However, "simply monetizing the land and building fancy enclaves does not make a city inclusive or sustainable or smart" (Dash and Chandran 2016). Yet even though expectable, it is still shocking to confirm –after HLRN updated its report (2018)-, that none of 99 SCPs prioritizes the rights of the disadvantaged, while supposedly aiming for *sustainable inclusion* (2017). Anyways "discussing issues of non-discrimination or equality" (p. 12) is not measured within "inclusive growth", especially since it relies upon a fundamental contradiction:

inequalities are the source of such growth. Accordingly, not even in a long-term or in a utopian scenario, (when all technicalities are accomplished) a fair (to the necessities of marginalized groups) distribution of outcomes can be expected. On the contrary, low-income populations may face an even more hostile environment, since no social investment supports upward mobility, by radically improving public education, e.g.

"If the best part of your project is dedicated to 5% of the area, the 95% has to survive with less than what it had previously." In stark contrast, to ABD, only 2 to 3% of the funding is dedicated to pan-city interventions; which means one or two services- commonly, transportation or solid waste management- are supposed to reach the city at large "for the sense of inclusion". Yet, due to the *illegal* status of 'informal' settlements, we could anticipate that those citizens, who need water, electricity, and sanitary infrastructure the most, will rarely (at least as intended by policy proponents) profit from the extension of such networks. Obviously, this leads to reinforcing inequalities: socio-economic positioning, instead of citizenship *per se*, determines the RTC. A techno-scientific rhetoric (as deployed by NIUA and Chandigarh bureaucrats, as we will see later) is fruitful to defend neoliberal planning: "we are proponents of managed urbanization, growing in a very coherent way", says Praveen (pseudonym), as he rejects either beneficial or harmful outcomes deliberately based on class status: "SC are about making the right-, data-driven, evidence-based decisions". Moreover, Praveen justifies the concentration of funds in minuscule demarcated zones, due to the lack of local bodies capacities "to undertake a bigger mission for a city-wide transformation". Despite hard work poverty is reproduced through generations, still subaltern populations are supposed to patiently wait for the *waterfall effect* from well-off sections to be assimilated elsewhere, and getting content with ephemeral *access*:

"Cities are doing as much as they can. *Most have picked-up densely populated areas and they want to transform them, but there are generally poor in those areas so whether people stay there or not it's a different thing, but poor people still own their livelihoods there, in terms of street vendors, informal workers, so they still come to those areas, they still benefit from them. It may be too soon to make some sort of judgment that it will not be inclusive (…) there has to be a long-term evaluation that has to be set-up. To ascribe exclusion just to a SC is probably unfair. People were excluded even before the SC project started, what you need to see is whether or not this is going to be accessible."*

Yet mere access, as argued above, is an insufficient promise for a democratic recognition of the RTC. Beyond walking through redeveloped sectors, the 'right to centrality' first of all would imply that poor people are legitimated for inhabiting the

same areas; they should be the principal not indirect (i.e. as informal workers in function of the middle/upper classes lifestyle) beneficiaries of public investment. Moreover, it is argued, "local bodies had to learn what a really high sustainable quality of life neighborhood looks like in a very short amount of time, in order to transfer these knowledge and skills to the city". Buying this argument is not only naïve, but almost insulting, since municipalities know pretty well and exactly where housing, clean water, electricity, waste treatment (instead of mere management), e.g., are urgently needed. Technology and skilling towards the improvement of processes could literally save lives, i.e., by equipping sewerage labor with appropriate tools. Upgrading services, hence, has to be thought much beyond energy/budget efficiency, but deeply/in an interconnected manner, wherein improving the living and working conditions of daily laborers is paramount. Otherwise SCs will sediment poverty. In fact, evictions due to SC plans have already been denounced by Narmada Bachao Andolan (The Economic Times 2017), stretching from Gujarat (Benett 2016) to Bhubaneswar (Jaiswal 2017). This confirms that slum-dwellers (Dash and Chandran 2016) and peasants are threatened the most, as usual. Employing SCs as rhetoric to expand and legitimate the *regime of dispossession* (Levien 2015), while arguing raising life quality standards, makes sense within a *war against the poor*, rather than *against poverty* (Sourabh 2015). And if millions of rupees thrown at elite segregation, *smart surveillance* and privatization of services are not outraging enough, remember this is not even "*their* (meaning the 1% of the 1%) *money*, [but] they're doing this at the expense of everyone else's (public)" taxes and land (Krause 2015). Yet who are "they" and who is "everyone else"? Next we'll analyze the construction of *smart people* being secluded from *the* (invisibilized) *rest*.

4.3. Embodying 'smartness'

By granting full politico-economical recognition to a tiny parcel of Indian citizens entitled to manage the conception, implementation, and monitoring of SCP, the government reiterates that an all citizens' right to inhabit, participate, and make the city is rather inconvenient for its PPP growth horizon. As argued in the former sections, SCs' proponents decidedly avoid defining policies, which confront existing inequalities as *smart solutions*. *Smart infrastructure* is not expected to be *constructed*

and *enjoyed* for all, and hence, or even worse, the Guidelines establish the undesirability of *representing* a diversity of interests contrary to the private sector and the government party. In parallel (to elected officials), the text mentions the constitution of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), as the sole responsible entity to conceive and monitor each SCP not only the government of India, but also private and foreign investors are supposed to like. Consequently, SPVs are grounded as "Limited Company" (MOUD 2015, 37), which mandatorily have to be "headed by a full-time CEO" to be accompanied by some "nominees from the Central, State (…) and (local) governments" (ibid. 12). Cynically such is promoted as a "collaborative" endeavor, since it commingles "the objectives and funds of all government departments, while *parastatals, private agencies* and *the citizens* are dovetailed during the process of preparing SCP" (ibid.). As the Guidelines persist referring to *the citizens* and *the people* in such a superficial way, it turns even more imperative to inquire who is precisely meant by the loose rubrics of *'smart citizenry' (p.22)/'smart people'?* Thus, whose/which knowledges are excluded on a class or bureaucratic basis?

In line with the purpose of 'smart communities' cited in the second chapter, the only explanation of the 'smart' component put in the same equation with 'people' refers to the use of ICTs for the means of optimizing governance. Nevertheless, as the text further specifies 'participation' as "doing more with less and oversight during implementing and designing post-project structures" (p.18), it is evident that 'smart people' are thought to be no one else than SPV members. This differentiation line gets even clearer when not *smart*, but simply 'people' are put into administrative brackets (Residents Welfare Associations, Tax Payers Associations, Senior Citizens and Slum Dwellers Associations) while their participation is not guaranteed, but solely consultations are offered (p.22). Aiming for *citizen-friendly* and *cost-effective governance (p.7)*, online services to obtain feedback and monitor government sites are legitimate tools bureaucrats are supposed to use, in order to identify "issues, needs, and priorities of citizens and groups of people" (p.22). Yet behind CEO (currently) intermingling with big-data management (soon) it is terribly naïve to trust that "citizen-driven" solutions will be generated by vulnerable sections of society and will remain accountable for their benefit, *even if* (although it has not been a 'smart' compromise yet) open government data is made available (Wright, Prakash, and Shah

2010, 37). What the promotion of e-governance through ICT might achieve, however, is simulating *the citizens'* (suspiciously broad and homogenous) consent with the SPV's disposal over use and function of land; particularly if this strengthens local alliances towards *neoliberalizing* the streets by getting rid of hawkers (Jain 2013) and/or finally wiping out slums (Arabindoo 2011), as shown in Chandigarh.

Who precisely is considered a 'smart citizen'? Due to minimal information in state publications, this is the main question that inspired this research precisely through an empirical approach. At the NIUA, as well as in Chandigarh, this was definitely the most sensitive topic to discuss. Arguing in the same technocratic line, Praveen initially tries to avoid the subject "I'm not given those philosophical questions, my task is with data only", yet after denying having knowledge of such terminology in the Guidelines, Praveen guesses: a "smart citizen is probably someone educated, hard-working… people who get economic value for their labor, have a good quality of life, enjoy living in cities". This whole statement is sustained by the classist ideology 'smartness' attempts to blind/naturalize. Especially in the Indian context, there is no guarantee that *hard-working people, living (or attempting to do so) in cities, get high economic value from their labor so that they enjoy a good quality of life…* as Praveen rightly points out, this depends on a precise kind of education almost exclusively achievable through implicit resources and social capital. Furthermore, considering that 'e-governance' is supposed to represent the sole interaction channel between 'smart citizens' and municipalities, 'smartness' is not merely exclusive, but highly selective to the convenience of power-holders. Deeba (NIUA, pseudonym) reflects:

"I personally believe that as for now we should forget the phrase "smart", because a large section of the population does not have access to minimum basic services (…) So if you have a homogeneous population as you find in the West, everybody has a smartphone, but in India it's only the elites (…) Until and unless we are homogeneous group in terms of the economy we are not ensuring that the facility reaches all, on the contrary we are increasing the disparity".

Besides acquisition, education on the use of ICT gadgets is required, which again this depends on class background, especially if these are meant to lead to some advantage:

"If you are illiterate, how can I expect you to be 'smart'? You should at least know the meaning of 'smart'. and if you're literate but you're poor, you don't have smart appliances anywhere close to you. The basic foundation of smart cities is literacy, yet not how we define literacy on the census (the ability to read or write any language and be at least 7 years old)… something more… you should at least be a graduate, to earn for yourself, to understand the current state of technology and, not only to contribute, but also to gain from all the developments which are happening around you. Until and unless you really are into the system how will you get the benefits from the system? If I want to apply for a trade license to the local body, to the municipality, so I must have that much of resources to open a shop, for that I need to have access to a laptop and e-governance…"

Yet the massive investment in the health and education sectors, as advocated by Deeba "in order to bring the poor to that level" is entirely absent, not merely in reality but, as we have been capable to demonstrate through the SCM, also in planning. Even if SPVs, alias, 'smart citizens' are mainly driven by CEOs, SCs are thought as a much broader regime of governance, wherein even if disadvantaged or marginalized, the whole society is encompassed. *Once* counting with *suitable* economic capacities, *everyone* is welcomed within "the smart consumerist *global* jungle" (McCarthy et al. 2009, 41). Sometimes, particularly the "remotest locations" (Assocham 2015, 18) are targeted, in order to expand by coupling the IT, ICT, and financial markets. This does not mean that technologies will create an *entirely new 'smart citizenry'* since 'new technological cultures- as Kavita Philip has argued -are also instrumental on performing masculinity, caste or creed supremacy in the digital sphere'. Consequently, Philip underlines:

"A [next] layer of political complexity adds to the growth of corporate interest in the world's 'bottom billion' [while] poor and marginalized populations are increasingly seen as potential new citizen-consumers, rather than as developmental lags or obstructions" (2016, 289).

Indeed, technological citizenship is not a novelty. Especially in India, as Itty Abraham and Ashish Rajadhyaksha (2015) argue, the National Population Register and Aadhaar systems have been implemented to "identify and separate citizens and residents in the interests of national security", as well as aiming for identifying "the needy, resource-poor (…) as a first step towards providing them with social security". Ideally, if hard data is used to fight exclusion, as an acclaimed Indian sociologist argues in an interview, then it should prioritize benefitting the marginalized:

"*The poor are the ones who want a source of certification more than anyone else. People like us would always have passports and other IDs, so we can claim our citizenship status. It's the poor, who can make claims about coming to the city for 7 years to work and this is the evidence of it*."

Notwithstanding, the aforementioned authors conclude in their study that the 'alliance between the digitization of governance and the privatization of welfare (…) lead to worse outcomes for the poor by producing new costs and barriers'. Increased illegibility under neoliberal dominated digital governance did not "'bridge the last mile' through greater transparency and efficiency ", but strengthened already uneven distribution of resources and power privileges (ibid. 83,84).

5. Chandigarh: 'smart from the start'

Today, India's most iconic example of modernist planning is also enlisted as an aspiring SC. Chandigarh's seven decades of history could certainly serve as a warning for future projects, as it is commonly observed that 'plan and monument' were not capable of guaranteeing 'a city in full,' "holding India's popular imagination" such as Mumbai, i.e. (Raghunandhan 2018). Yet critical perspectives suggesting more democratic, rather than elitist visions of the city are usually displaced by Le Corbusier's fervent admirers. Among policy makers and residents, mostly architects vehemently defend Chandigarh as a "world and living heritage", which modernist philosophy, although being exempt from a 'colonial hangover', has to be explained to the layman (Parul 2014). The apparent inseparable junction between city and planner, Le Corbusier's Chandigarh (or vice-versa (Prakash 2002)), was further strengthened by the SC discourse, principally since both coincide in "the insistence of order as a cardinal principle of modern town planning". Chandigarh's success, according to Rajnish Wattas(2018), relies on its "grid iron layout [which] represents a self-sufficient urban module that can be repeated multiple times to create the total urban form". However, if such order is distorted, due to 'unbridled growth', e.g., Wattas alerts: "Chandigarh will become like central Paris, its safety walls will be settlements around…" (Parul 2014). Following our motivation to learn from the (un)expected outcomes of modernist utopias, hence, beyond the aesthetic relevance of CIAM or SC paradigmatic examples, the analysis of Chandigarh's *epistemic, civic and material* limitations to RTC, illustrate the intrinsic politico-economical purpose of planning. It bears the power to safeguard a certain lifestyle for *modern/civilized subjects* at the expense of *daily laborers*: street-vendors, *rikshaw-valas*, cleaning personnel… they all compose that undesired caste but useful class; therefore allowed to enter, but not to stay in the 'planned sectors'. Nonetheless, even if "in Corbusier's mind the *periphery* was sacrosanct" (Chalana 2015, 72), for subaltern groups promises of modernity never materialized *per se*; obliging them to *un-do* planning, in order to construct a livelihood, still unceasingly threatened to be dismantled and further marginalized. At the same time, real estate within and especially around the peripheral satellite towns of Chandigarh has not stopped flourishing. Chandigarh's current SC scenario, along with various master plans prepared in the region, corroborate Roy's observation about

informality, instrumental to condemn the poor, yet a common practice among elites, who capitalize the RTC through alliances and, definitely, clashes as well. Yet the aspirations of better living conditions for the working classes are not given up without resistance. Rather, this research is heavily guided by empirical insights throughout a variety of actors, whose major basis for contesting the SC is the right to housing. Consequently, this chapter is structured along the following sections. The uniqueness of Chandigarh (5.1) demarcates 20,000 acres of supposedly isolated land from *the rest of the country*, especially from *rural Punjab*. However, the consumption lifestyle it demands highlights the constitutive interdependencies between the city and surrounding villages. Founded upon violent displacements, the political history of the periphery (5.2), characterized by *suck in* (overtaking the agricultural, cheap labor) and *expulsing processes* (avoiding the proximity of working classes), is central for our study. Despite generalized concerns pointing at SCs' risks to engender 'total conformity' (Gardels 2018), such paradigm provokes evident inequalities (particularly in terms of infrastructure), which are once again challenged; as illustrated through a housing rights' front lead by students and slum-dwellers, who denounced Chandigarh's Slum-Free campaign, a prelude to the SCM. The Municipal Corporation, hence, attempts to be backed by wider manifestations/performances of public support, such as pictures, diagrams, and votes; which are countered by the voices of bureaucrats, journalists, activists, scholars, among further interviewed citizens. Neither can the skepticism on *functional-* yet actually corrupt elites – be overcome by e-governance gadgets (apps, i.e.), nor is the trust and politicization of slum-dwellers guaranteed by a couple of demonstrations. Hence activists advocate for more regular and deeper dialogues, which break the SCs' logic of digital immediacy.

5.1. City's 'uniqueness'

Chandigarh's history is majorly told by a modernist narrative that centralizes the role of Le Corbusier (Wattas and Gandhi 2018). Even today it is presumably one of the most sympathetic cities to master planning in the whole South-Asian continent. Hence, the city's value is encapsulated by its architectural legacy, instead of the culture that inhabits such spaces (A. Shaw 2009). Even at the cost of inequalities, such overall prestige granted to techno-centric expertocracy encompasses the main

reason why I chose Chandigarh as case study (among various cities showing resistance against the 'smart' paradigma[9]), precisely since I incrementally recognized commonalities between SC discourses and Chandigarh's foundational elitism (a). In Chandigarh, once assumed to have an optimal infrastructure, expediting flows, and hence disregarding citizens' interventions in master planning, Le Corbusier's ideals of a highly hierarchical and functional grid are well protected, since its heritage status serves to maintain the city's socio-spatial distribution in times of widespread demographic growth (b). Besides initially being dedicated to bureaucratic elites the city's politico-economical exceptionality relies on its Union Territory status. In addition to high incomes and an unsurprising apathy to taxes, Chandigarh's administration's proximity to the central government exemplarily suggests that the institutionalization of PPPs is certainly pushed under the current SC's framework, although such is not a novelty (c). Before passing to the analysis of RTC contestations within Chandigarh's SCP, I consider it is crucial to quickly go over these three points.

a) Pride: a portrait for Independence

Sliced Punjab required a new capital in the Indian side; a *modern way of life* (in terms of work, leisure, spirit and mobilization) defined Chandigarh, in contraposition to *conservative Lahore (Perera 2006)*. Flying over Punjab, Le Corbusier and Nehru determined the acquisition of the territory (28,000 acres of majorly cultivable land), which corresponded to 58 villages. Following such massive displacements, prolonged demonstrations of farmers blamed the government for creating "another refugee problem" (Kalia 1987, 146). Chandi Mandir-Panchkula, a local goddess, was taken as inspiration for baptizing the new capital: Chandigarh. Even more conveniently, as displayed in Le Corbusier's and City Architecture's museum (pic. 5), rests of the Harappan civilization found while preparing the sediments to build Chandigarh, directly connected the site, not only to nationalist historiography, but also to a tradition of planning. The "authorship of the Chandigarh plan" (Perera 2004), however, is an ongoing highly sensitive debate, since, there were certainly plenty of architects and engineers involved, although it is widely known that Nehru granted Le Corbusier an exceptional, full license to design and construct the city. In 1959, two

[9] Initially I also considered Dehradun, i.e.: https://www.hindustantimes.com/dehradun/uttarakhand-residents-hug-trees-to-protest-against-smart-city-project/story-LkDkZqkuR52jnzZOMf53qI.html

years after inaugurating Chandigarh, Nehru said:

'It is the biggest job of its kind in India, because it hits you on the head. You may squirm at the impact but it makes you think and imbibe new ideas. I do not like every building, but what I like above all is this creative approach, not being tied down to what has been done by our forefathers and the like, but thinking out in new terms, in terms of light and air and ground and water and human beings, not in terms of rules and regulations laid down by our ancestors. Therefore, Chandigarh is of enormous importance regardless of whether something in it succeeds or not. Chandigarh is more famous than most Indian towns… simply because it is a thing of power coming out of a powerful mind' (Nehru 1959)

Before, Le Corbusier took charge of the planning commission, Albert Mayer, who coined the *City Beautiful's* slogan, and Matthew Nowicki, who died in a plane crash in 1950, proposed a plan, which departing from organic processes in 'the neighbourhood' exhibited a much more *Indianized* experience and vision *(Perera 2006, 232)*. In contrast, Le Corbusier's trip to the site in 1951 was his first to India (ibid.). Notwithstanding, at that time he was already an international star, whose influence was reflected in the CIAM's manifesto, wherein the modernist city intended to transform society through the built environment (ibid. 231). Thus, Chandigarh was conceived as a 'radial, concentric city of exchanges'. This means that because of 'fundamentally entailing a decision-making and consumption centre' sustained by 'intersections of flows of transport', Chandigarh could afford the luxury to be exempt from a 'significant, productive base', while rather depending on 'the continuing availability of socially produced surplus'. Nevertheless, as a large diversity of productive activities involved in giving life to a city were disregarded by the master plan, pretty early Madhu Sarin (1977, 200) (one of the first residents of Sector 2) questioned the contradictory unsustainability of a *functional city*, which refused to recognize the needs of the working poor, who constructed and served the city. Still, among the residents of planned sectors critiques are rather exceptional; as I could confirm through interviews in the mall, the heritage of master planning remains being an outstunding source of pride for middle-/upper classes (Dewaele 2015).

b) Optimality and change: beyond Le Corbusier

Around half a century after its inauguration, narratives of uniqueness and superiority over the rest of India still stand over the myth of Le Corbusier, either for highlighting the maintenance of green spaces, wide high-ways, among other presumed virtues of planning, or for rejecting any critiques to the negative consequences of such, particularly regarding the highly hierarchized spatial distribution of the city. Le

Corbusier's grid (pic. 6) was analogous to a human body: Sector 1, the Capitol Complex clearly resembles the city's administrative *head*; Sector 17, the commercial and cultural centre represents the *heart* of the city, while the Industrial Area (currently dismantled) implied the viscera. Within each sector 'innumerable open spaces and parks' would provide the *lungs*, and cultural and educational institutions, the *intellect*. All of these would be articulated by the *circulatory system,* a network of seven types of roads, would enact Chandigarh's main feature: flow. Precisely such is at stake, considering its population record-breaking car-ownership (Mufti 2014). This explains why traffic has been established as Chandigarh's SC focus. Yet the lifestyle that the highest income-earning city enjoys makes it difficult to hamper migration. Initially designed for a 5 lakhs population (mainly housing bureaucrats and high officials[i]), within seven decades, the city inhabitants have surpassed the first million. Even if Le Corbusier emphatically opposed the construction of satellite towns at the periphery, the tri-city interaction between Panchkula and Mohali established a fertile area for residential, business, and educational projects (Chalana 2015, 74). Wide socio-economic divides (in terms of extension of the lots (pic. 7)) between the north and the south of the city, respectively developing in the 50s and 90s, signalize a 'psychological gap', according to the city's current Chief Administrator, which is nonetheless sedimented in heritage discourses(Chalana and Sprague 2013) and bureaucratic complexity, unless a big investment project (exemplified below) draws the interest of the administration. The valuable land[ii] of Chandigarh, it should be remarked, is a constant matter of ambitious contestations for old-settlers (often perceived as Partition's VIP refugees) attempt to defend their hegemony over corporates and traders, who moved in solely a couple of decades ago. *At least* both groups coincide in the discrimination of 'poor immigrants' (particularly men), who are often blamed for rising insecurity, while *shanti towns* are accused of environmental contamination. In sum, Chandigarh is dominated by a mix of *urban landowners,* who despite 'rural embarrassment', typically adapt patriarchal habits, inherited from feudalist Punjab to a modern layout[iii]. Our argumentation points at various examples of such behaviours prevailing throughout the SC's project.

c) "It's not citizens, but bureaucrats who run the city"

In spite of being considered a "bastion of business and economic activity" (Kalia

1987, 9) the impossibility of bottom-up policy-making is well established according to most citizens (random, varied age, gender, profession) I interviewed in the mall. "If hardly any Indian city is run by its residents- as historian Rajiv Lochan (PU) said - Chandigarh even less!" From the point of view of young and life-long activists, who I interviewed, one of the main reason major administration changes seem unachievable through citizen engagement, is the fact that in 1966 Chandigarh acquired the status of a Union Territory. This means that in terms of disposition of top-bureaucrats and funding it is directly ruled by India's Central Government guaranteeing, thus, its compliance to national policies. "That's why we've been able to build so much more social infrastructure than other peripheral states or cities", as a leading bureaucrat highlights: "that gives us [in parallel] a lot more of money and aspirations". Altogether this means that elected representatives have less power within the Administration, especially under the SC regime, which pushes the Municipality to become a Corporation[iv] and the Commissioner turns to CEO, altogether relying on consultancy firms. Besides some historical closeness, which serves as a justification of French cooperation agreements with Punducherry (former colony) and Chandigarh (Sharma 2016), it is also understandable that Nagpur (apparently without any significant connections to France) was also chosen. The fact that a 'BJP-led municipal body was capable of handing over its water supply to Veolia, a French company, for 25 years' (Nair 2017) sheds some light on the SC's intrinsic politico-economical raison d'être: the thirst for privatization harmonizes the interests of local, as much as inter-national public-private elites' (Raman 2016).

5.2. Chronic of evictions, reclamations and insufficient compensations

Bearing in mind that Chandigarh emerges in a postcolonial scenario, wherein the efforts to institutionalize the active confrontation of inequalities were driven by the Constitution and much of Nehru's efforts, i.e., it seems inconceivable that the plans for a city, which did not reserve (but displace) housing for the working classes was approved. Constantly declared 'temporal' or 'informal settlements' those, who initially constructed the city were restricted to the margins (Sarin 1986, 2011). As this vicious circle continues, it is increasingly outraging to maintain Le Corbusier as a hero (de Jarcy 2015). If the upward socio-economic mobilization of subaltern groups is extremely tough in neoliberal India, in Chandigarh this seems almost unachievable.

a) ‘City Beautiful’: a critical historiography

Between 17 (Sabhlok 2016) to 50 (S. Sharma 2012), the precise number of villages displaced in order to construct Chandigarh may be debatable. Yet one thing is certain: demands for fair compensations of ‘land, trees, and civic infrastructure’ have been constant since the 50s. Almost entirely absent from regional newspapers and government reports the demands, repressions, and victories of movements (such as the anti-Rajdhani Committee formed in 1948) were hidden from mainstream narratives of the overall peaceful and civilized ‘City Beautiful’. A quick reading from an alternate ‘Social History of Chandigarh’ (K. Sharma et al. 1999), as provided by Soumen Bagchi, accentuates undeniable and reiterating effects of master-planning: dispossession, marginalization, ‘neutralization’, and bureaucratic tricks (e.g. deficient maintenance of records) either to avoid or diminish compensations, accompanied by insufficient expertise on legal tools for reclamations. Still, their knowledge and organization improved through justice and rights demands (2001). Altogether this history should warn us from ‘smart planning’ romanticizations. Thus, along this section, I seek to provide parallels, which suggest that despite a sense of belonging is reserved to middle-and upper classes[v], Chandigarh, like any other city, strictly depends on the labor of the citizens it marginalizes. Therefore, such *co-constitutive interdependencies,* as conceptualized by Ruthie Gilmore, or “assumed duality (as described by Sarin) between forces of production and decision-making structures is actually a unit” (1986, 199). This acknowledgement becomes the most powerful argument for daily laborers, villagers and migrants (herein generalized as the *working poor)* to reclaim their rights over land: in terms of labor (e.g. street vendors) and housing. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that Le Corbusier never thought that poorer sections could be part of the city. Consequently, as Sarin formulates, “planned development produces *and* perpetuates both, squatter settlements and the informal sector” (ibid. 202) by failing to conceive the city’s development organically, in terms of needs and rights. Today, the SCs’ endeavour corroborates a legacy, wherein poorer citizens of India aspiring life-quality improvements were never welcomed in the *City of the Open Hand*, but rather condemned to socio-spatial categories, such as *informality or illegality,* which deny their RTC.

b) Slum-free completion? Connecting 'smartness' to housing rights

In initial decades hardly attracting more inhabitants than the ones who got a position in the administration, three generations later some suggest it is still possible to consider Chandigarh as a 'city of outsiders', due to the variety of cultural backgrounds that (beyond Punjab and Haryana, increasingly Delhi or Himachal) anchor each family (Kumar Teotia 2016). Thus, even if the majority of the population has a history of migration, there is an abysmal difference between those who migrated much earlier or recently, whether one owns the plot (*the rich* are either landowners or high public officials) or rents it (majorly bureaucrats depending on contract). While landless informal workers tend to embody the *real* outsiders. Sukant Deepak narrates how India's former PM chose Chandigarh as the first *Slum-Free City*:

"*While the unplanned slums had been casting shadows on the City Beautiful for long, two months after Singh showed the city promise of a new tag, armed with 10 JCB machines and 2,000 security personnel, the Chandigarh administration knocked at the doors of the biggest slum; Colony Number 5 [and in a harsh winter, 2013] turned a colony housing around 35,000 people into debris. In no time, around 7,000 houses were demolished. The publicity wing of the administration claimed to have cleared 60 acres of land that boasted of a market price of Rs 3,000 crore. For this 'achievement', the UT administration won an award of City with the Best Planned Habitat for Urban Poor."* (2015).

Further, Deepak emphasizes that the 97% of slum-dwellers belong to unprivileged castes. They came from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and other neighboring states, in order to work as gardeners, carpenters, plumbers, domestic helpers… Some of them would be 'rehabilitated' soon, others were now homeless. Initially proposed as a strategy to alleviate poverty (Mathur 2009), the Slum-Free rhetoric (Arabindoo 2011) quickly turned into a justification for massively dismantling undesired 'bastis', indeed all across India, yet with particular hurry/pride in Chandigarh. Beyond the awards, which according to a sociologist from CRRiD "are given by the central government for doing normal things, many cities are not even doing", the idea of rehabilitation did not emerge from RWAs, as a people's plea, but rather from the administration, since "slums create embarrassment". More than elsewhere this city's aesthetic prestige keep legitimizing the violent 'erasure of the Ugly from City Beautiful', as activists Navpreet Kaur and Daljit Ami (2014) pose it:

"The city media was completely hostile to the plight of these homeless, who for decades contributed in keeping the city "beautiful" with their sweat and blood. Rather than giving voice to these invisibilized citizens, some newspapers carried front-page stories about the 'wealthy slum-dwellers' with pictures of televisions, refrigerators, and even ACs. These slums, though, housed the poorest of the poor".

Another interviewed journalist (2018) illustrates the interests the press represents:

"Street vendors are much lesser humans to middle-/upper classes. It's much worse in Chandigarh. They interact much less; there is no overlapping, but very well demarcated communities. Gated communities is a new trend in India, here the city has been built like that. For example, when Colony 5 was demolished, the next day Times of India had a headline on how upper classes struggled, because the maids didn't come. This sounds like some Orwellian book, but it happened, it's been published.

On top of that, even if Chandigarh's rehabilitation scheme (pic.8) received a prize, Kumar Teotia's empirical study (2013) leads him to consider it a failure. To begin with, the novel condominiums were built around 15 km away from the city. Not solely could segregation (brought together under poor infrastructure) potentially result in 'future slums', but if slum-dwellers need to pay for long transportation, their livelihood (the reason why they came to the city) is gone. It makes sense that they are not always *happy*[vi] for shifting, since they were not consulted when it was decided what kind of structure they needed. Providing a room, 'just one shelter away from the city', according to Kumar Teotia, doesn't help much. Bearing in mind that poverty is a multi-dimensional issue a comprehensive view of other needs such as health, education, and water supply is required. Altogether, the demolishment of 12 out of 18 slums between 2013 to 2015 framed the context for the foundation of Ghar Adhikar Sangharsh Morcha (GASM; Union for Housing Right's Struggle) conformed by a diverse set of professionals, yet especially led by students (Students for Society) and professors from Punjab University. In 2016, a year since the SCM was launched and various critical pronouncements towards 'smart' plans arose; GASM became central to my research interests, because of directly connecting SCs to the elites' strive to *grab land*, which by default implies an attack on the working poor's right to make, inhabit, and work in the city. 'People's Resistance to the Smart City Project', to be more concrete, is the title of the article written by 'Pali', convener of GASM (2016), which drew my attention as it seemed to suggest that a certain opposition has not only been discussed, but also mobilized, actively and materially. Even though the text does not inform about the tacit organization of resistance against the paradigm, the clearness in its geopolitical (WB imperialism) and politico-economical (Slum-free) critique, motivated me to contact Pali as well as additional funding members and broadly follow their efforts to politicize SCP for the next year and a half. How did initial articulations of resistance to the SCM evolve across their activist experience to the reconsideration of the limitations confronted in such a neoliberal scenario?

From its introductory statement, Pali frames his critique to the SCs' project around the neoliberal agenda it is attached, wherein multiple "policies of liberalization and privatization have been introduced" as opportunities for global capitalists to overcome the 2008 crisis. This explains why an analysis of the SC's definition is spared, as well as the overview of its deriving services is kept very short; what matters is the World Bank and particularly U.S. American corporations are behind. Consequently, even if often cited dependency-theory concepts often give the impression of an outdated vocabulary, Pali dares to point at what many journalist and academics avoid; on one hand the geopolitical anchoring of the 'smartness' discourse, and secondly the intended extension of financial and technological markets, globally. However, as imageries of the 1st -externalizing the responsibility for the issue -and 3rd world are generalized, a chance to identify the local (political and corporate) elites profiting from the nationalist SCM (homegrown populism and capitalism) is missed. In contrast, a victimized representation of Indian citizens (as postcolonial subjects) alerts damaging consequences: "through their smartness, *they* will make *us* fool *once again*". Supposing that the opposite of a *smart subject* is *fool*, Pali does not challenge whose hegemonic perspective dictates such demarcation. The fact that various cities have signed understanding agreements with foreign states, rightly locates the source (PPPs) and the end (privatization of land and services) of intended investments the 'smart' discourse attempts to enable. Altogether, the way Pali articulates his critique to SCs makes Marxist terminology highly relevant and even more contemporary:

"The government is building smart cities by crushing its own people" (…) For whom will smart cities be made? …If the land in the smart and other cities (where slum dwellers live) is public land then what would be the land of these workers... where they will go? This earth doesn't belong to the working-class people. Are they living on earth just to do the labor, for making these smart cities for the elite?"

In 2014, hundreds of citizens came to various demonstrations and a public hearing organized by GASM, in order to protest against demolitions. Playing with the hopes/votes of the working poor, however, policy makers betrayed their agreement and moved forward with additional demolitions. Hence, in spite of already being used to distrust the word of politicians, it turned clear for GASM that 'the real fight' had to be established within the 'political field', instead of short-sighted legal reparations. At stake are the *historical* foundations (past/current injustices and future abuses), upon which slum-dwellers are not only entitled to respond to demolition notifications, are permanently empowered to demand their socio-economic/-spatial rights.

Pali highlights the importance of a collaborative rather than competitive approach:

"*From the first day we communicated that this administration will not give housing to all, this created divisions among slum-dwellers, who realized that the administration would only give housing to 25%. So many got busy preparing/completing documents, instead of collaborating with each other. Yet, eventually they realize that many people with complete documents still didn't get housing: so, documents are not the issue. Out of 25000 houses required, at that moment only 12000 were built.*"

The kind of political organization and trust GASM was aiming to construct relied on longer, deeper, and patient dedication to bottom-up dialogues. From the beginning the idea was fertilizing the grounds, in order to support slum-dwellers to 'fight their fight'. In the initial months, five of the founding members I interviewed visited a couple of *bastis* each, around three days a week on the attempt to understand how communities perceived their issues (these were mostly immediate concerns, such as water, electricity, schooling) and connect with influential leaders. Theatre performances, screenings or medical camps were explored as communication channels (pic. 9). Yet most importantly pamphlets and newspapers (in Hindi, informing about issues for the working-class in the region from a Marxist perspective) produced by GASM, invited the inhabitants of threatened colonies to weekly meetings. The goal was discussing government policies, quoting Pali "how they are totally anti-worker, anti-farmer, anti-women, anti-people, most of them". Decisively, women played a central role: firstly, women were the majority of participants, because of their schedule even if they commonly work, they would have duties at home, too, so secondly, women arguably think about the family's wellbeing in a broader perspective, i.e. defending slums, in addition to proximity to work, because of education opportunities. And moreover, men were already part of some labour organization advocating for better payments and holidays, not for housing. Hence, as institutionalized local leaders were avoided an anti-hegemonic structure started to be forged. Yet progressively such approach turned unsustainable. Frustration expanded quickly once protests (pic. 10) could not stop demolitions and other threatened areas were postponed. As the waters calmed, slum-dwellers in parallel with GASM members lost the urgency and commitment to meet regularly. They also had to respond to study, work or family activities. Pali is very critical of the rise and decline of the movement he initiated; the following statements sum up some key learnings:

- *"We were not able to understand the dynamics. We were not experienced, but we have learnt a lot. Especially that you have to work with the working-class and you have to be like them, in each and every sense. You are an outsider who comes from the air, meet them for 1 or 2 hours, and then come back and go after one day... they won't trust people who come from the outside, they're more interested on the people, who are from their own people."*

- *"Slum-dwellers do not stand for all sort of demands. They often say they came to Chandigarh to work, not for houses, which I understand honestly… There's diverse people in slums, some are not that poor, but 70-80% are very poor; can't pay rents, can't cover children food, hardly imagine they can study".*
- *"It is very clear that even slum-dwellers don't care about what's happening in the name of SCs; Make in India, Digital or Skill India, i.e. One reason may be that the working-class comes from many different places, so maybe-up to some extent they have their houses in their own villages, this might be a tiny portion of land, which is also an option. That is why the working class is not fighting sharply… there are struggles to decrease working hours, but not to increase wage".*

How could 'smart' technologies help in this regard? Even before digital access, the fact that slum-dwellers are often illiterate (in local languages and English) already complicates their communication with activists and any bureaucratic or political process, in general. Adding to this, the daily labourers majorly focus on surviving, they barely find time to organize a revolt in response to immediate alarms on issues that affect them, such as the provision of basic services. If activism based on personal encounters, already causes trust issues on representatives who are not that seldom attached to a longer chain of interests (according to Pali, "bourgeois parties and the administration hold local leaders to work through them"); will a much more abstract promise of *sustainable living* through *optimized use of ICTs* and the beautification of certain sectors up to *world-class standards*, generate hope among slum-dwellers? It seems commonsensical to categorically respond "no", which was indeed confirmed by the interviewees in various *bastis*, during numerous visits, as I will sketch below. Yet such recognition is insufficient for GASM and other activists alike, who keep busy reflecting about more effective strategies, which despite time and team constraints, could be rewarding in a longer term, like education i.e. For now, the influence of GASM's work is manifested in some legal advancements (denouncing wrong spelling in applicants' formularies for housing, as well as independently contacting the police in case of (sexual) abuses, instead of solely discussing it among commoners), which sporadically favoured some families. These are also long processes, which require a set of professionals cooperating with good will, in addition to the right documents, and informed *clients*. Overall, this whole context depicts very distanced, say abyssal, possibilities for SC to be subverted towards the advantage of *subaltern urbanism*. Especially since whoever has engaged in public housing, among other basic rights, is conscious of the varied ways biometric surveys can be manipulated, in order to strike out families that have been waiting up to 10 years from the list. Blinding such pressing needs, while re-directing attention to further redeveloping some hubs, is a luxury that only certain sections of the city can afford.

c) No chance for in situ – 'digital' stands for 'world-class'

The SC basically enables a regime of exceptionality that, in the same manner, 'allows constructing an IT Park without deep, detailed studies on the relevance and need of an IT Park (t)here, just because it's the in-thing to have'. Further, Jyoti (pseudonym), who is an architect and senior activist, fought 10 years for the case, in order to avoid the acquisition of 500 acres (a third of the project) for the IT Park. However the project is technically not cancelled, since now the area is going to be the third phase of Chandigarh's 2031 Master Plan (CPM). Considering Chandigarh's distinctive history, even prior to SCs, land disputes over 'Rajiv Gandhi's, rather known as IT Park' imply a major reference to understand how politicians and corporates take advantage of digital trends, in order to deliberately sell or appropriate land at exceptionally low prices (10% of its value), without any previous consultation. 'Ridiculous' observes Jyoti, who resides in the area. "One of the main purposes of the Periphery was preventing land speculation"- reminds us Manish Chalana (2015, 75) – yet "the Chandigarh administration engages in effectively that". Just like SCs, the project was "promoted as a SEZ, PPPs circumvent land's use laws/local jurisdiction". Interchangeably hence, policy makers and influential citizens re-interpret the meaning and purpose of the 'greenbelt' established by Le Corbusier in a Garden Cities logic as a 'buffer zone' around the city, in order to forbid poor migrants to encroach, hence, approach planned sectors. Yet commonly this zone is offered in the real estate market for middle-/upper classes or indeed for corporate projects. According to Jyoti such are mostly arbitrary decisions accompanied by questionable 'self-cooked data', which justifies it. While the CMP 2031, e.g., mentions "restoring the original city-periphery concept is well [-] nigh impossible at this stage", it also 'identifies seventeen pockets within the Periphery for high-density developments in a variety of uses including residential, commercial, institutional and infrastructure' (ibid. 77). In parallel, under the excuse of safeguarding a barely visited park, as well as in view of a metro, which is not official yet, slum-dwellers were displaced (Express 2016) in light of Chandigarh's status as India's "garden and oxygen capital" presumably being threatened (TNN 2017b). Thus, it is clear that generally, the City Beautiful elites prefer throwing money at roses (the Rose Garden (pic. 11) in Sector 16 is an iconic, living monument) and keeping the poor apart, rather than investing in water,

electricity, and waste infrastructure for all. Thus, re-activating small-scale economies or skilling, just as Smart Cities should be about: improving everyone's, not solely the rich quality of life. These, as other engaged citizens, who have observed how the city and broadly how India works can tell, are neither managerial, nor technical mistakes. With or without ICT services, class ideology governs. Corruption and undemocratic practices have frustrated generations of well-trained citizens, willing to collaborate in city governance like Jyoti or Madhu:

"According to the master plan: *whenever something is redeveloped there should be efforts for intermixing social groups, but ultimately, it's a combination of the market and political power, which determine the outcomes, and they get away with it, no one challenges them…it's just incredible! I think the issue is when there is no transparency, no accountability and no clear criteria on which decisions are made, then it becomes an old-boys-club… the whole idea of setting the Housing Board was to make affordable housing available, especially for those who can't compete in the market, so it was really for lower income groups. First 2/3 years they did build for EWS, afterwards it became high-income groups. Over a period of 10 years, when the population grew over a few lakhs, they built so many units for non-residents Indians*[10]*, with subsidized land, while not even a single unit was built for EWS!*

During her tenure (1998 to 2001), Sarin made pressure to reshape Housing Board policy according to projections of demand and shortage. But nobody liked it, she says, so her contract ended. Similarly, Jyoti got tired of 'being allotted to a lot of ineffectual committees', so she decided to work outside of a 'body that has no real political intentions to serve needs'. The kind of data SCP aims to collect (more precise information about waste and transport management) will not change much for the deliberate socio-spatial marginalization of the working poor. Drawing upon a conversation with Housing Board's a high official, I underline some rhetorical and practical strategies to (un)recognize the RTC depends on class. While slum-dwellers are commonly neglected as untrustworthy subjects, the Housing Board is proud of fighting such 'mafia': "they actually love slums, but they apply for housing, because they want to make business". Still, public housing is not a gift. In fact: "they can't sell it and then go back to the slums. If they really need a house, then they have to live there". Even if obliged to rent it for 20 years[vii], improvements through retrofitting situated knowledge is entirely sidelined prior, during or after the construction.

"It is my housing", the technocrat says, *"1000 people will say 1000 things, but, they're not professionals, they don't know what is right from wrong. They don't even know what is the importance of ventilation, so why should I want them? I don't think I should" (…) "I am an architect, I am professional, I understand LC, they don't, so who'll teach me?"*

[10] In addition to CPM 2031, Chalana (2015, 74) points out "Punjab had proposed a township northwest of Chandigarh meeting ''international standards'' for nonresident Indians or Indian expatriates looking for a second or retirement home in their native land. The town of Anandgarh (originally proposed as 'New Chandigarh'in 1995) aimed becoming "an ultra-modern, futuristic city with global vision, built on a 10,500-acre site that contained over two dozen villages and productive farmlands".

Following the architect, Le Corbusier conditioned the city's exceptionality to the degree that the working poor, from anywhere in India, are not legitimated to aspire the same life quality than the inhabitants of planned Chandigarh:

"*If you ask them, they want the world. They want a hospital right next to their house. But they don't want a slum right next to their neighborhood, right?* (…) *I cannot allow narrow streets, how will my ambulance pass through those shanties? Not in Chandigarh. Migrants (slum-dwellers) come from Bihar, UP where the streets are also narrow. We don't want to propagate it. Dhanas is a planned area. When the population is good enough to demand their own hospital, the ambulance will reach there.*"

Even if their sole demand is improving the infrastructure, they constructed by themselves, instead of being demolished, slum-dwellers and its advocates (GASM, e.g.) are not heard. Their contribution is vital for society, yet rehabilitation *in situ* is not a possibility for the administration. Major construction projects around Elante Mall, formerly industrial area, used to be bordered by the biggest working-class colonies, until Colony 5 and now Colony 4 remain the last ones standing. Jyoti, also a professor, remembers an incident at the College of Architecture:

"Students would suggest creating a three-storied commercial building as a boundary so that they (Colony 5) are behind… No one would believe that 33% of the population lives in slums; people just don't want to look. They want to continue making walls, blocking them away… they had this fear…"

"*So the character of the area is shifting to a more consumption-based (malls and hotels) place than a production-based place-* says Aanya, a scholar at IISER Mohali - *people feel more safe when only their kind of people inhabits the space around them. (…) If you really want to make an area smart then pick up a slum area, nicely manage waste in it, put up plants, sewerage, water, electricity systems, manage electronically. There one has the potential to put-in systems and actually improve citizens lives. But the way they're doing it is that they're already picking up areas that are already well developed in terms of the services. The SC is meant for the already polished classes.*"

In Chandigarh, as it is the case inter-nationally most often than not, SCs pursue a classist raison d'être. Hence, expanding a consumption 'lifestyle' is favored over providing public services, support health and education. Colony nr. 5, initially constituted due to the Industrial Area, is now in ruins. It became a very depressed area, almost liquidated (pic. 12). Remarkably, in comparison to other *bastis*, inhabitants who do not have access to water nor proper food, immediately got closer to me in large groups, because of curiosity, indeed, but especially hoping I could provide any kind of help. The biggest mall of the North Western region stands now as a huge massive white and glass wall (pic. 13) radically dividing the daily landscapes of those who afford buying there and those who barely survive.

5.3. Discussing 'smart city' plans in the street, not in apps

In parallel with chapter 4, I propose examining the contestation of Chandigarh's SCP by focusing on the three sections that helped us structure the inquiry of the RTC within the national SCM. To start with, (a) we will analyze the main justifications for Chandigarh's SC candidacy (Chandigarh Administration 2016b). Its promotion as an *IDEAL city* and the accentuation of a rewarding trajectory confirm that the point is not extending services but scaling up in the rankings. It is clear that in Chandigarh's second attempt, (b) bureaucrats have exemplarily employed the concept of Area-based and Pan-city development, even more decisively expressing capitalist visions of master planning (CPM 2031, i.e.) through the SCs' language. The voices of a diverse group of interviewees, either currently working at the administration, or having constructed close social relations, serve to counter the SC discourse of transparency, efficiency and increased participation. Since, due to the design and low density of the city in comparison to other Indian metropolis long residents get to know the majority of influential citizens *personally*. Interviewees often manifest distrust towards the consultations that arguably were only performed to vindicate the interventions and vision of the city that the administration anyways had in mind, initially (c). Not even bureaucrats understand the meaning of 'smartness' it is testified; yet they see this as an opportunity to grab funds from the central state and private investors. In other words, there was never an instance of dialogue, wherein proposals originated from social movements, individuals or any kind of associations with diverse, hence, conflictive interests (Mouffe 2000) that could bring planning debates much closer to citizens' daily struggles. Nonetheless, comfort with structural privileges, frustration outcomes in earlier attempts to participate (as illustrated above), together with the UT's subordination to national schemes disrupt possibilities for citizens' skepticism to lead to active contestations of the 'smart' paradigm. On the optimistic side, only middle/upper-class citizens (whom I interviewed in the mall or in IT offices) identify with the project. Critical scholars, activists, slum-dwellers clearly do not. 'If politicians would care for us then, they would essentially stop demolitions and focus on *in situ* development of schools, e.g. Especially among daily laborers there is hardly any appropriation of 'smartness', as Datta diagnosed. Their priorities differ radically on the way of constructing community networks and reclaiming basic infrastructure.

Even one year after the policy was launched in September 2015, instead of achievements there was generalized shock, due to the absence of Chandigarh when the first SCs' list was published. This remained the common denominator for citizens to follow the Administration's response until its inclusion in the second list was celebrated, hence avoiding what could have become an existential crisis (Rohtaki 2018b). "You take any parameter, Chandigarh is the best city in India", the Municipal Commissioner reflects, "infrastructure is almost 100% covered and 40% of the entire area is green (…) yet that doesn't mean there's no path for future development". Definitely, the most repetitive explanation for the later consideration of Chandigarh in the SCs' list is that Chandigarh is a SC already, actually much earlier than the term itself. Indeed, the *high quality services* that its citizens enjoy do not fit national parameters, rather the objective (generally, yet particularly amidst the SCM) is reaching 'foreign standards' (Rohtaki 2017). On top of that, another pragmatic explanation may be that on the attempt to stick to the Master Plan 2031, which was determined much earlier, the Administration (2016a) failed on aligning to the central government's vocabulary and format of smartness; ironically calling for major consultancy reliance. An influential architect who works for the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) said:

"The first city to be recognized as a SC was Bhubaneswar and that's the most stupid city as compared to Chandigarh… It may be that they gave a fantastic idea, but I could see the entire exercise of SCs: to hire a man, who is best on writing in English and coping proposal from somewhere irrelevant from this place and they evaluate and rank this".

a) 'Already smart', but justified

As point of departure, in a city where basic services are virtually guaranteed for the residents of planned sectors, Chandigarh's Commissioner explains "our path will be totally different". Although ICTs work as a scapegoat for further comfort, not everything is built upon technology in Chandigarh's SC vision, rather supplying an 'experience of a sustainable living' in line with middle-/upper class lifestyle/desires.

"*Instead of basic infrastructure, more towards happiness, healthiness, greenery, better urban understanding, better infrastructure and better experience for people. (…) First, there should be an in-built smartness in the infrastructure and processes related to the citizen. So, whether it's bus services or government services (…) smart system would be if you can apply from your home. Second, you should get the status report automatically, on your mobile phone or on your computer so you need not visit a certain place and check once and again what has happened. Similarly, when streetlight is not working, then detecting it immediately by generating a message coming directly to the concerned office. (…) The goal of a city is to provide a certain kind of experience to its citizens, smartness is not only technology; but where a citizen enjoys his or her life; a sustainable, healthy and happy environment: not that much pollution, space to play, for re-creation activities, such as morning yoga*".

A SCP is basically an exercise of city branding, yet tourists are less targeted in this endeavor. Rather, describing Chandigarh as the 'best, happiest, and cleanest city' resembles a presentation card to attract private investment. Further displayed awards corroborate this depiction: 'among the top 25 outsourcing destinations in the world', 'best e-governance', '4th most livable city in India- high HDI', 'model Solar City' or, in accordance to the Smart Cities Council, 'India's most promising city' (Chandigarh Administration 2016b, 4). Furthermore, as recommended by the NIUA, the analysis of 'Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats' (ibid. 5) supposes a self-assessment strategy to simulate critical reflexivity on an overtly abstract conception of citizens' living conditions. Consequently, this works as a self-applauding tool for the luxuries middle-/upper classes do (strengths) and could (opportunities) further enjoy. While inequality, violence, and further injustices are overlooked, 'safety concerns' counts among possible 'threats'[11]. Other weaknesses ('limited private sector employment opportunities') and opportunities ('strategic location, excellent connectivity, potential to develop Knowledge and services hub') point at *qualities* that would make the city attractive for *business and a world-class lifestyle*. The further elaboration of Chandigarh as 'an IDEAL city' is sustained by similar superficial descriptions, which avoid any concrete compromises. The already "Innovative Distinctive & Dynamic Economically vibrant Accessible Livable city" aims to comparable abstract goals (ibid.): 'a Vibrant and Distinct Regional Centre', envisioned as a leader in sustainability, livability, equality and innovation; a City that celebrates its 'Modern Planned Heritage'. Note that *equality* refers to *opportunities* (Municipal Corporation 2016), hence, opting for *accessibility* to housing, health, education, transport, or welfare, which numerous studies (Duggal 2010; Kumar Teotia 2013, 2016) have categorically denied to exist. If any improvements for the working poor can be identified at the intersection of ABD and Pan-city initiatives, then such are always thought in function of service providing, like Transit Oriented Development, i.e. Under the slogan of "better preventing than cure", the plan welcomes "strategic blueprint development", which intends to 'emerge stronger to withstand the 21st Century challenges of climate change and modern-day disasters… merely by improving public transport and walking paths (Chandigarh Administration 2016c). A much direct response to diminish traffic and pollution would be that the

[11] "Rising traffic congestion, parking, high risk seismic zone, competition for investment, outward migration of youth employment". (ibid.)

grids' residents choose public over private transport. 'The rich won't get off their 4-wheelers, though'. In contrast, within *planned Chandigarh* the poor already opt for the 'cleanest' transportation methods: walking, sharing rickshaws or bicycles. Bearing in mind that enhancing *flow* was not the only initial purpose of the grid, yet also one of the most relevant commonalities with the SCs' imaginary, it is understandable that sophisticated and exorbitant costly transport infrastructure awakes the interests of public-private investors, such as the French proposal of 'three Tricity corridors', in order to deal with "traffic generators" (Rohtaki 2018c).

An additional source of concern for Chandigarh is, according to a PU historian, the constant pressure to catch up with any modernizing trend, such as Navi Mumbai's coins of 'eco-friendly, sustainability', which seemed to be missing. Consequently, particularly amidst the 2014 elections, there was a need of bringing in a fresh (digital, global) vocabulary, which is more attractive than JNURRM reforms. "Only then there was a lot of noise about SCs", says a researcher at IISER Mohali, "it has been thrown on us as a panacea for all the ills of the city, but I think it's a fraud". Indeed, as acknowledged by Praveen (pseudonym) a senior resident, who had the opportunity to lead architect and industrial unions, the word 'smart' comes from 'smartphones', yet the mission itself derives from Modi's pressure to catch-up with the 21st century:

"In terms of infrastructure, most of our cities are third class. They don't have systems, electricity distribution, medical facilities aren't available, no transport system, the educational system is also deficient… Everything that grew by itself that's it! ... SCs is about who has the power, that's it.'

Aanya, also from IISER Mohali, points at the symbiotic relationship between nationalism and modernism:

"Each time urban planning is seen as a tool to create a certain kind of citizenry and image for the country – *nationalism pulls on this notion of both being forward looking and reinventing history and then proclaiming a bright future. The idea of India shining, e.g., within that notion SCs fit perfectly"*.

"While the UT administrator hoisted the National Flag at Sector 17 parade ground on Republic Day" the press echoes such bureaucrat's vision of "Chandigarh, the pride of India, turning out to be an ideal Smart City [since] in the area of e-governance it has already taken the lead" (HT 2016). Nonetheless, three years after the Mission was initiated, almost no changes can be identified *in the ground*. Efforts and funds were physically, not even digitally, concentrated on *governance*. By building an expensive Smart City Office (Express 2018), i.e., bureaucratic governance is literally put at the

center. Thus, even if Chandigarh's Administration (2016b, 2) promotes the changes for diversifying the use of ICTs (i.e. through Aadhaar, e-kiosks to pay taxes, citizen friendly websites, SCADA for water management, 88 biometric devices in important departments), these are rather governance tools, which facilitate management. An outstanding minority of citizens interviewed pointed at *e-governance* as a 'smart' novelty. Similarly, to Modi's apps (pic. 14), Chandigarh envisions using ICTs, which by no means fulfill deliberative, but solely affirmative means. Aansh (pseudonym), a social journalist, asserts how complicated it is to find a story in Chandigarh, because 'everything works there', 'there are enough paying centers, which are never full'. Yet amidst the IT hype, the use of ICTs is a medal to show off:

"A cow loving person-sending messages in Whatsapp fits perfectly. More app downloads give better ranking, so the administration encourages people through the radio. They tell you 'last year we fucked up in cleanliness rankings, this year please download the app'. The administration put its website into an app and there's also a police alarm app. Some company sold this idea to lots of cities. These kids know business, probably studied in the same college".

b) The quest for capturing public funds

The fertility of the smart discourse to attract 'innovative' business (digital, real estate, services) is not merely invoked by most of the bureaucrats interviewed, who see a chance for expanding industries, but it is also supported by young middle/upper-class citizens, who already sense growing competition in the labor and education markets. "Where will our educated children go?" - asks Praveen – "How can we avoid them moving out elsewhere and facilitate them further comfortable living in Chandigarh". In response, the city's Commissioner reinstates Le Corbusier's project as a 'concentric site of exchanges', where there is hardly any scope for an industrial area. Nonetheless, in spite of observing that in such area 'land is a very scarce commodity', he does envision a kind of industry, although different from 'mass-scale manufacturing'. Instead 'knowledge and service industries (i.e. hotels, convention centers, offices)' should profit from the high level of technical education in Chandigarh and its surroundings. Hence, the Chief Architect admits that one of the central goals within Chandigarh's SC's framework is 'planning an incubation center, where start-ups can come' and together with the already existing technical institutes, "these people will park themselves, as interface for the industry and for meeting new people".

In a similar arbitrary manner cited earlier, there is the possibility that the percentages of public support are in fact 'self-cooked data', yet due to the lack of transparency such is hard to question. We may be forced to assume the 'consultation' results, that 95% voted for establishing Area Based Development in sectors 17, 22, 35, 43 (where 'smart' services (Rohtaki 2016) should be concentrated), while 98% said 'yes' to "Greenfield Development for the stretch along Vikas Marg with a proposed Business and Financial Centre". Making himself responsible for the project, Praveen explains me how the SCM entails a golden opportunity for pressure groups to attract public funding[viii]. According to him, among policy makers no one is certain of the history and meaning of 'smart', but that's not an impediment to make business and redefine it. Anyways many agents attempt to sell services. He poses an example:

"If I'm in engineer on software from Bangalore I'd come to the government and tell them that what you need is big-dat, and computing power, and you know that kind of thing. And I'll try to ensure that all money goes into SCs, which is into data collection… Let's say I'm selling train wheels; I'd say SC means good transportation."

So very broadly, ABD is about the geographical concentration of '*essential smart city features' (Chandigarh Administration 2016b, 10)*. Resembling IBM's or CII's diversified expositions of offered services, the diagram envisions an area with 'public Wi-Fi hotspots, interactive kiosks, underground wiring, pollution level monitoring, police kiosks/e-Beats, smart meters and grids, solar energy, scientific waste disposal, GPS enabled bin-tracking system', among others (ibid.). Nonetheless, some of the measures could also be viable without technologies, like 'designated car-free zones' or '100% coverage of path and cycling tracks'. However, the emphasis is put on a certain 'smart' lifestyle: street cafés and open plazas are part of "Sector 17's rejuvenation". Shown in a 'before and after' aesthetics (ibid. 14); these novelties approximate *make-up,* rather than substantial changes. "Landscaped open spaces" i.e. are accompanied with "street furniture": bus stand, street sign, bench, and led lights. Yet if the heritage status already forbids even the smallest interventions, such as painting the balconies with another color or shape[ix], how are they going to re-shape Le Corbusier's into 'smart' sectors? Or did the materialization of such utopia never really matter anyways? Two years after the mission was launched, the only differences I note in the streets are blue (instead of green) traffic signs with the Smart City logo on it (pic. 15), as well as a laser show (with music and projections) in S-17 (pic. 16), and wagons selling water (pic.17), instead of making it more reachable (cleaning it, e.g.). Yet the privatization of services is also going to affect the middle-classes. Pali warns

that the majority is ignorant of such disadvantages at the moment, because of identifying with upper mobility aspirations (hegemonic culture). In the same vein, 'smart parking' has meant installing kiosks, where 10 rupees are charged, although analogously. Thus, if fighting 'encroachment parking' is aimed, in order to give middle/upper-class citizens a feeling of security ('they just want to be among themselves') "Smart Sector Surveillance" might not even be required. The working poor, rural migrants are not only stigmatized as the protagonists for robbery or as danger for sexual molestation, but, i.e., in commercial sectors their presence remains an undecided polemic, since the shopkeepers in S-17 have been protesting and putting pressure for informal vendors to leave elsewhere, even if they acquire credentials. Thus, it would not be surprising to see ABD, the 'smart hub', getting declared as a widely privatized area 'free of informality, free of encroachers'. In a Pan-City approach, however, not even the most basic urban facilities, like water supply, are displayed in Chandigarh's SCP's highlights (ibid). Even if a Housing Board Official remarks that 'whichever superficial scheme *has to be there'*, because of "politics, you know, they will always have a soft corner for the slum people", 'pan-city solutions' demarcate a neoliberal, self-responsibilizing regime, where PPP suppose gains for all:

"The biggest share of public investment goes to infrastructure, such as hotels or convention center, says the Commissioner, *which is going to bring more egalitarianism. Everyone is going to be benefitted out of a better water supply system. Except for illegal encroachers in government's land… the rest of the population will rather be benefitted indirectly, through new jobs (skilled and not)."*

Pan-city solutions rely on technology, wherein 'smart' traces the line between city-citizens and city-servants. Hence, any infrastructure that could benefit poorer sections is initially thought in terms of the services they could provide (to middle/upper-classes, legitimate residents), and not in regard to their own living:

"W*e're trying to use more working places in that area, so that big development gives them opportunities to work (…) this are basically "service sector people", who are staying in slums, so they'll need less time to travel, and then we're building 70kms of cycle tracks – trying to promote bike-sharing process and trying to use technology: implementing an intelligent traffic management system."*

Remarkably, the choice of pan-city initiatives; on one hand the 'smart integrated e-governance' and the expansion of a unified Intelligent Multi-modal command and control center (water, police, health and traffic systems, e.g.) on the other, are also backed by public support or at least that's what they say. 68% of votes prioritized e-governance, understood as "online delivery of citizen services". "Enhancing the safety and security of citizens through tech solutions" comprised the 16%, while

"integrated public transport and smart traffic management solutions" got 15% of the votes. 1% went to "energy efficient intelligent street lighting" and 0% went to "technology enabled healthcare solutions". Judging from the interviews I held nonetheless, I am highly skeptical. The majority of citizens I talked to revealed concerns about jobs, increasing rents, and managing to pay study fees. Indeed, safety is an issue, especially for women, who feel threatened by *newcomers*, in light of further rape and molestation cases going public (I will return to this in the discussion). However, violence is often enclosed behind doors and social structures. Dominant subjects are anyways capable of buying innocence, while CCTV cameras fail to protect targeted minorities (Pathak 2018). Even technological solutions, it should be underlined, are normed by social hierarchies; as illustrated by the following examples:

A scholar from Punjab University argues "whoever implements these policies at a very local level has all subjective perceptions and biases when it comes to gender, caste, class…" Hence, in regard to 'safety and security', she describes how guards at PU are entitled to sanction couples or punish women, who come 'late' to their hostels. Cameras, hence, work rather as tools for imposing fear, for disciplining, although rather human decisions matter. "Cameras won't keep society us safe from the panic based on caste (which she calls a 'collective amnesia') or religious discrimination, that wouldn't be an issue if the subject is an upper-class male". At the same time, "middle/upper-class*boys* are also violent, but remain protected by families, concerned they will not get 'well married' if people find out they consume drugs, which is a latent issue in Punjab, and especially in Chandigarh". The biggest criminals are probably those, who profit from someone else's sweat; CCTV won't capture that.

"Safety should be part of our culture, says an established architect, *cameras and policemen won't help. This is a planned city, if something goes wrong, I would not say it's unintentional, but intentional. (Stratified) planning is one of the tools to promote discrimination…"*

Secondly, waste management is an interesting example of how huge investments in smart technologies (sensors, e.g.) could be spared if social commitment is prioritized. Separation of solid waste, i.e., could start from households. Motivated by the SCs' framework, students at Nitte University, Mangalore, launched an awareness campaign last year, which however lasted very shortly, due to meager support of the authorities. On the other hand, a PU historian emphasizes how systems for waste collection developed at university have failed when implemented in the city, due to the lack of

communication of the initiative. "The problem across Indian cities" he says "is governance. The decision-taking body is always the state, so if citizens are not *there* it takes always a longer period for the people to accept what the state offers". Nonetheless, citizen engagement was only conceived very superficially in Chandigarh's SCP, basically solely for promotion rather than for tacit implementation or follow-up of the policy. In fact, only daily laborers will keep dealing with everyone's waste, which is a fundamental work, indeed, yet very badly paid and at the expense of mostly inhuman conditions[x]. Principally in this topic, the classist connotations of 'smartness' related to culture and sanitation arise the clearest. Following Chandigarh's Commissioner:

"You must understand in India, people are very smart in adapting technologies and then there will be people who we take as illiterate or semi-illiterate that also use smartphones… The application of this smartness in making your surrounding means fulfilling basic duties (saving resources, keeping their city clean, understanding the city culture and contributing to it). If a city has to make toilets, i.e., these cannot be right next to each other… if the citizens are not smart, not beautiful in using those toilets then you cannot make a city open defecation-free. So that is the difference between a SC and a non-SC. You go to a developed city and you will find that people don't even throw a piece of paper on the street, they'll look for the garbage bin and then they throw it there."

This means that even if laborers are in charge of keeping the city functioning, i.e. by maintaining it clean, their socio-spatial category of 'slum-dwellers' is used as the opposite of 'smartness', ironically denying them the right to enjoy such cleanliness around their own homes. Despite the conditions, all the houses and residents in *bastis* and rehabilitation colonies I could visit, were very clean. It is, hence, outrageously unfair, that the working poor inhabiting in slums, are under constant risks of diseases (pic. 18), due to the bad quality of the scarce water they manage to access, which obliges the ones who can afford it to spend significant sums on water tankers. Further, Datta (2018, 9) highlights Chandigarh's "smart cleaning strategy" (inspired by analogous best-practices in Mohali) as an example of the exclusionary behavior that "smart citizenship" dynamics reproduce. While citizens are encouraged to track "the attendance, uniform, equipment and performance of sweepers"- 'by taking pictures and upload them in real time to a municipality's cloud-based software' - *the digital* is instrumental to prolongue (post)colonial notions of sanitation, it traces an *abyssal line* between 'smart' and 'subaltern citizens'. The former, "claimed their space in a smart urban future using their 'digital acts' to discipline the latter", as they are legitimised to surveill working-classes, who have "little or no control over their own labor" (ibid).

A PU sociologist calls this "absent presence[xi]": even if 'they sustain the economy of the city', slum-dwellers are simply absent from the imagination of residents, 'absent from our discourses, our language, our questions, from everywhere'. She adds:

*"We don't need to talk about them, because they're **there**. You throw away your domestic help, another one will come, because of the surplus availability of labor in this country. This is all connected to global processes, though. Consider labor-chowks, where unemployed laborers keep standing throughout the day, waiting for somebody to give them work (many in the city) … And **they** are talking about SCs, when people are not earning the daily wage, the basic minimum they can't earn. They are unemployed in this city and **you** are throwing them away, even from their slums"*. (Emphasis added).

On top of that, while authorities refuse to recognize 'illegal settlements' as part of the city, slum-dwellers are essentially forced to survive without proper water or sanitation systems. The fear that more families arrive, structurally deprives them for their RTC:

"*If there are five people in the family, says the earlier cited architect, they call everyone from the village… poverty remains a critical issue, but it can't be used as a business. For them it's a business', occupying land, which is a mechanism for owning it… and you know what's the price of land here! A rickshaw driver just deserves the right to accept, but not own the shelter (…), because the priority for him is not living, not quality of life, it is money."*

c) Pride and shame: constituting a smart caste

At the junction between Le Corbusier's Chandigarh and Chandigarh as a SC stand elites' efforts to maintain their privileges, considering that intrinsic to modernizing urban trends, the growing pressure for legitimating planning and policy interventions with citizens' participation (relying on the (only recent) development of digital ICTs) is nowadays not only utopic, but plausibly possible. The deeper we investigate the consultations' process, the more chiefly we confirm that SPVs rely on the guidance of consultancies and companies, rather than on pleas coming from *mainstream* citizens. An upper-class caste, conformed by bureaucrats and businessmen, is entitled by the SCM to trace the line that defines *(non) smart citizenry*. Hence, legitimated by Chandigarh's *pride* discourse and relying on the city's *exceptional* history; amidst the SCM, a modernist discourse imposes again varied categories of s*hame,* on the ones, who materially construct and sustain such infrastructure. Altogether (in *epistemic, material and civic* senses) not only currently, but decidedly, also in decades to come, the indifference towards the struggles and needs of India's majoritarian population, the working-classes, is justified by SC planning. Besides being deprived of their RTC on a discursive basis, hence, the following *performances* aim to institutionalize it.

The bureaucrats that I interviewed commonly emphasized that the SCP did not appear randomly manifesting the interests of the ruling classes, but various steps were accomplished, in order to ascertain the consideration of 'people's aspirations'. Yet the role of consultancy agencies and corporate meetings preponderated in this exercise. In fact, it was not the lack of budget, what kept Chandigarh's SC projects ineffective for around two years (up till I held the majority of interviews in March 2017). Concretizing negotiations with consultancy firms was a condition for the interventions to be launched, since "they are the ones that are going to make the project reports, who issue attendance and who are going to help us finalizing the company", says the Municipality's Joint Commissioner. Furthermore, globally powerful agencies (such as AECOM (TNN 2015, 2016, 2017a)) were hired[xii], in order to administer the "social media and public interaction". Yet besides voting platforms (calculated by the 'reach' of likes, comments, or polls) on Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, and the municipality's app, 'mygov', citizens' were *allegedly*[xiii] encouraged to participate through feedback forms, essay, drawing competitions, and within meetings. "So, both online and offline modes are there", says the bureaucrat. However, anytime I requested the possibility of observing some forms, I was directed to another official or told to come back tomorrow. No one was capable of showing me one formulary. Worse, the only feedback forms I found online[12] ridicule whatever e-governance/e-democracy theoretical discussion as it brazenly asks for affirming with the SCP in two out of three questions; whereas in the third one it is possible to suggest modifications to be *included*. Additionally, outraging is the compulsory mandate to put personal information, wherein the "father or husband name" emphasize the patriarchal and classist associations, which keep ruling the city.

Anyways, it was estimated that around 60% of the population participated (Chandigarh Administration 2016b, 6). As a result, the higher priorities are in the ranking, the more abstract are compromises, and vice versa, the lower percentages, more concrete solutions would be required[13]. Furthermore, the multiple-choice modality implies that both questions and answers are already given. Discussing about

[12] https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/draft-document-vision-and-sub-goals-chandigarh-ideal-city/; https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/give-suggestions-how-make-chandigarh-smart-city/
[13] 1) Economy, 2) safety, 3) e-governance, 4) water and electricity, 5) waste and sanitation, 6) education, health, city infrastructure, 7) mobility (ibid. 7).

taxes, land privatization, or investment (not geographically, but questioning the consumption economy vs. transforming *bastis* into higher life quality areas) is not an option. Rather, well framed by a neoliberal ideology, there are only two items under *economy*: *access to employment opportunities* 62% and the *ease of doing business* 38%. Even in regard to *e-governance*[14] (apparently 3rd priority; 16%) 41% voted for participation *in city planning*. Yet, consultations are not foreseen as a long-term mechanism for communication between citizens and their representatives[xiv], i.e., but these are most surely *performed* in order to pass to the next SCs' round.

Expert agencies were hired in order to assure Chandigarh's selection in the SCM. They advised how to display a consultation process (e.g. pictures and attendance lists are obligatory for validating meetings (ibid. 9)), which results in seemingly unbiased *priorities,* in spite of encompassing highly political questions. In parallel, this explains why the precise content or development of participatory mechanisms are irrelevant for current or future policy-making, following the Chairman of the Indian Green Building Council Chandigarh Chapter (one of centers of excellence CII):

"There is no file, because otherwise how could you understand what 100000 people want, is not relevant. They did invite some people, but it wasn't very detailed that every citizen should participate. No, it can't be possible... For a person living in a slum the priority is different, than mine… is a very complicated process that is not known to you, not known to me, how as a citizen I could know how to answer these 15 questions? No, they as an agency will answer it. I've been through Mackenzie report on what makes cities great; 1: doing more with less, 2: people, 3: governance; 3 issues, if you take care of them you will have the city smart".

The clearest evidence that policy/business elites are expected to embody, "smart citizenry" is visible in the task of *networking SPVs* with *handholding agencies* (French Development Agency and CII) and so-called *vendors* (Danish, French and UK cities, CISCO, and Indian Fair of solution providers) (ibid. 19). Besides, public meetings "are formalities, not active participation", says a sociologist, who in spite of working in Chandigarh for 20 years, has never seen a consultation, but read it in the newspapers. "Of course, they have to make some proceedings on suggestions", he adds, "but these are *ad hoc arrangements*". What is precisely discussed in the meetings then? "They are just chatting"- says Jyoti - "high profile citizens, don't understand SCs, but their names matter…depth of dialogue is not there". Some RWAs might indeed attend, says another interviewee, yet "they represent the middle-

[14] The rest of e-governance elements are: "access to government schemes" and "ease of bill payments"; hence safeguarding the *status quo*: top-down city management.

classes, who are more politically active and most of the time men, who have some political alignment with people in power." This means, critical or somehow deviant subjects would be even sharply uninvited; just like a member from GASM, who resides in sector 20: "after 3 days I got to know through newspapers that there were meetings in the park just behind my house" – he laughs... Those, who have engaged on reclaiming political and legal channels as a relief for subaltern groups, know it's not technologies or new schemes, but political will that grants or restricts the RTC:

"*There is no such thing like common decision-making. The SCP was itself made by the WB and it is implemented through finance capital. The working class is not included, and they are the real sufferers from this plan. Participation is totally fake. The results were published openly, but as I said earlier: even the large protests of slum-dwellers were not recognized in the smart city plan. So how can we say that the administration will listen to the individual worker when they are ignoring the large protests*?"

6. Discussion: do 'smart cities' shrink or expand the Right to the City?

Taking the global *virality* of the SCs paradigm as point of departure, the purpose of this research has been inquiring whether such discourse, charged of novel possibilities for governance, optimization of resources, and citizen's participation (just to mention a few), is actually reliable for developing into policies that enlarge the RTC by putting particularly subaltern struggles at the center. Consequently, a focus on diverse and intrinsically stratified forms of exercising citizenship in India, which remains being mostly determined by socio-economic positioning (under globalized capitalism, this could be generalized elsewhere), implied concentrating on the construction of a 'smart citizen(ship)' – overall an audaciously abstract concept. For the means of approaching the second part of our research question, hence, this section quickly summarizes to what extent is the RTC endangered by SC initiatives inter-nationally. The illustration and discussion of *bottom-up* contestations to SCs' promisy-making start by outlining the insights of contextualizing Chandigarh, our case study, in a much wider (in fact, existential) tradition of modernist planning (6.1). Nonetheless the rhetoric and dynamics of safeguarding or contesting elitism are keen to identify similarities across further SC projects. Altogether, this research's focus on right to housing debates and activism suggests abating the pressurized optimism on 'chatur citizen' formations, since also in contraposition to 'smartness' we find fertile grounds for (re)constituting subalternity (6.2.), as exemplified by street vendors, women, artists, and students - by expanding the field of RTC contestations (6.3).

By locating SCs, next to Garden Cities or CIAM utopias, within a broader history of repeated attempts to universalize the norms of urban planning, this dissertation has attempted to re-think the nature, depth, in sum, the validity of questions we might have discarded by assimilating the conclusion of certain periods of *paternalistic/ managerial technocracy*. Nonetheless, what all these enterprises share is a decisive trend (hence no mistake, but part of the plan[xv]) towards elitism and segregation. Even currently, SC discourses, beyond striving for the financial support of corporates, are usefully displayed in nationalist or localized campaigns of city branding. Alike *Le Corbusier's Chandigarh*, SCs are crucially sustained by the prestige and power that scientific clarity/ambition provokes on citizens, "who- restricted to fulfill a certain job - are proud of such well-run factory" (Kalia 1987, 43). Accordingly, decades of discontentment with the rigidity of Chandigarh's grid, wherein 'straight lines and single-use zoning did not simply have an aesthetic function, but entail an indispensable aid to scientific planning, while transforming formulas into self-fulfilling prophesies' (J. C. Scott 1998, 141); planning eventually became a source for popular, besides elitist pride. Today, technological solutions are even less considered reflections of the eccentric imagination of planners, but techno-culture seems unavoidable at any level; work, socializing, education or services. Echoing Cedric Price (*1979*), hence, it remains paramount to inquire: "*if technology is the answer; what's the question?"* In this vein, Dan Hill (2013), a talented advocator of "unlocking the potential of technology in the city" indeed warns us to not generalize digital technologies as democratic. "Let's be careful not to make the same mistakes we made 50 years ago- he says -which we are still paying for, and still making." However, widening the pool of citizen preferences and digital interaction channels, via feedbacks or crowd funding, is insufficient to assure democracy. Thus, hereby we have attempted to sketch the precise relationship between governance and the role acquired by citizens, through the use of digital technologies. Some interests become even louder, while further cement is thrown over a myriad of struggles already dismissed. Instead of fueling certain SC critic's fears over machines/technologies, this research has emphasized that domination remains among groups of human beings. Just as the force of natural 'resources', which actually cannot be managed, technologies simulate control by *displaying processes and patterns,* useful for their exploitation (Halpern 2014). Orit Halpern bridges her critique to Corbusier's and SC

enterprises by denouncing them as simplification exercises, which instead of dealing with complexity (by prioritizing dialogues based on practised knowledge), virtually displace or at best extremely reduce diversity, in order to predict the completion of a function/program (ibid.). The same logics of cybernetics, Orit argues, are now applied to SCs. Even though she refers to Masdar and Songdo (paradigmatic Greenfield enterprises) the observation that speculation (real estate, e.g.), being the driver of these projects, rather than its actual citizens and results, is a crucial commonality that we found among PPPs. Infrastructure and surveillance do not need to be materialized, in order to awake our concerns for the (ab)use of ICTs in governance.

Engaging in a multiple-scales analysis of the SCs' debate inter-nationally, in India, and in Chandigarh, this research concludes: 'smart governmentality' does not depend on a *control-room's enactment*, in order to exercise a fundamental influence on the city. Rather, digital-enabled performances of participation decisively change notions of citizenship towards data gathering. This means that, mediated by ICTs, citizens are conceived as sensors, whose (un)conscious task is providing feedback. Amidst such techno-dependent future, the market determines which choices are available. Consequently, even if entrepreneurial neoliberalism is promoted via collaborative (fiction of popular consent) endeavors, SCs are fundamentally anti-democratic: the algorithmic logic entails a huge *black-box* (de Waal and Dignum 2017, 267). For this reason, Maroš Krivý (2018, 22) insists that "the society of control is not precisely another technocratically driven top-down attempt to discipline citizens (…) [which] could be challenged by a simple inversion of this relation via a bottom-up liberation of technologies in the name of the people ", nor would it be sufficient to ask for inclusion. Such lack of creativity while criticizing SCs, yet remaining within the same cybernetic logic, is challenged by Halpern, who observes that being discontent with SCs broadly, her colleagues restrain to 'senseable cities' improvements (2014, 242). Notwithstanding, as theorized by Lefebvre and de Certeau, subordination and control are never totalitarian; divergences (often in subalternity) should therefore be taken much seriously. The right to land (Sampat 2013, 2016b), i.e., belies myths of urban self-sufficiency, since it challenges the legality/morality of accumulation. Land is not voluntarily ceded (Sampat and Sunny 2016). Beyond ICTs use for reinstating the privileged RTC, what 'smart' novelties are foreseeable for the already marginalized?

6.1. Generic exceptions: modern, beautiful, smart Chandigarh

Considering the high prestige that techno-scientific discourses enjoy in a society still enchanted with modernization, it is especially interesting to analyze SC politics from Chandigarh's historical experience, because much beyond aesthetic and discursive layers this city's socio-economic structure uncovers the SC's *true colors*. Chandigarh an elitist project from its conceptualization to its materialization should no longer be taken as an experiment towards equality that went wrong. The fact that it "now stands charged as a socially segregated city, a fortress of privilege" (Kalia 1987) is not a mistake, rather it is the accomplishment of a *regime of exclusivity* that, legitimated by planning, is justified to discard equality as desirable. Similarly, the tragedy of increasingly automatized cities (through digital technologies i.e.) is not the *lack of culture*[xvi], but the possibility of safeguarding socio-spatial and lifestyle privileges by confirming, such as the case of Chandigarh, an elitist culture. The obsession to concentrate only in the *planned sectors* by overlooking the region's history, culture, and labor conditions, upon which Chandigarh stands, is hence not a naïve miscalculation of planning[xvii]. Rather, in times of overall demographic growth in India, elites are capable of accommodating a *feudalist, modernist or smart* rhetoric, in order to guarantee the feeling of caste supremacy. The city's size moreover enables a smooth transitioning from rural to urban-rural, as a journalist formulates:

"It's easy, you own the village. In planned sectors feudal lords don't compete, they're friends. And the rest of them want to be like you. Delhi would be tough, more moneyed people, Bombay is egalitarian, nobody will give a fuck, London can't be afforded and still is no oasis. The best part is ***this*** *does not even look like India, it's better than many world countries. If you superimpose this entire structure in France it will look absolutely normal, even there people would say 'what a beautiful city'".*

Chandigarh's CEO, land owning, policy-making caste, is now entitled to embody the role of 'smart citizens', whose pictures in *meetings*- which had no real *game-changing* innovation potential apart from PPPs– will now be used to allege public consultations actually took place. In this sense, SPVs are instrumental for gaining terrain over RTC reclamations, in order to avoid assuming the responsibility to diminish inequalities and guarantee basic services. For this reason, we have forwarded the concept of 'generic exceptions' since, as a JNU sociologist argues, Chandigarh's "spirit and structure is the same than other metropolis. Just that it stands over a planned city, but it's basically a middle-class city like all the others. The core of the city is the rich."

Nonetheless, such visions, performances, and institutionalization of 'smart citizenry' are not capable of pacifying the unconformity with rising inequalities. Therefore an empirical research, which centralized the experience of student coalitions leading housing rights' reclamations in a SC's framework, could expand our learning on 'subaltern urbanism', to the extent of demonstrating, again, that in spite of the 'management' (control) ambitions of its proponents, such technocratic rationale is not as quickly and deeply internalized by critical citizens, whose struggles have and continue been defending/enlarging the RTC. Such coalition for housing conformed by students, activists, artists, and scholars (hence a very diverse constellation of class/caste/gender identities opposing neoliberal policies) extend beyond GASM the need to acknowledge alliances in foregrounding subaltern struggles. As illustrated below, interviewed activists communicate the importance of building trust networks in the *bastis*, yet in a very patient manner continuously learning to work with existing *social infra-structures* (Chattopadhyay 2012), rather than destroying it. Echoing Scott (1998, 144) "strong neighbourhoods, like strong cities, are the product of complex processes that cannot be replicated from above". Hence, *bastis* should be protected from elites, instead of being demolished. Firstly, because knowing each other for a while creates networks of solidarity and trust, to say the least security (avoiding thefts, sexual assaults and other kinds of violence). Secondly, because once communities are marginalized (selected families are now mixed in *rehabilitation*), the absence of this trust seems disastrous. According to a woman I interviewed, it means *starting from zero*. Due to mobility costs and very brief 'leisure' time, interactions get immediately restricted to new living and working locations. And finally, the working poor should have priority over the right to centrality, because (in addition of being citizens, already sufficient RTC legitimation) they are the backbone of the city.

6.2. (Re)constituting 'subalternity' – within or against 'smart urbanism'

Altogether, the methodologies, matters, and subjects, GASM (among other activist groups) engage with, in order to support slum-dwellers' exploration of varied means to reassert their RTC, defy the overall logics of SCs. While SCs opt for immediate app-enabled solutions, although eventually leading to material outcomes, citizen participation does not involve personal, but abstract (someone else - 'the system's'),

interactions. While the institutionalization of online services and sharing preferences attempt to increasingly validate likes on Facebook or views on Youtube (probably even simulated by government agencies/employees) as public support, GASM 'tactics' (Certeau)' are highly subversive (Lefebvre), because these encourage taking charge of one's-community's RTC *personally*. Consequently, rather than hoping to work with the grammar of short-term collaborative planning through reserved channels (online-polls), most activists opt for deeper, constant dialogues, which are capable of building trust relations and constructing long-term alliances. Those dissenters, who advocate for diversifying urban policy-making according to basic needs, injustices, and rights deserve much broader recognition once conceiving, implementing and correcting planning (in terms of expertise and communication with the citizens, especially those marginalized) than CEOs. Overall, the decisiveness of a common construction in dialogue with various sections of society induces to possible bridges between "smart" utopias and everyday RTC struggles, which- it should be emphasized – was never considered but stand in an apathetic relation to the plan.

On the other hand, the promptness with which Datta (2018) invokes the emergence of 'chatur citizens' as indication of a "process of decolonization from the hegemonic power of the national programme through the rhetorical subversion of smart citizenship" (13) seems overstated. The flippancy of her optimism is not solely unrealistic, but almost disrespectful to the daily struggles of laborers, whose acknowledgment of cognitive capacities, in their own terms, is by no means novel, but neither sufficient for tacit (material, civic) differences on exercising their RTC. Hence, although Datta rightly points out that "online citizen consultations extended social inequalities from the urban to the digital realm" (ibid. 9), it seems too simplistic to rely on a 'speech act', a vision, in order to suggest postcolonial subjects are capable of countering their 'exclusion from the digital realm' by reclaiming 'their right to be a smart citizen' fundamentally on an epistemic basis. "The chatur citizen is yet to come in Indian smart cities, but the discursive landscape has been cast for its emergence" - she says. Further, although Datta describes 'the chatur citizen' as a "potential breach", since she/he "finds possibilities of social collaboration across digital and material spaces to *disrupt* how things are done, who by, where and on what conditions" the author is not capable of providing any example, especially since she is anyways referring to the "future[- not the current PPPs-driven –]smart city" (ibid. 12).

Various incoherencies between the 'actually existing SC' and the future 'smart/chatur citizens' are worth remarking, since these emphasize the paramount relevance of a deeper empirical research. On one hand, solely enumerating citizens in the MOUD's consultations is already assumed as a "transformation of a territorial 'population' into digital citizens" (ibid. 7). Thereafter, 'ordinary citizens' are supposed to "be trained to become smart citizens", in order to "articulate and perform their access to digital space in ways that serve the demands of SCs" (ibid.). Yet, not any random citizen is supposed to be selected for such transformation, but rather CEO elites, as formulated by Datta: "tech-savvy, entrepreneurial and judicious citizens working for and on behalf of state enterprise, innovation and growth". They, too, already exist and require no process of transformation, since they have appropriated the 'smart' identity. In parallel, beyond 'chatur citizens', the majority of Indian citizens already manifest opposite citizenship formations. Accordingly, while 'smart citizenship' intrinsically constitutes an exclusivist category its counter representation, the 'chatur citizen', falls into the same trap. The influence on the politico-economic agenda and infrastructural planning of the city is no longer defended as a Constitutional right of every Indian citizen. Rather "analogous to an urban hacker or a clever programmer", the 'chatur citizen', would need to *somehow* 'gain access for participating in virtual and material spaces of the *future smart city*, thus subverting the normative *subjecthood* of smart citizenship presented by the state' (ibid. 12). Throughout this paper I have focused on arguing that despite futuristic horizons, SC business and policy-making has epistemic, material, and civic consequences for Indian citizens *now,* hence, subaltern and subversive *subjecthoods* to the category of 'smart citizens' already exist. By reclaiming their right to centrality to work and reside close to the SC, as exemplified by slum-dwellers' resistance in Chandigarh, the recognition of struggles, which challenge SCs should not presuppose a 'pirate modernity' (Sundaram 2010) language of 'hacking' since subversive practices and reclamations outside of the *logics and language* of *'smartness'* already represent the *norm*. Moreover, hacking is not only a subaltern practice, but Aadhaar (Khaira, Sethi, and Sathe 2018) and cashless economies (B. Scott 2018) are example of top-down scams. In fact, as repeatedly manifested in interviews across various *bastis* (Dhanas, Maloya, sectors 52 and 25, Khajeri Village, and Col. 4) the "smart" romance flirts much less with slum-dwellers and villagers than it does with the middle-classes aspiring to establish within

Chandigarh's bourgeoisie. For that reason, I find very unrealistic to foresee the former will adapt to the rhetoric of 'smartness', in order to exercise their RTC, anytime soon. Instead of seeking inclusion/identification within, the potential for challenging the exclusivist nature of SCs relies on taking distance from such paradigm. It is safe to generalize, i.e. that besides encountering SCs' publicity only in newspaper or on the radio, the wide majority of interviewees quickly stated that SCs are for the rich. "The rich are literally acting as parasites- said a woman -sucking the poor's blood". Meanwhile municipal workers are considered cheaters. Various interviewees denounced the same abuse: as water meters are introduced (instead of "fetching water through tankers at our own cost"), "the municipality sends us exaggerated water and electricity bills, as high as INR 8000 a month[xviii]." Further, based on decades of experiencing the public sectors' discrimination, the term 'SCs' generated immediate repudiation, which hampered further conversations with the same terminology. Nonetheless, by introducing the topic, a clear line was demarcated between the programs' benefit to "those, who own land, maybe employed as permanent servants" and "those, whose life is restricted to earning a one-time meal to feed themselves". Overall, the inhabitants of *bastis* did not show any interest for a detailed discussion on SCs. In fact, they do not even have the time nor the resources to contest their vernacular translation as 'chatur citizens'. They are simply asking for housing (applications pending for a minimum of 10 years), otherwise not being evicted[xix], and fair services. While bureaucrats in 'planned Chandigarh' are proud of the city's water and electricity coverage, slum-dwellers face electricity cuts for entire days, especially during the summer. The middle-/upper sections might require such energy for cooling down, whereas the minority of slum-dwellers, who were capable of getting an AC are often accused (e.g. on the media or by a Housing Board official) of being rich. Yet amidst today's alarming global warming (Fleming et al. 2018), considering *bastis'* dense infrastructure, not only are its inhabitants *per se* the most vulnerable population (Vijayawada 2018), but moreover under a SCs regime the development of SCADA technologies for energy management are keen to sabotage EWS. Due to the complexity of such systems, an ordinary citizen's hacking act seems almost impossible. Summing up, I have resisted supporting Datta's optimism on an emergent 'chatur citizen', because requiring any further conditions for citizenship *rights* to be recognized, either as 'Chandigarh's modern citizens or India's smart citizenry', is a

trap. At times aesthetic/cultural values, today increasingly cognitive capacities, all these categories of exclusivity are actually a class[xx] camouflage for legitimating privileges and expanding influence. If development policies are to prioritize particular groups, then these should support those, whose RTC struggles are the toughest.

6.3. Stretching contestations: education and other aspirations

Altogether, by posing universalizing lectures such as 'planetary urbanization' (Brenner and Schmid 2013) and 'smarter planet'(Casile 2011) under question, this research has insistently argued that for the sake of inquiring either SCs, the RTC or whichever iconic paradigm of 'the Urban Age', ontological differences 'at the margins' become central since these are capable of *providing or emptying* dominant lectures *of meaning*. Hence, contestations to manifestations of power accumulation, are often nurtured by struggles *at the margins of the city*, which not necessarily point at 'the rural'; although it could very productively do so, as demonstrated by peasantry mobilizations against Dholera - SC (Datta 2015; Sampat 2016a) or most recently by the imposing march of 30,000 farmers from Nashik to Mumbai (Satheesh 2018). Throughout this work, notwithstanding, we have concentrated on *marginalized or in-between* categories, whose RTC is not fully recognized. Daily laborers or women, (gender, too often attached to class), more concretely, can be *present, yet absent*, at the same time, because their work and rights are not fairly recognized. They are regularly excluded from the city's policy-making, and typically both (land is usually inherited through male line) are deprived from owning the land they inhabit or work. The claim for 'azadi' (liberty) of middle-class women in various demonstrations in Chandigarh is a crucial example, because they are not solely asking for access and opportunities but demanding what they consider a right. By way of conclusion, I will sketch further examples of street vendors', artists', women and students' RTC claims, which even though often articulated with different words, such as the accreditation of informal laborers, no timing restrictions for women in university hostels or updating performing art narratives to stories from the working classes, it can be generalized that these actors see themselves as communicating agents. These activists not merely pose pleas to the administration, but above all the former are committed to inform fellows about their rights and motivate them to reclaim such.

Despite the rigid functional distribution of Chandigarh's sectors, whereupon all traders were supposed to be located inside of shops (instead of streets) street vendors, chai-walas, hairdressers, food providers, in general, have resisted various policies ruling the city's infrastructure. In response, middle- and upper-classes acting as 'guardians of the bourgeois city' (Shapiro Anjaria 2009) have attempted to forbid their right to work in the streets. Else street vendors would not be capable of paying a rent, yet the citizens of Chandigarh are particularly harsh to them, as a journalist says:

"*A very cultural specific thing about Chandigarh is that they don't like street vendors, whereas most of cities do, even in spite of class; because if you go to books or oral histories you will hear about street vendors to be part of our heritage. Not here, they're aggressively against being like any other city.*"

Nonetheless, during my research field I did witness plenty of examples, where especially for food, chai, or little shopping items street vendors were surrounded by clients (pic. 18). Unfortunately, due to my language limitations I was not capable of talking to them. However, especially around Sectors 9 and close to the IT Park, the proliferation of food stalls has been allowed to some extent. There has been some tolerance considering that there are virtually no restaurants around the IT Park (note, even if recently planned, also lack recreational areas to walk after lunch, i.e. (pic. 19)). Whereas food options close to Sector 9 are very expensive (clearly above middle-class average[xxi]). With the purpose of regulating street vendors in public areas, in order to protect their rights, in 2014, the Streets Vendors Act passed nationally. Yet, in Chandigarh it has rather been abused for the contrary: entirely getting rid of street vendors in Sectors 17, 19 and 22 (Rana 2017). In consequence, especially Sector 17, which already had experienced a huge loss of visitors, due to the opening of big malls, was entirely empty for some months. When I visited it for the first time in October 2016 it was 'death' as the cited journalist would say. But resistance has been constant. Street vendors, organized in unions, even posed demands to the High Court, as they refused to move (TNN 2018). Yet the pressure of shop keepers, also demonstrating with candles and banners in S17, has been constant, too (Victor 2017; Budhiraja 2018). While discussions about their 'rehabilitation' (note the analogy to the Slum-Free policy) continue, it is clear that the argument for protecting Le Corbusier's master piece from encroachers (Rohtaki 2018a) is no longer sufficient. The novel 'smart hub' rhetoric, however, might satisfy the bourgeois desire to eradicate street vendors, at least in some sectors.

Modern and feudal at the same time, Chandigarh's consumption and patriarchal culture is widely known in the region[xxii]. Popular songs about the City Beautiful's women often make reference to the same street: Geri Route (between sectors 10 and 11). Citing writer Amandeep Sandhu, Aarish Chhabra explains the tradition:

"'Geri' is the feminine of 'Gera', the term used in Punjab for "the farmer going on horseback to survey his farms". Citing Chhabra: The use of the feminine "is to ascribe gentler qualities to it, make it more innocent than its reality While earlier it was a sign of protection and power and vigilance, the act has now become a ritual. Within it, the term encapsulated the political economy of large farms where the owner has many serfs working for him…" Now that owners are separated from lands and moved to cities, changed their steed from horses to SUVs, the necessity has become an empty ritual. You are mistaken if you feel 'geri' in cities is harmless men having some fun – chicken and rum – without harassing women. That is not how women feel…" (2017a, 97).

In parallel, Chhabra tells me about a campaign to rename the route to 'Azadi Street' (2017b). Accordingly, a march called 'Bekhauf Azai' was organized (R. Khanna 2017; Parul 2017). Remarkably, the march took place at midnight, under the slogan of 'reclaiming the city', considering the increase of sexual assaults on women getting public. Even though rape cases take place daily, these were supposedly restricted to the outskirts of the city. For this reason, particularly Vernika's case, the daughter of a high official, who was chased by two guys in the attempt of getting into her car, shook the city. The class intersections of RTC reclamations are highly complex. One of the organizers, i.e., said that "eve-teasing is increasingly happening now, because of people coming from the outside, basically with that sole intention; to hang out, but it has become toxic, normalized." On the other hand, the march and the future name of the street 'azadi' signalize a leftist alignment, which has been censored by the state as *anti-national*. This constitutes a clear political choice, which Chhabra ridicules in the same manner that he accuses GASM and SFS (who also participated in the demonstrations) of "just adding to the noise, because they are not willing to compromise", he adds, "the new left obsessed with militating against the elite, when they're elite themselves". Yet particularly in terms of gender politics and fighting the privatization of the university, the continuous work of SFS has been translated in its first election and, more importantly, the first female president in PU. Amaan (also organizer of the march, interviewed by Chhabra above) was the first female candidate in the university. She argues the relevance of such institution for women, who gain some freedom from patriarchy while studying, yet during their breaks or after they graduate, they are pressurized to marry[xxiii].

Furthermore, the work of young and senior artists to respectively "bring poetry to the city open spaces, as well as to slums", and, on the other hand, to decentralize theatre presentation from city auditoriums to *bastis,* reflects the activist's dedication to fight the wide inequality in education and cultural spaces. They organize workshops with women and children, or bring theatre groups (to Dhanas, e.g., a 'rehabilitation colony'), in order to work with schools. "Theatre is conceived as leisure for the middle-/upper-classes of Chandigarh. It starkly avoids talking about caste and when dealing with gender issues, its rather pseudofeminism is not liberating, but a consumerist ideology of how women are supposed to be seen." This is why working in the *bastis*, with 'the common man', is of paramount relevance; they bring a substantially different perspective from caste, labor, migration, demolitions, and religion. Remarkably, clashes between *hindutva* and *progressive* streams are not limited to theatre, but significantly in education institutions. PU's SFS, i.e., stands as the strongest opposition to RSS/ABVP's influence rapidly expanding elsewhere (Arshi 2018; Mukherjee 2018). Pali, Amaan, among other activists, who earlier concentrated on politicizing slum-dwellers' housing rights (GASM) now majorly dedicate to regional initiatives, such as 'Mashaal' the first *left* magazine in Punjabi.

Intrinsically attached to privileges or restrictions on the exercise of the RTC, education has globally been "implicated in solidifying the urban neoliberal agenda materially and discursively" (Lipman 2011). It entails a key space in the larger struggle for the RTC. Hence, in India, even smaller towns, such as Kota (Puri 2015), have centralized educational coaching in their economic agenda. In highly competitive cities like Chandigarh, the education field is also highly stratified, ranging from advocacy for basic rights, upward aspirations or for securing a positional advantage, considering that even government schools are 'much better than many private schools'[xxiv]. Following Chhabra (2017, 21), whence "the moneyed elite set the standards, the 'EWS types' are at best patronized, never included." Further, the establishment of IT skills as central currency for social mobility is doubtlessly connected to globalized digital neoliberalism, which- besides the SCM -in India it is manifested by the significant expansion of Higher Education crediting institutions. As formulated by Radhika Menon (2017) "degrees and qualification are vital credentials" for surviving in the current economic model. For this reason, various slum-dwellers,

expressed their refusal to demolitions or 'rehabilitation', since they emphasized the relevance of their children's capability to continue in schooling in their living the proximity. "The urban fringe offers a means to escape social hierarchies, caste rigidities and patriarchal restrictions", as argued by Geeta Nambissan (2017). Yet, in parallel, social segregation is reflected within government schools, which are "overcrowded, dilapidated and are predominantly accessed by the poor and disadvantaged groups". The desperate strive for socio-economic mobility amidst highly unequal and insufficient education infrastructure has nurtured the rising "shadow economy" market, wherein very low-quality, yet private education targets low-income groups. But for Geeta there is still hope "the Right to Education (2009) and the Right to Information Acts have encouraged people to approach the courts" signalizing that gradually "a new sense of urban community emerges" (ibid.).

Meanwhile, finding a job capable of coping with the costs of living in Chandigarh is a highly pressing issue for the majority of young citizens I talked to. In addition to the 'great night life, great crowd' narrative in Chandigarh, work opportunities in the area, as well as renown universities are powerful aspirations[xxv] magnets. However, it is also feasible that the expansion of ICTs will provoke further labour precariousness[xxvi]. Following Jyoti, 'for generations they have been told, becoming engineers they will earn a good living'. Nonetheless, as the credential economy rises and the labor market is incapable of expanding/diversifying, those RTC reclamations (even more legitimated through education certificates) 'will grow a bubble of anger about to burst'.[xxvii] Precisely such revolts might be hampered by SCs, Hindutva politics, and an extremely abusive state determined to demonize dissent (R. Kumar 2018). In parallel Aarish reflects:

"In the rich there's always the fear that the poor will someday wake up… Probably in my imagination if I'd be rich I'd know I fucked up somewhere. But there's no need for a strategy, because that's built into the system, they don't need it."

Summarizing, beyond surveillance and privacy rights, which for many SCs' critics suppose the main source of concerns, this study has explored a variety of rights (education, gender, work, yet in particular the rights to housing and land) that are potentially endangered by SC policies. Like past utopian experiments, more than epistemology, what is principally at stake in SCs are civic control and material gains.

7. References

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8. Appendix

[i] Praveen: "*everyone living in sectors 2 to 11 has huge one-acre houses. And they have all the money and the political power to get everything they want. Most of them are not even from Chandigarh. So, for instance, we live in Sector 11, my wife's father used to be a commissioner. All right, big power; his father was chief justice of Punjab, brother, Chief Justice of Haryana Court, many brothers, they were all Indian Administrative Services, which means they control the show. On my left (neighbor) is an ex-minister, MLA from Punjab, power. Next to him is a retired director general from police, power. On this side there's a person who has managed to come in here but with the money, but still he's got enough connections in the market. I mean, whatever, you have this entire line full of power for generations. So, they don't care. Whatever you want, you get.*"

[ii] Chief Architect*: "one of the highest in the region. We have been auctioning our properties for about five decades now, so that gives us the best market value".*

[iii] With the pace of time, citizens born and bred in the city engage even harsher in denying rural connections. According to a journalist, Chandigarh offers the *best of both worlds,* youngsters keep driving jeeps, but prefer relating to IT than to agriculture*: "This was the manifestation of every feudal lords' dream: you could be an English sahib in Chandigarh. You could wear a tie and jacket, while you go back to your kurta pajama, then you go to your fields and live both lives together, absolutely smoothly. You could have a coffee here, then go to the village and order your servant to cook chicken for you. Seeing their habits could coexist, they started coming here. A lot of them got plots here, big spaces to build houses, because the ruling class was also Jat. For instance, the guy who's credited for building Chandigarh, his family owns the theatre, he was in Congress and his grandson is in BJP. But they travel across parties, because they're Jats, they rule anyways. So, 62% of Punjab is Sikh, 18% is Jat, but it's not that Sikhs rule Punjab, it's Jats within the Sikhs.*

[iv] Praveen: *nobody knows what to do with the SC… our administrators are totally out of touch with reality, but they don't care. The Indian Civil Service is a colonial legacy to control natives, and they have been trained in such a way that they don't give a damn. They say, 'let's get an airport, or a stadium, or horse racecourse or a super fancy railway station', which probably they don't even use, but they get the money, and they sanction it. In other states politicians have to be re-elected, for that they have to do some work for the poor, etc., so the politician is answerable to the people, bureaucracy is not. On paper Chandigarh does everything that's right, because it's a totally bureaucratic place.*

[v] *"There are people here that haven't been to sector 40, sector 42, which is not slums, but they haven't been there, their whole life is here, so the class structure militates against newcomers, like any class or caste system.* Me: *but they might not be necessarily newcomers, they might have been there for decades as well...* J: *no, that's a class system that exists within the city, the ones that come from outside face a very strange resistance, even from sector 42's people… Now the generation of 25-30 years old (born and bred here) have become vocal, they now say they've hardly ever been to their hometown. Everyone used to have a hometown before, because Chandigarh has been built of nothing. That generation resists outsiders from any kind, there's a clear Chandigarh class. The actual ones enjoying the Chandigarh life live in the northern sectors, the southern ones are just trying to identify with the city while living in the same conditions, slightly middle-/upper-class. So they're very strange people, economically they earn the same than I do or maybe even less, physically they live in a space which is not prime in Chandigarh, culturally they're Punjabis and they cannot afford to go to the kind of places, the clubs which are elite culture. What they're militating against is that they're neither 'me' nor 'them'. There's a constant state of brutal competition with themselves, wanting to be someone else, a clear manifestation of what we disrespectfully call 'yuppies'. They want to delink themselves from Punjabi culture… and they're very right in doing so, because it's a very crude culture. But crude can also work, because it can be cute, rural can also be cute, but the aggression is what they disown, if you notice."*

[vi]Housing Board official: *"nobody will be happy with a small house; they want a bigger house. Only thing is they should be happy, because they have moved from a slum to a house, which has got supporting infrastructure: water supply, electricity, light, and ventilation.* Me: *have you talked to any family?* HB: *No, absolutely no direct contact. See their requirements will vary from person to person. I don't think they are going to be a right judge of what they want. They want the world; the only thing is we can offer them whatever we can offer. See whatever the land is made available to me and whatever I can do within that so my/that land will be optimally utilized, and the beneficiaries rises to the maximum number of people. So, there is a point I cannot go beyond."*

[vii] Resident of a basti: *"It's a private company affair. If my house/flat costs some 2.5 lakh INR, then this amount has to be divided in 20 years and paid monthly. Each 5 years the amount of the installment will increase and eventually after 20 years the house will belong to its dweller. So, you will have to protest for it. They are constructing these houses, getting rent, but eventually making the rich, richer."* Pali: *"under private-public partnerships, half of the amount is funded by the government, and the rest by private players. In China as well, private owners construct buildings and then rent it out.* R: *But these houses will not sustain 20 years. The walls and roof have started decaying now only. People living on top floors face water-dripping issues during the rain season."*

[viii] Praveen: *"I said, 'why can't we just designate a piece of land and call it an IT city?' Unless you designate areas for certain jobs you won't get it. So immediately when you set up an IT area the industry comes, because IT enables resources. Then we thought, nowadays you call things like this, you have a Food Park, SEZ, along with it we wanted to have a Film City. The industrial area is now called Industrial Campus Park. Rules changed, which means that now you can even have hotels… SCs, they started figuring out what it should be. Nobody knows as yet. It is just a listing. Most government organizations, to be more precise the MC, they are the ones who are maintaining the city, so basically, they're trying to find ways and means to take money from the center, 1000 crores. So, what officials try to do, as soon as they get the money, he wants to put it here (makes sign: pocket). That is where the trouble starts… What happens is that different pressure groups are trying to snatch the SC, having the bottom gold. A Spanish/Canadian company comes to Chandigarh trying to take money from the side of metro… You have to do something no one knows the price of.* (Example of sweeping machine - such special products cannot be bought by anyone, but the state). *So, you'll have a laser show in sector 17 plaza, the machine costs 5 lakhs, I will spend 500 lakhs, that's the way to do it. Is it directly useful (like internet)? No. Next example; promoting project as as parking lot, then using it for a hotel. So, who gets the money? Some chap sanctioned it in the Municipal Chorporation ('chor' means thief). It is shown as a public utility, but actually used by somebody private; everybody is trying their business grows to take more money into their pocket. So, IT companies from Bangalore get together and say: 'ok, here's one lakh each, so let's all go and have a party in Chandigarh and invite the administration'. These guys come and organize some sort of SC conference or summit, and invite 5 jokers from here, 5 jokers from there. Suddenly you end up having 200 people there and each of these guys gives a speech and everybody feels good, but their interest is: graving a share of the pie. So, then I invite to the mayors of 10-20 cities. They take them to Sweden, e.g., permanently spoiled them and then I show them the factory presentation. These guys are impressed. Then I send them back with the gift and probably even invite their wives: now I have 5 mayors in my pocket. What is the mayors' job? - To buy my machine.* Me*: EU prepares the ground for businesses with discourses of ecological sustainability, energy, stuff like, and that is the way to legitimate to do business with people.* P: *especially Germany is thick in the CII. You scratch my back I'll scratch your back.*

[ix] Aarish Chhabra (2017, 37): Sector 17's fate was sealed the minute a mall big enough came up. (…) One thing everyone agrees on, let's use the vast space – the plaza – for something that sets the market apart. Open-air cafes, fancy flea markets, seasonal fairs, licensed vendors, gazebos for people to sit and chat, and probably some more trees to counter Corbusier's sizzling concrete! Ideas float around like a mild breeze that never leaves Chandigarh. But the obsession with a so-called heritage has meant Chandigarh's heart has grown older than the city is. The minute the government plans to shift the parking space to a new underground lot, there are protests. The minute there are talks of allowing vendors, the elite of the city is worried about this 'Paris-like' city losing its sheen. The minute someone talks of the new in a city that claims to a symbol of modernity, the ghost of Corbusier pops out of one of the many imposing, borderline-ugly behemoths that he built.

[x] Chhabra (2017, 110,111): Don't throw that banana peel on the road! Wait until you spot a garbage bin. Put it in there. And feel good about yourself. That's the essence of the drive called Swachh Bhrat as we, the people, led by the Grand Saviour of the Nation, begin this journey towards Clean India. It's a different matter how the prime concern after the demolition of a slum is the non-availability of maids for a few days. This is about something severe, something more uncomfortable. This is about life and death. This is about Satbir Singh and his ilk. Satbir, 35, was a sanitation worker of the Chandigarh public health department. He died after accidentally inhaling toxic gas rising from a manhole near Lake Club late in the August of 2014. He left behind his wife and four children. The family would still have been in celebratory mood, for it was just two months ago that Satbir had got a regular job after remaining on contract with an outsourcing agency. It wasn't to last. As is the tradition in our large-hearted country, it would be seen as God's will. But this death was avoidable. If only man had safety gear, like a basic gas mask. 109 (…) Satbir's death came barely two months after the fire in Sector 17 that killed two firefighters. But no heroism was attributed to him, even as the firemen were rightly seen as martyred while carrying out a life-threatening public duty. No cries of bravery awards are being heard. No one is saluting Satbir on Facebook either. He was a sweeper, not even a trained sewer man assigned for the job that he was doing. There is no group insurance policy for these workers, so each case has to go through repeated requests, patronizing officials and the ever-present red tape. Cleaning filth is no hero's job. In all, there are around 2,700 sweepers for Chandigarh, of which nearly 1,500 are under outsourcing contractors. There are just 73 technical sanitation employees, including 53 sewer men. Most work under the aegis of the municipal corporation, and some under the administration [earning between 8,600 to 15,000 per month]. (…) It's not surprising that the Safai Karmachari Andolan, a national movement for sanitation workers, has slammed the Clean India campaign strategy, saying that if Prime Minister Narendra Modi was serious indeed, "he would have begun by improving the lot of sanitation workers, who have a life expectancy of only 52 years" as against an all-India average of 66. "The Swachh Bharat Abhiyan is a way for the middle-class India to get over its guilt," Wilson Bezwada, national board member of the Andolan has said. He's right. For now, the ruling class remains distant as ever, and more didactic than ever. The 'heritage' manhole covers of Chandigarh sell for lakhs abroad, further underlining a cruel irony. And we feel better by putting that banana peel into the nearest garbage bin. Let someone else deal with the serious shit."

[xi]Researcher from IISER-Mohali: "*If a woman wouldn't come to cook and clean in my house, it would not be possible for me to work. Autorikshaw, restaurant employees, they're present anywhere in the city! But for us, they are absent… For me the biggest danger is that they (policy makers) speak of the welfare of the city and city residents, and at the same time are able to do whatever they want to and have been doing for ages (like demolitions, not taking poor into account when making policies) as if, for whom are you making this city 'smart'?? Who needs SCs? This language is very dangerous, now they're giving us some data, but if you look at ground and go and speak to the poor of this city, then there is no change, because bureaucratic processes are same, right? Institutions are the same; I mean how can you talk about change in such a superficial level?? Nothing is going to happen, and nothing is happening…It's really hollow!*

[xii] Chief Architect*: "It was a democratic exercise, have you gone through the program? -* Me: *yeah, definitely. - So that says that you have to go through the aspirations of people and then we have to build our agenda. So, if you start comparing parametrically on all aspects of the city we are pretty ahead, most of them, because there were at a different socio-cultural level and the political situation… We are the capital of two states, which brings a lot of priority to doing works here.* Me: *certainly, Chandigarh highlights meetings with RWAs, consultations… how can I have access to see them…* CA: *what all happened there? I think in the MC, they have hired agencies, especially for the social media and public interaction situations.* Me: *any issues to access money because of demonitisation?* CA: *no, it is not that we do not have the capacity to handle the money; we haven't had the capacity to hire a consultant for the last 7 months.*

[xiii] *Praveen: "Either you collect or cook up data. In Chandigarh they have their own people on Facebook. See most data is a farce. That is a fact of life. The Municipal Chorporation, they're here just to grab money. Surveys come from the heads of departments, nine in total.* Me: *how can I prove that?* P: *So, it's a crazy situation. When they do a thing like this, they hire a consultant, and all the blame can be passed on to him. In Chandigarh it's the same consultancy working for Amritsar and Ludhiana. I don't know the name but it's from Gurgaon, basically somebody with political connections. The administration is inaccessible, zero e-governance/e-democracy* (even if Praveen participated from the SC's app*). You have a consumer handbook, roads, parks, elections, Chandigarh Administration directory with personality names, all that junk.* Me: *this is the irony of a SCs' 'transparency', online national SCs page puts the UT Home Secretary's phone number as well, is he going to pick up the phone?* P: *Of course not.*

[xiv] CRRiD researcher: *"if they organize meetings regularly and institutional mechanisms for participation evolve, then that can help, but they don't want to do it. "*

[xv] Kalia (1987, 43) In the Plan Voisin for Paris, the place of each individual in the great urban hierarchy is spatially coded. The business elite (*industrials)* will live in high-rise apartments at the core, while the subaltern classes will have small garden apartments at the periphery. One's status can be directly read from one's distance from the center. But, like everyone in a well-run factory, everyone in the city will have the "collective pride" of a team of workers producing a perfect product. "The worker who does only a part of the job understands the role of his labor; the machines that cover the floor of the factory are examples to him of power and clarity, and *make him part of a work of perfection to which his simple spirit never dared to aspire*." Just as Le Corbusier was perhaps most famous for asserting that "the home is a machine for living," so he thought of the planned city as a large, efficient machine with many closely calibrated parts. He assumed, therefore, that the citizens of his city would accept, with pride, their own modest role in a noble, scientifically planned urban machine.

[xvi] Kalia (ibid.): Chandigarh was the dividing line between the past and the present. It is no accident that there are no statues commemorating India's past. (…) It was meant to be something beyond a new state capital. But it lacks culture. It lacks the excitement of Indian streets. It lacks bustling, colourful bazaars. It lacks the noise and din of Lahore. It lacks the intimacy of Delhi. It is a stay-at-home city. It is not Indian. It is the anticity. With all shortcomings though, Chandigarh provokes the interest of people far beyond the borders of India."

[xvii] Kalia (ibid. 145): "The government naively believed that the creation of a capital would resolve other social, economic, and political problems of the state, but there was no study on the impact on the region as a whole. Chandigarh is a designed city, not a planned one".

[xviii] Resident of a *basti: "It is a flawed calculation, basically they take reading from the meter, but the price we paid is not analogous to the amount of water we use.* Me: *Where do you think this extra money you have been charged eventually go?* R: *How would we know? It must be going to government's account only. We people are uneducated or semi-literate. The people we deal with are not only educated, but they are doing it for years. So whatever they do, they do it very sharply."*

[xix] Ankit: *"I don't think they're continuing their fight as such, because it's more like a psychological war right now between the administration and the residents. They've been given some homes in the rehab colonies, then they've started demolishing those people's houses, not the whole colony. So, people who don't have proper places get*

stressed. Between one-third and half of the population (3 lakhs) gets housing, so these are demolished and you're psychologically dismantled. One-lakh households should be constructed, but they are not planning to do more. Moliyagra already stopped because of funding."

[xx] Amaan poses question. "*In case elected, will there still be demolitions or is she going to stop that"* A man raises to interrupt, he rather changes the question to: *"tell us when all slums will be demolished so this city can finally be peaceful and beautiful."* A: *"So how can we look for alliances in an environment, where people is openly advocating for demolitions?* M: *"even more complicated when people are pro-slum–free. Supposedly there is hope but they get uncomfortable, when asked if rehabilitation could be in the same space of demolishment."*

[xxi]Pali: *"See, now even the middle-classes don't know the disadvantages of this smart city plan, so till then they are the supporters of this, because in comparison to other countries they want more advancement. But in the long run the parking fee is going to be high, the electricity, energy and even basic food will be more costly for them. The administration is abolishing the street-vendors, which are a cheap source of food for many citizens, and when they are not allowed then the people will have to feed themselves from Dominos, McD, KFC etc. They are very costly and till then they would also establish their monopoly in their competitive market. Infrastructure and services are going to be improved and still they are improving. But the mechanization of services is also spreading more and more unemployment, especially in a kind of country that has more than 1 billion population."*

[xxii] Amaan: *The notion of Punjab being very rich probably comes from the lack of a reading culture. Reminiscence of feudalism will always remain in Punjab. The glorification of weapons, mustache, branding clothes, and objectified women is characteristic of Punjabi songs.*

[xxiii] Amaan: *"Research is the only chance to not marry, yet. However, in university there are still plenty of limitations for women, whose entries to the hostels are controlled. Still, at least this gives some credentials to leave home, talk to different people, and formulate a strategy to pursue inquiries of one's own. Boys have one or two years of relaxation after they graduate, women don't. That's why you encounter many of men socializing in PU, they're ex-students… When PU attempts to arbitrarily multiply the fee, they are not cutting funds like JNU, in order to destroy a culture, but increasing costs assures there will always be people, who want to get inside. So, they are actually changing or confirming an elitist culture… Women in powerful positions are immediately seen as feminist, hurried to marry soon, because otherwise it will be hard to find a man, who is more educated. If a man is a bureaucrat, for example, the woman has to be a schoolteacher.*

[xxiv] Aarish*: "the big gulf between Chandigarh and the rest is that government schools are much better than private schools elsewhere in India. So even the worst schools have 'smart' classrooms. They have a projector, a TV, digital blackboard and stuff like that. That could have happened much earlier, but anyways what's the government doing about SC? Nothing, they're putting blue boards in place of green boards. At least in Chandigarh I haven't seen anything else. They're getting money under new heads… "*

[xxv] In his book Chhabra writes: "In this city if over 11 lakh – 12lakh if we count Panchkula and Mohali, even more if the villages-turned-suburbs like Mullanpur are counted in – it is hard to meet a 'Chandigarh native' other than hyperbole-infected yuppies who proudly hide where their parents actually come from, or simply refuse to engage in a thoughtful conversation about home and homesickness as they are too busy being awesome instead. (…) But this writer is part of the overlooked majority, the young aspirant from Punjab who is too much of an insider to find a place in such a series, yet the quintessential outsider who is driven by the ambition that defines Chandigarh. An island in terms of its clean streets, non-savage police force, green cover and genial vibe, the city is the hub of opportunity for those escaping the clutches of drugs and desperation that continue to deprave Punjab. There was a different hope this time. Of shifting into a flat in Zirakpur, where thousands who can't afford Chandigarh real estate have bought houses with the hope of finding a home again…" (2017, 18).

[xxvi] Pali: "*There are many platforms on paper but not applicable to some special category of people i.e., workers. The middle-class is excited about e-governance but the working class has not so much facility of smart phones, and illiteracy is also there, so they are not the beneficiaries of the e-governance. Rather e-governance would replace their jobs in many aspects. More e-governance means less number of workers required for governance."* Chabbra: "*economy of outsourcing jobs even in the government, they're diminishing posts gradually… so e-governance helps you not to interact with the system, you're sick of the system (distrust), but participation of the people in building those systems decreases, people are no longer the system, the system is artificial intelligence… It also creates a joblessness that is irritating after a while."*

[xxvii] Me: *"bubble of anger might exploit soon, due to certificates acquisition but no job, as Jyoti said..."* Amaan*: "I hope that happens, because to what extent will they tolerate? Even if they earn less, they want to get to Chandigarh, Mohali, Panchkula… not back to their places. Especially since it is so hard to find jobs, I think the anger is inside, it is bubbling, but it needs to have a good leadership as well to have a good direction… It should culminate in a way that people have something in their hand, so not simply protest and that was pretty much it."*

9. Pictures

1.



Source: Casile (2011): IBM, for a Smarter Planet



Source: Frost & Sullivan (2015): Strategic Opportunity Analysis of the Global Smart City

Source: MOUD: (2015): Smart Cities: Mission Statement & Guidelines

2.



Source: Casile (2011): IBM, for a Smarter Planet



Source: Frost & Sullivan (2015): Strategic Opportunity Analysis of the Global Smart City



Source: MOUD: (2015): Smart Cities: Mission Statement & Guidelines

3.

Figure 5: User Data on Proprietary Platforms — An Evolution?



Source: Author.

Source: Taylor (2016): User Data on Proprietary Platforms – An Evolution? P.16)

4.

Comparative Dimensions	*Smart Cities* Approach	*Smart Citizenship* Approach
Mode of urban governance	ICT-linked interests are closely involved in lobbying, marketing, consulting / advising, public relations and project advocacy typically for 'world class' megaprojects or infrastructures	ICT-linked interests negotiate with civic leadership in a transparent public environment through 'client relations' and local needs are addressed through work with / for community and civic groups
Mode of civic engagement	ICT-linked civic engagement involves forms of citizen tokenism, public relations, marketing and / or polling exercises; civic priorities are shaped by centralized or tightly managed political power plays	ICT-linked civic engagement is shaped by decentralized citizen-driven forums and discourses, including the steering of civic-cyber initiatives (which are nurtured through existing face-to-face engagement processes and institutions)
Mode of urban infrastructure provisioning	ICT urban infrastructure provisions are shaped by private-public partnerships (core risks assumed by the public sector) as well as with premium network services for exclusive enclaves, special economic zones, showcase projects; and 'trickle down' effects	ICT urban infrastructure provisions are shaped by principles of universal and affordable 'access for all', digital openness and the Internet is treated as a 'public utility' with support for: open access, net neutrality, civic privacy and ICT-related education, training and digital libraries, etc.
Mode of managing civic space	ICT provisions and access are associated with accepted 'losses of privacy' (personal and public sphere) due to justified needs for corporate tracking / profiling and state infringements on digital privacy due to security concerns	ICT provisions and access are publicly debated including how novel technological advances shapes rights to: free speech, association, civic dissent, information privacy / tracking and protection against state or private corporate / commercial intrusions
Mode of managing urban livability	ICTs are employed for environmental innovations, efficiency and profit-making tools or platforms; sustainability or livability advances are an additional bonus from efficiency, and profit-making priorities	ICTs are employed with a focus on supporting existing local environmental work and quality of life issues, including: eco-justice, air quality, water, soil, light or noise pollution (along with 'global-local' issues like climate change)

Source: Shadoway and Shekhar (2014): (Re)Prioritizing Citizens in Smart Cities Governance

5.

Source: author, March 2018

6.



Source: Chandigarh Administration



Source: Christian Wild

7.

Source: author, March 2017 – Sector 2

8.

Source: author, March 2017– Dhanas, rehabilitation colony

9.

Source: GASM, February 2014

Source: GASM, March 2014

10. Source: GASM, December 2014

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Source: author, March 2017

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

Source: Rajya Sabha(2016) PM Modi on demonetisation survey: 93 % back Govt move

14.

Source: author, March 2018

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Source: author, March 2018

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Source: author, March 2018

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Source: author, October 2016

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Source: author, March 2018

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

Source: author, March 2018